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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the political behavior of Latino millennials when
compared to non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials. While most studies paint
millennials as a monolithic generational cohort, this dissertation asks the following
questions: Are Latino millennials distinct in their political behavior from millennials of
other racial and ethnic groups? Do Latino millennials vary in their group identity from
older Latinos, if yes does this create different patterns in their political participation when
compared to other racial and ethnic millennials? The results show that linked fate varies
among millennials and that Latino millennials identities are distinct from non-Latino
millennials. Additionally, linked fate also varies across generations of Latinos. Due to
their distinct identities, Latino millennials are impacted to participate in politics by their
unique identities when compared to non-Latino millennials and Latin non-millennials.
Overall, millennials vary due to their racial and ethnic identities and participate in politics
differently as a result.
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Chapter 1
Millennials and Politics
INTRODUCTION
When the word millennial is used in the political context, the first thing that
comes to mind for many is that millennials do not care about politics. Current newspapers
use headlines such as, “When It Comes to Politics, Do Millennials Care About
Anything?” from The Atlantic, or “How Millennials Could Kill Politics as We Know It If
They Cared To” from CNN (CNN 2018; Atlantic n.d.). These are just two articles
demonstrating how the media portrays the millennial generation and their involvement in
politics. The focus of these articles is the apathetic nature of millennials toward electoral
politics. Specifically, highlighted in these articles are the low turnout rates of millennials
and their low levels of trust in government. Among these two areas of focus are also their
left leaning political ideology and their love for political activism (CNN 2018). The most
frequent way millennials are engaging in political activism is through social media. For
instance, CNN (2018) describes how millennials have brought the attention of several
movements to the forefront of politics, though the use of hashtags on social networking
sites, some which are #BlackLivesMatter, #MeToo, among many others. The behavior of
millennials toward politics is something that can forever shift the political landscape of
the United States, especially, since digital technology is here to stay and will only
continue to evolve from here.
However, the most pressing concern among political scientists and political elites
is the lack of voter turnout among the largest generation in America. The millennial
generation is composed of 80 million individuals who were born between 1981 and 1998
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(Fry 2016; Hayes-Bautista 2017). From the 80 million millennials in the U.S., 62 million
millennials are considered eligible voters (Fry 2018). This is a large voting bloc that
surpasses generation X and baby boomers (Fry 2018). One recent political article
examines how important wooing the millennial generation is for Democratic Party (PBS
2019). Getting the millennial vote for Democrats is not only important for a change in
presidential leadership, but it is essential for a change in federal, state, and local politics.
Many argue that millennials voted at lower rates in the 2018 midterm elections, but what
is clear is that there was a jump of 10 points from the 2014 midterm elections to 2018
(PBS 2018). This jump in turnout among millennials shows that this generation will vote
if given the right candidates and policy positions. In the 2018 midterm elections, there
were several millennial candidates who ran for congress, such as Alexandria Ocasio
Cortez, a millennial herself, who effectively used Twitter for her campaign and ran on a
more progressive platform catering to millennial policy issues (PBS 2018). It is these
events that motivate more research on the millennial generation because this generation
does not only have the right to vote but will be the next generation of political elites. The
factors that shape the political involvement of the millennial generation are essential for
our continued understanding of American politics, but also for our understanding of
applied politics.
This generation has a unique generational political identity; as a result of both
formative events and trends (Rouse and Ross 2018). Some of the formative events
shaping the generational identity of millennials are: “the Clinton impeachment,
Columbine shooting, 9/11 terrorist attacks, war on terror, Hurricane Katrina, and the
Great Recession” (Rouse and Ross 2018, p. 28-29). As for the formative trends
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influencing the development of the millennial generational identity are: “increasing
[racial and ethnic] diversity of this generation, proliferation of digital technologies,
globalization of the world economy, unemployment and underemployment, and
detachment from traditional institutions” (Rouse and Ross 2018, p.29). These events are
distinct from what generation X and baby boomers experienced and result in the unique
millennial identity.
One of the differences characterizing millennials is their racial and ethnic
diversity. Figure 1.1 shows the racial and ethnic composition of each generation. The
silent and baby boomer generations both have a greater percentage of whites when
compared to the millennial generation. Contrary to baby boomers and the silent
generation, millennials have a good distribution of racial and ethnic groups, but Blacks
and Latinos make up a large portion of this generation.
One of the defining characteristics of millennials is their racial and ethnic
diversity. Figure 1.1 displays the racial and ethnic composition of each generation. The
silent and baby boomer generations both have a greater percentage of whites when
compared to the millennial generation. When combining the baby boomer and the silent
generation, both of these generations make up 49 percent of whites. When comparing the
percentage of whites from both the silent and baby boomer generation to the percentage
of Blacks in the baby boomer and silent generation Blacks account for 37 percent of both
generations. As for the percentage of Asians and Latinos who are from the baby boomer
and the silent generation 36 percent are Asian and 27 percent are Latino. Contrary to
baby boomers and the silent generation, millennials have a good distribution of racial and
ethnic groups. With whites making up 25 percent of millennials when compared to
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Asians who are 31 percent of millennials, Blacks who are 34 percent of millennials and
Latinos who are 38 percent of millennials. Blacks and Latinos make up a large portion of
this generation.
Figure 1.1: U.S. Generations by Race and Ethnicity
Among Adults
White

25

Asian

25

33

31

Black

34

Latino

31

26

10

28

28

9

38
0%

32

20%
Millennial

16

40%
Gen X

21

60%
Boomer

80%

6
100%

Silent

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of the 2014 American Community Survey
(IPUMS)
Note: Whites, Black and Asians only include those who are single race and not Latino.
Latinos include any race.

The ethnic and racial diversity of millennials is crucial for American politics, for
several reasons, 1) Latinos and Asians will compose a larger share of this generation, and
2) racial diversity will serve as a formative live experience because millennials will be
socialized in an era of racial and ethnic diversity (Rouse and Ross 2018). For the second
point, Latinos and Asians have some of the lowest rates of voter turnout in the electorate
during the 2018 midterm elections (Census 2019). The low turnout rates among two of
the fastest growing populations of America is important to study to learn why these two
groups vote and to ensure adequate political representation. Research finds that
millennials are becoming more tolerant of other racial and ethnic groups when compared
to other generations. This racial tolerance should not be confused with millennials living
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in a colorblind society, but rather shows how millennials views regarding race are
shifting. For instance, Rouse and Ross (2018) attest that millennials are not a monolithic
group because of their racial and ethnic backgrounds and that millennials are well aware
of the racial injustices in society, with millennials from racial and ethnic backgrounds
noting that Blacks and Latinos are more likely to say the justice system is biased toward
racial and ethnic groups and whites say the same to a lesser degree. This racial diversity
among millennials is imperative to understand because millennials unique political
beliefs sheds light into how race impacts American politics in contemporary society.
Contribution
From what was uncovered in the data analysis among millennials and nonmillennials by race and ethnicity, the main contribution of this study is to build on the
scant literature on generational cohorts and political behavior. Specifically, there is an
analysis of 1) what predicts linked fate for millennials and non-millennial, 2) the role of
linked fate on political participation for millennials and non-millennials, and 3) an
assessment of online political participation among millennials and non-millennials.
Through the expansion of these research areas, there is a comprehensive analysis of
millennials and non-millennials.
However, the most important contribution of this study lies in comparing Latino
millennials to non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials for a complete
assessment of whether millennials are indeed a monolithic generational cohort and adds
to our knowledge Latino political participation across generations. Examining Latinos is
necessary as this group is highly sought after by political elites and because of the unique
characteristics of Latinos. When taking a closer look at Latinos internally, there are
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interesting characteristics with regards to shifts among Latinos. Figure 1.2 illustrates the
characteristics of Latinos by nativity and generational cohort. From this figure it can be
inferred that Latino millennials are more likely to be U.S. born when compared to
previous generations who tend to have a larger share of foreign-born individuals. These
shifts in the characteristics between younger and older Latinos makes this group an
interesting population to study. Because of the differences among Latinos by generations,
this study focuses on examining whether millennials are indeed a monolithic generational
cohort and whether Latino millennials are distinct from non-Latino millennials and
Latino non-millennials.
Figure 1.2: U.S. Latino Characteristics by Generation
Latinos Adults
Foreign

28

US Born

39
51

0%

20%
Millennial

26
26

40%
Gen X

60%
Boomer

7
17

80%

6
100%

Silent

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of the 2014 American Community Survey
(IPUMS)
Theoretical Perspective
The overarching theory focuses on racial identity and digital media use as
explanations for why millennials are distinct as a generation and why millennials differ
from non-millennials. First, due to different factors shaping racial and ethnic identities
among millennials, I argue that Latino millennials will have a distinct ethnic identity
from non-Latino millennials, which will lead to differences in political behavior among
millennials. Latino millennials will vary in their ethnic identity as result of the anti-
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immigrant political climate that has been perpetuated by political elites, the media, and
American society overtime and that reached a boiling point during the 2016 presidential
election. The way Latinos are portrayed by political elites and the media led Americans
to view Latinos as undocumented immigrants or illegals, when many Latino millennials
are U.S. born (Perez 2015; Chavez 2013; Krogstad et al. 2016). This rhetoric creates a
stereotype of Latinos that expands to those who are U.S. born and have been in the U.S.
for generations (Flores-Gonzalez 2017). The consistent attack from President Trump on
deporting Latinos or illegals, as well as building a wall, was part of his 2016 presidential
campaign and is part of his political agenda. This rhetoric is used as a means to racialize
Latinos as immigrants.
Based on these consistent attacks on Latinos as a whole, I argue Latino
millennials will feel that their group is threatened, and this should serve as a motivator to
heighten their sense of linked fate. Linked fate is defined as believing that one’s
individual fates are tied to those of your own racial group. Because of this, individuals
with linked fate are more likely to engage in political decisions that benefit their group
(Dawson 1994). Latino millennials ethnic identity, I argue, is shaped by a hostile antiLatino political climate when compared to non-Latino millennials and is heightened by
excess media exposure this will motivate Latino millennials political participation. Based
on differences in ethnic and racial identity, I argue that millennials are not a monolithic
generational cohort and vary due to their groups individual ethnic and racial identities.
Secondly, digital media and technology use is a defining characteristic of the
millennial generation and serves as an important distinguishing factor between
millennials and non-millennials (Rouse and Ross 2018). For instance, 89% of millennials
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use social media sites, such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram compared to 73% of
Generation X, 54% young baby boomers, 45% of older baby boomers, and 29% of the
Silent Generation (Rainie and Perrin 2016). Additionally, more millennials use
smartphones than non-millennials (Rainie and Perrin 2016). The percentage of
millennials who own a smartphone is 88% when compared to 77% of Generation X and
59% of baby boomers who own a smartphone (Rainie and Perrin 2016). Given the
increase in usage of smartphones among millennials than non-millennials, millennials
should be more likely to engage in politics in distinct ways from non-millennials. These
differences in digital media use also result in the differentiating characteristic of
millennials when compared to non-millennials.
The Political Debate of Millennials
Before discussing the outline of the chapters and providing a summary of
findings, an overview of where millennials stand in the academic setting is imperative. In
the following sections, there is a discussion of where millennials fall in politics based on
scholarly research. Followed by this discussion is an analysis of the political patterns of
millennials and non-millennials by race and ethnicity as a frame for this dissertation.
A clear debate in millennial politics pertains to perceptions of this generation’s
apathy towards politics. A clear consensus of whether millennials stand with regards to
their interest in politics has not been reached among scholars, with some scholars stating
that millennials are apathetic about politics (Bauerlein 2008; Twenge 2006) and other
stating that millennials highly interested in American politics (Rouse and Ross 2018;
Greenberg and Weber 2008; Dalton 2016; Milkman 2017; Winograd and Hais 2008).
This debate is a result of the conceptualization of what it means to be engaged in politics
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and millennials preferences in political activities that are not related to electoral politics.
Political participation encompasses several activities and some of these activities are
viewed as being more political engaging than others. For example, if individuals vote
more frequently they are perceived as highly politically engaged, but if a similar
individual does not vote and prefers to protest, then these individual’s might not be
regarded as highly political. The conceptualization, in short, is where the debate of
millennials political apathy emerges.
Moreover, political behavior is defined as engagement in a variety of activities
citizens participate in to influence government, elect public officials, and governmental
policies (Conway 2001). Examples of political activities include: voting, protest,
donating to a political campaign, contacting a public official, boycotting, solving a
community problem, wearing a campaign button, signing a petition, to name a few. The
most traditional form of political participation is voting and is the type of activity used
the most to determine levels of political engagement. This is also where the demarcation
line is drawn between scholars of millennial politics.
Certain scholars put forth the argument that millennials are highly disengaged in
the political process and that this is primarily a result of their self-absorbed nature and
technology (Bauerlein 2008; Twenge 2006). Yet, other scholars view millennials’
political engagement more optimistically and scholars do find that millennials are highly
engaged in politics due to their high levels of protest activity (Rouse and Ross 2018;
Greenberg and Weber 2008; Dalton 2016; Milkman 2017; Winograd and Hais 2008).
However, others argue that millennials are not engaged in politics because of their lack of
voter turnout (Twenge 2006). Millennials are expected to have lower levels of voter
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turnout since young adults are less likely to vote than older adults (Rouse and Ross
2018). The reductionist view that because millennials have lower levels of turnout but
participate more in non-electoral activities results in a political apathetic generation is
problematic because this generation has unique preferences in how they engage in
politics.
Participation Patterns of Millennials and Non-millennials
To assess the patterns of political participation among millennials when compared
to non-millennials, I draw on recent data from the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election
Survey (CMPS) 2016. The results display interesting patterns of political participation
among millennials in comparison to non-millennials. To examine voting rates, I rely on
data on validated voter rates from 2016. Validated voter information is gathered by
verifying each respondent who said voted in the last election with their voter record. Data
on millennials and non-millennials voter turnout is shown in figure 1.3 and suggests there
is a 9 percent difference in voting among millennials and non-millennials; with nonmillennials being more likely to vote than millennials. This result falls in line with
research suggesting that millennials have lower turnout rates than non-millennials (Rouse
and Ross 2018). When viewing turnout data by race and ethnicity figure 1.4 illustrates
that regardless of race and ethnicity, non-millennials are more likely to vote than
millennials. But when simply looking at non-millennials, the data shows that whites
(77%) have the highest turnout rates, followed by Latinos (76%), Blacks (72%), and
Asians (67%) have the lowest rates of turnout. For millennials, Blacks (69%) have the
highest rates of turnout, followed by Latinos (64%) and whites (64%) and Asians (55%)
once again have the lowest levels of turnout. One finding to highlight is the high rates of
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turnout out among Black millennials when compared to non-Black millennials. This
shows that previous turnout trends displayed by non-millennials are shifting with regards
to the millennial generation.
Figure 1.3: Validated Voter Percentages in the 2016 Election
80%
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63%

% Voted

60%
50%
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40%

28%

30%
20%
10%
0%
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Did not vote
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Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016

Figure 1.4: Validated Voter Percentages in the 2016 Election by Race and Ethnicity
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Source: CMPS 2016
Additionally, figures 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 displays various levels of engagement
across a range of political activities. From the data millennials fall behind non-millennials
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in various types of political activities. This same finding is true when examining
millennials and non-millennials by race and ethnicity. From the results on voter
registration, the data shows that only 40 percent of millennial are registered to vote in
comparison to 75 percent of non-millennials this is a 35 percent difference in voter
registration. Millennials are far less likely to register to vote than other generations. As
for race and ethnicity among millennials, white millennials are more likely to participate
in an array of political activities when compared to non-white millennials. This shows
that when examining non-voter activities, the presence of a racial gap in political
behavior still exists. Non-millennials also show similar patterns of political activities,
with non-millennial whites participating in an array of political activities more often than
non-whites. However, an interesting finding is that non-millennial Blacks have the
highest levels of voter registration than other groups. Thus, demonstrating persistent
differences in political behavior by racial and ethnic groups and generations.
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Figure 1.5: Participation Patterns of Millennials and Non-millennials
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Figure 1.6: Participation Patterns of Millennials by Race
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Outline of Chapters and Summary of Findings
In chapter two, the main question asked is if Latino millennials ethnic identity
differs from non-Latino millennials and from Latino non-millennials? Chapter two
examines what factors shape linked fate among Latino millennials when compared to
non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials. In this chapter, I argue that Latino
millennials ethnic identity will differ from non-Latino millennials and Latino nonmillennials as a result of positing on social media and immigrant discrimination. The
results from this chapter suggest that social media and immigrant discrimination do not
directly shape linked fate among Latino millennials. However, evidence is found
demonstrating that the factors that form identity among millennials differs by their race
and ethnicity, and that Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials linked fate is shaped
by different factors. In short, Latino millennials ethnic identity does differ from previous
generations of Latinos and within the millennial generation. This chapter contributes to
our knowledge of Latino politics, because it shows Latino identity is not stagnant and
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shifted among Latino generations, with Latino millennials identity being shaped by antiLatino rhetoric, which does not shape Latino non-millennials identity. This suggests that
the racialization of Latinos as immigrants is impacting Latino millennials to a greater
extent than Latino non-millennials.
Chapter three builds on the previous chapter by examining the role of linked fate
on political participation among Latino millennials when compared to non-Latino
millennials. In this chapter, I test the role of the traditional measure of linked fate and the
novel measure of immigrant-based linked fate to examine potential differences in
political participation of millennials and non-millennials. The findings suggest that the
traditional measure of linked fate functions the same for all millennials and nonmillennials, propelling all racial and ethnic groups to participate in politics. When
examining the novel measure of immigrant-based linked fate, the results suggest that
Latino millennials are more likely to participate in politics because of their attachment to
the immigrant community when compared to non-Latino millennials. These results show
that Latino identity impacts the political participation of Latino millennials. The main
contribution of this chapter stems from how Latino immigrant-based linked fate is a
strong predictor for Latino millennial political participation, but not for non-Latino
millennials. This evidence shows the strong role of Latino racialization as immigrants has
in driving political participation among Latinos, but not for other immigrant groups, such
as Asians.
In chapter four, I engage in the portion of my theoretical framework regarding
digital media and technology and examine online political participation among
millennials when compared to non-millennials. I also include an analysis of racial and
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ethnic differences by generational cohort. This chapter complements the analysis by
examining how millennials and non-millennials, by race, participate in online political
activities. This chapter also tackles the role of linked fate on online political participation
among millennials across time by using panel data. Ultimately, this chapter finds that
there are differences among millennials and non-millennials patterns of online political
participation. With millennials being more likely to participate in online political
activities than non-millennials. The second portion of the analysis finds that linked fate
does influence online political participation among millennials. The main contributions of
this chapter are that digital media is an important component of millennial political
engagement. Digital media is here to stay and serves as a motivator for political
socialization among millennial youth, as the panel data suggest. The presence of a
generational identity among millennials also motivates political participation among this
group, which can unlock the key to engaging this generation into electoral politics.
The final chapter is the concluding chapter of this dissertation. In this chapter, I
summarize the three empirical chapters and discuss the broad implications of this study
on the subfield of American politics. There is also a detailed discussion of avenues for
future research that can be done to build on this dissertation. But most importantly, there
is a detailed explanation of the contributions of this dissertation.
Among these contributions are how factors predicting linked fate have not
remained stagnant among the Latino community and Latino identity has shifted because
of the anti-immigrant political climate specifically targeting Latinos. Linked fate for
Latino millennials is not shaped by the same factors as it for Latino non-millennials,
which suggests that Latino identity will shift overtime and will not mirror those of older
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generations of Latinos. Another contribution of this dissertation encompasses the role of
racialization of Latino millennials as immigrants and how this is a determinant for
political participation for Latino millennials, but not for non-Latino millennials. The last
contribution is with regards to new predictors of online political participation, the last
chapter shows that a generational political identity influences online political
participation, which adds to our knowledge of what predicts online political participation
for millennials.
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Chapter 2
Latino Millennials: Assessing Predictors of Linked Fate
INTRODUCTION
Research on generational analysis only examines generations as a monolithic
group but neglects to examine the composition of race and ethnicity within a generation.
The millennial generation has caught the eye of political elites due to its racial and ethnic
diversity of millennials (Frey 2016). Within the millennial generation, Latinos are the
largest ethnic group. Latino millennials make up roughly 38% of all millennials when
compared to Blacks who make up 34%, Asians who make up 31%, and whites who are
25% (Patten 2016). The fact that millennials are highly diverse leads to my inquiry of
whether millennials are a monolithic generation and whether the group identity
(measured by linked fate) of Latino millennials is distinct from non-Latino millennials
and Latino non-millennials?
To examine if there are potential differences in identity among Latino millennials
when compared to non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials, I examine what
predicts linked fate for Latino millennials and for non-Latino millennials, and Latino
non-millennials. Linked fate has become a vital component of scholars understanding of
political behavior. Research pertaining to linked fate in American politics poses that
linked fate is a predictor for why racial and ethnic minorities participate in politics
(Dawson 1994; McClain et al. 2009; Chong and Rogers 2005; Masuoka 2008; Sanchez
2006a). Based on these studies demonstrating the important role of linked fate on
political participation, this study aims to expand on previous research on the type of
predictors that shape linked fate among generations by race and ethnicity, with a specific
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focus on the predictors of linked fate among Latino millennials when compared to nonLatino millennials and Latino non-millennials.
An assessment of what contributes and shapes the linked fate of Latino
millennials and non-Latino millennials will provide insight as to whether Latino
millennials are indeed a monolithic generational cohort. Previous research on linked fate
shows that Blacks, Asians and Latinos all have distinct factors that shape these individual
groups linked fate (Dawson 1994; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010).
Based on these studies, I build on research of linked fate by examining if the predictors of
linked fate do indeed vary by generations and by race and ethnicity.
Other contributions to the area of linked fate include adding other measures and
theoretical explanations as to why linked fate will vary across generations of Latinos and
why linked fate will vary among millennials. The predictor I utilize as a new addition to
our understanding of linked fate across generations of Latinos is social media use. Social
media use is included as a measure that predicts linked fate among Latino millennials
because social media use or digital media is more pervasive among the millennial
generation than among non-millennials (Rainie and Perrin 2016). Digital media use is
also a defining characteristic of the millennial generation, but not of non-millennials
because millennials came of age during a time of technological advancement (Rouse and
Ross 2018). As a result, my theoretical expectations are founded on the notion that social
media use will serve as a predictor for linked fate among millennials, but not among nonmillennials and that this will transcend as an explanation for differences in the predictors
of linked fate among Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials.
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Moreover, with regards to the factors that shape linked fate among Latino
millennials and non-Latino millennials, my theoretical expectations are grounded on the
impact of immigration as a salient issue among Latino millennials, but not among nonLatino millennials as an explanation for why linked fate will vary among millennials.
Based on research by Bimber (2003) who argues that new technological forms of
communication have an impact on American politics because of the ability of digital
media to proliferate information at a faster rate than previous media platforms. Due to
large amounts of information shared on social networking sites, I argue that Latino
millennials will be exposed to immigrant-based racial content that will trigger higher
levels of linked fate among Latino millennials, but not among non-Latino millennials.
This is a result of immigration being a more salient issue among the Latino community
than among non-Latinos.
In sum, Latino millennials linked fate should be as a result of higher levels of
engagement of social media when compared to Latino non-millennials because Latino
millennials will encounter more content on social networking sites regarding immigration
issues than Latino non-millennials. Also, the linked fate for Latino millennials will vary
when compared to non-Latino millennials because of the lack or relevance of immigrant
among non-Latino millennials. The overall contribution of this study is the examination
of the role of new information platforms as a mechanism for an increased sense of linked
fate among Latino millennials when compared to non-Latino millennials and Latino nonmillennials. Thus, this study analyzes linked fate through an inter and intra-generational
analysis of linked fate.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
There is an abundance of studies on the political participation of racial and ethnic
minorities in relations to whites. These studies demonstrate that there are different
explanations for why racial and ethnic minorities participate in politics when compared to
whites (Hero 1992; Leighley 1990; Leighley and Vedilitz 1999; Verba and Nie 1972;
Sanchez 2006a; Shingles 1981; Stokes-Brown 2003; Valdez 2011). Dominant theories of
political participation are centered on the role socioeconomic status (SES) and political
attitudes play in contributing to higher levels of political participation (Verba and Nie
1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995). The
socioeconomic model states that higher levels of income and education translate into
increased levels of engagement in a variety of political activities (Verba and Nie 1972;
Kenny 1992; Leighley 1990). In addition to SES, political attitudes are found to have a
positive impact on higher levels of political participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Liu
2001). Some of the political attitudes used to explain higher levels of political
participation are trust in government, political interest, external and internal efficacy
(Campbell et al. 1976). However, while these theories of political participation explain
the patterns of participation for whites, they do not apply equally to racial and ethnic
minorities.
As a result, political scientists gravitated toward developing other explanations for
racial and ethnic minority political participation. These studies focus on the role of group
identity as a driver for higher levels of political participation among racial and ethnic
minorities, as traditional theories were unable to explain why racial and ethnic minorities
participate in politics. Linked fate is a concept rooted in the feelings of closeness to
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others from an individual’s racial and ethnic group and is based on thoughts that what
happens to an individual’s life is tied to the group they belong to (Dawson 1994; Jaynes
and Williams 1989). Linked fate is a concept derived for the African American
community and is defined by Dawson (1994) as African Americans who perceive their
individual fates are tied to those of their racial group and who are more likely to rely on
group-based interests when they make political decisions. In other words, African
Americas who feel their fate is tied to other blacks will be more likely to vote for certain
policies or political candidates that have the best interests of their community. Several
studies on linked fate and African Americans point towards a clear relationship between
linked fate and political participation (Dawson 1994; Simien 2006; Tate 1993; McClain
et al. 2009; Chong and Rogers 2005). As a result of studies examining linked fate as an
explanation for political participation among African Americans, there has been an
increase in research aimed at untangling whether linked fate can be applied to other
groups besides African Americans.
From these inquiries, there are several studies examining what predictors shape
linked fate among non-African Americans. Among those groups included in the
application of linked fate for non-Blacks are Latinos and Asians (Lien, Conway, and
Wong 2003, 2008; Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). These studies ultimately
find that linked fate among Latinos and Asians is predicted by factors other than what
predicts linked fate for Blacks (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2003, 2008; Masuoka 2006;
Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). The predictors shaping linked fate among Latinos and
Asians are expanded on in more detail in the following sections.
Variation in Predictors of Linked Fate by Minority Group
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As previously discussed, the term of linked fate was first coined by Michael
Dawson (1994) as a way to assert why African Americans have group cohesion.
Specifically, Dawson (1994) states that Black identity stems from the historical treatment
of Blacks in America. The treatment of Blacks as group members rather than as
individuals led Blacks to consider the well-being of the group as proxy for making
political decisions that not only benefit the individual but the group as a well (Dawson
1994).
The predictors used to assess linked fate among Black’s emerged from including
various measures that relate to group cohesion among Blacks. One predictor is racial
discrimination because Blacks have been consistently racially discriminated as a group,
which has led to the development of Blacks being united as a group (Dawson 1994).
Attending events and partaking in group membership of organizations that are tied to the
African American experience, such as church attendance is another predictor of linked
fate among Blacks (Dawson 1994). Measures of socioeconomic status, such as income
and education are included to understand whether polarization based on SES impact
linked fate for Blacks (Dawson 1994). Among the measure of SES is one that tackles the
perception of Blacks doing economically better to assess if this is a motivator for linked
fate (Dawson 1994). Lastly, measures of exposure to politics through church and media
platforms, in this case newspaper, are also included (Dawson 1994).
From this seminal piece there has been an expansion of studies examining linked
fate among African Americans. These studies tend to focus on the intersection of gender
and race among African Americans (Simien 2006; Stout et al. 2017). Specifically, Simien
(2006) examines the role of gender and linked fate among African American women and
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men. This study paved the way to understanding the salience of gender identity and racial
identity among African Americans (Simien 2006). In addition to the study by Simien
(2006) on gender, recent studies point to the role of marital status on linked fate among
black women (Stout et al. 2017). All of these studies build on Dawson’s (1994) initial
analysis of linked fate among Blacks.
Moreover, when applying the concept of linked fate to Asians, the results vary
from those of African Americans. Some scholars find that the concept of linked fate does
not apply well to Asians (Wong et al. 2011). Even with scholars suggesting that linked
fate does not apply to the Asian community, there are studies examining the predictors of
linked fate for Asians and find support for an Asian pan-ethnicity (Masuoka 2006; Junn
and Masuoka 2008; Hayes and Skulley 2015). Studies on the predictors of linked fate for
Asians find that experienced racial discrimination is vital predictor for linked fate among
Asians (Masuoka 2006). Additionally, income also impacts linked fate for Asians, which
is a distinct finding from that of African American linked fate (Masuoka 2006). One of
the most interesting findings is that there is variation among Asian national origin groups
and linked fate (Masuoka 2006). Not all Asian national origin groups hold a sense of
linked fate, which impacts whether there is a monolithic identity among Asians (Masuoka
2006). Based on these findings, the predictors of linked fate for Asians differ from those
of African Americans because socioeconomic status, in this case income, promotes
linked fate for Asians, which is not the case for African Americans. Also, national origin
groups predict linked fate among Asians, which again differs from that of African
Americans. In sum, predictors of linked fate vary among racial and ethnic groups.
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In addition, the predictors for linked fate among Latinos vary from those of
Blacks and Asians. For instance, shared language, national origin groups, immigration
policy, and different forms of discrimination shape Latinos’ group identity (Masuoka
2006; Sanchez 2006a; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). These predictors of linked fate are
somewhat distinct from those used for Asians because, while linked fate among Asians
and Latinos’ are motivated by national origin, socioeconomic status is a more
pronounced predictor for Latinos than Asians (Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka
2010). The relevance of socioeconomic status for shaping Latino linked fate is also not
consistent with research conducted on linked fate for Blacks which shows that race is a
strong predictor for Blacks than socioeconomic status (Dawson 1994). Another notable
difference among linked fate for Latinos and African Americans is the role of
discrimination on linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Sanchez and Masuoka (2010)
find that racial discrimination does not motivate linked fate among Latinos as it does for
African Americans. Among their findings, Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) show that
foreign-born Latinos were more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than nativeborn Latinos, which shows the role of nativity as a predictor for linked fate among
Latinos.
From the Sanchez’s and Masuoka’s seminal piece, studies have built on the area
of linked fate among Latinos. First, Fraga et al. (2010) finds that linked fate does not vary
across national origin groups. In other studies, Sanchez and Vargas (2016) find that racial
discrimination is a predictor of Latino and African American linked fate, which is a
distinct finding from the Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) piece. To add to the discussion on
discrimination, another study finds that discrimination from outside groups yields higher
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rates of linked fate among Latinos, with internal discrimination leading to lower levels of
linked fate among Latinos (Sanchez and Rodriguez-Espinosa 2016). Based on these
differences, I assess whether these predictors for linked fate still hold for minority
millennials and whether new technological platforms shape linked fate among Latino
millennials from non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials.
Gaps in the Literature
Some gaps in the literature of linked fate are due to a lack of examination of
generational cohorts linked fate and the role of new technological advancements as
possible predictors of linked fate. For instance, while the concept of linked fate has been
applied to Latinos and Asians, it has not tackled the question of how new generations
linked fate compares to previous generations. In this case more research needs to assess
the patterns of linked fate for millennials and non-millennials. Following this assessment
there needs to be an evaluation of whether predictors of linked fate are the same for each
racial and ethnic group of millennials and a comparison of these predictors to racial and
ethnic non-millennials to observe possible shifts in the formation of linked fate among
generations.
In addition to examining the impact of traditional measures on linked fate, I
examine the role of new information platforms as a determinant for linked fate. While
previous studies used measures of ethnic media as predictors of linked fate, I add an
assessment of social media, due to millennials increase media usage (Rainie and Perrin
2016). Some scholars show the importance of engaging in internet use among millennials
as a mechanism for political socialization and engagement (Winograd and Hais 2011,
2008). This generation is more likely to access and proliferate news through the internet
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(Caliendo et al. 2016; Milner 2010). One interesting point Caliendo et al. (2016) makes is
that millennials are more likely to connect through the internet and develop social capital
in a distinct manner than what was originally put forth by Putnam.
In other words, traditional mechanisms for the development of social capital do
not apply to millennials as they did for other generations. Not only are millennials more
connected through the internet, but they have information more readily available through
digital devices. The use of the internet is not only a mechanism to access information, but
it also facilitates communication of ideas and information, which differs from other
technological mediums of information, such as television or newspapers (Caliendo et al.
2016). Connecting with others through social media has become a norm in which
millennials engage and might serve as a possible predictor of linked fate. Thus, some of
the gaps this chapter attempts to fill emerge from including new predictors that shape
linked fate.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Variations of Linked Fate across Generations and Latino Generations
Preliminary research across various generational cohorts demonstrates
millennials’ have higher levels of digital media use when compared to non-millennials
(Rainie and Perrin 2016). Among these findings, the most striking is the large difference
in social media use by generational cohorts. For instance, 89% of millennials use social
media sites, such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, when compared to 73% of Generation
X, 54% young baby boomers, 45% of older baby boomers, and 29% of the Silent
Generation (Rainie and Perrin 2016). Additionally, millennials use smartphones to a
greater extent than non-millennials (Rainie and Perrin 2016). The percentage of
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millennials who own a smartphone is 88% when compared to 77% of Generation X and
59% of baby boomers who own a smartphone (Rainie and Perrin 2016). Making live
video footage of political events, discrimination, violence, etc. is more accessible to the
public as a result of smartphone ownership and is becoming an effective medium for the
proliferation of information. Millennials, according to the American Press Institute
(2015), are actually high online news consumers, which leads to the argument that
millennials are more prone to use digital media than non-millennials.
Moreover, drawing from literature in political communications, I argue that
Latino millennials are readily exposed to various forms of information as a result of the
fourth information revolution (Bimber 2003). The rise of digital media results in high
levels of exposure to a variety of content, such as racial issues which is not privy to older
generations who do not use digital media to the same degree. I utilize Bruce Bimber’s
(2003) theory of the fourth information revolution that states that the internet reduces
costs of access to information and makes information readily available. From this
information revolution, I argue that Latino millennials will have quick access to
information from the internet than from other media platforms (i.e. televisions,
newspaper, radio). Also, due to higher levels of social networking site usage among
Latino millennials this younger generation will be more exposed and engaged in racerelated news than their counterparts, Latino non-millennials.
While studies on social media and exposure to race-related news are scant, there
are preliminary studies that show that social media proliferates race related news and
movements to a wide audience (Anderson and Hitlin 2016; Bonilla and Rosa 2015).
Studies note that “Black issues” are proliferated by the use of Twitter and Facebook and
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that some of the most used hashtags surrounding social movements have been #Ferguson
and #BlackLivesMatter (Anderson and Hitlin 2016; Bonilla and Rosa 2015). Preliminary
findings from the Pew Research Center comparing racial groups exposure to racial
content on social media find that 68% of Blacks are more likely to see race related
content on social when compared to whites who are 35% who are likely to see race
related content and Latinos who say 54% of what they see on social media are race
related (Anderson and Hitlin 2016). Additionally, 28% of Blacks say most or some of
their social media posts are related to race in comparison to 8% of whites who post on
social media and 20% of Latinos who say that most of their posts are about race
(Anderson and Hitlin 2016). The manner in which social media sites expose and engage
individuals to race related issues can create a mechanism for higher levels of linked fate
among social media users because of the exposure and engagement of race related
content on social media.
Based on preliminary results that social media is most used by millennials than
non-millennials and that exposure and engagement in race related content is most
prevalent among racial and ethnic minorities, I argue that Latino millennials linked fate
will be predicted by exposure and engagement of social media posts related to the current
anti-Latino political climate. In addition, this same logic of exposure and engagement in
social media posts regarding the anti-Latino political climate will not be as pronounced
for Latino non-millennials and will not be a strong predictor for Latino non-millennial
linked fate due to a higher consumption of digital media among Latino millennials when
compared to Latino non-millennials.
Variations among Latino Millennials and Non-Latino Millennials
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Moreover, Latino millennials’ exposure and engagement of media in an antiMexican and anti-Latino political climate can enhance the levels of linked fate among
Latino millennials than for non-Latino millennials. This political climate serves as a
trigger for group threat. Scholars of group identity find that Latinos who face
discrimination or are exposed to anti-Latino rhetoric will have higher levels of group
identity (Perez 2015; Sanchez 2006a). The 2016 GOP presidential candidate targeting
and framing Mexicans in a negative light should increase levels of linked fate among
Latino millennials (Sanchez and Gomez Aguinaga 2017). Additionally, research on race
and belonging in America among Latino millennials finds that political climates impact
the racialization of Latinos (Flores-Gonzalez 2017). In her qualitative vignettes, FloresGonzalez (2017) shows how Latinos of different national origin backgrounds are viewed
as Mexican. Latinos in America are racialized as being Mexican, undocumented or
immigrant, which results in a different socialization and racialization for Latino
millennials in American politics. These perceptions of Latinos and the anti-immigrant
climate, exacerbated by Trump, are why Latino millennials should have higher levels of
linked fate than non-Latino millennials.
The factors that predict linked fate among Latino millennial are the anti-Mexican
political climate, anti-immigrant political environment, and high rates of deportation. One
instance where linked fate brought youth and various Latino activists together to mobilize
was for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to gain access to higher
education and employment opportunities for undocumented children of immigrants
brought to the U.S. at a young age (Martinez 2014; Robles and Gomberg-Muñoz 2016).
In addition to DACA, Latino millennials should also share a greater sense of linked fate

30

with other Latino millennials due to their ties to the immigrant community as a result of
some having undocumented parents, family members, or friends. A poll conducted in
Colorado of Latino millennials in 2016 asked respondents if they knew a family member,
friend, or a co-worker who is undocumented, and 60% answered yes. These ties to the
immigrant community and the anti-immigrant political climate should serve as predictors
for a heightened sense of linked fate among Latino millennials, but not for non-Latino
millennials.
Among the several studies on group threat; Leo Chavez’s (2013) recent study
shows how rhetoric such as “illegal” turned into the Latino threat narrative used by
political elites. While Chavez’s (2013) study illustrates how rhetoric negatively portrays
Latinos as a threat, White’s (2016) study shows how that threat also mobilized the Latino
electorate during the implementation of the secure community’s policy. During the 2016
presidential election, polls on Latino millennials show their low favorability of Trump
(Latino Decisions 2016). Additionally, data from the Colorado Millennial Poll (2016)
shows that 82% of Latino millennials in Colorado are in favor of immigration reform.
This data points to the salience of immigration policy for Latino millennials. Studies on
Proposition 187, the “Save Our State” initiative, show how an anti-immigrant policy led
to the mobilization of Latinos in California (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja
and Segura 2003; Ramírez 2013). In addition, studies examining immigration
mobilization and protest activity more broadly point to how racialized policies have
mobilized Latinos (Zepeda-Millan 2017). Based on these studies and data demonstrating
the salience of immigration for Latino millennials, I argue that the anti-Latino climate
should result in higher levels of linked fate among Latino millennials than non-Latino
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millennials. In sum, group threat should be the determining factor for heightened linked
fate among Latino millennials, but not for non-millennials. Therefore, I propose the
following hypotheses for this study:
H1a: Linked fate should be higher for millennials than non-millennials, when
controlling for other factors.
H1b: I also anticipate that linked fate will be correlated with linked fate among
millennials who post on social media, but not for non-millennials who post on social
media.
H2: With regards to Latinos engaging in social media use, I anticipate that
engaging in social media use will be significantly correlated with linked fate for Latino
millennials, but not for Latino non-millennials.
H3: Latino millennials who perceive discrimination against immigrants will be
more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than non-Latino millennials who do not
perceive discrimination against immigrants.
H4: Additionally, I anticipate that anti-Latino rhetoric will be correlated with
linked fate for Latino millennials but will not have the same effect for older Latinos and
non-Latino millennials.
DATA AND METHODS
To examine the various predictors of linked fate among Latino millennials and
non-Latino millennials, I employ the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey
(CMPS) 2016 (Barreto et al. 2017). The inclusion of variables on linked fate, perceived
and experienced discrimination, and the large sample of racial and ethnic groups make
the CMPS 2016 an adequate dataset. The total number of observations in the dataset are
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10,145 and were collected online between the dates of December 3, 2016 to February 15,
2017. The survey is available in six different languages which are English, Spanish,
Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Korean, and Vietnamese. This survey also
samples both registered and non-registered voters. The full data are weighted within each
racial group to match the adult population in the 2015 Census ACS 1-year data file for
age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration status. A poststratification raking algorithm was used to balance each category within +/- 1 percent of
the ACS estimates. Data are not weighted to their national combined racial average. That
is, Whites account for 10 percent of all cases, and each racial group account for roughly
30 percent. Additionally, appended to this survey is the validated voter measure for years
2008 to 2016 for respondents in the survey. In other words, individuals who reported that
they voted where verified through voter records to assess if these individuals did indeed
vote. The total sample across different racial and ethnic groups are displayed in table 2.1.
The total sample across different racial and ethnic groups are displayed in table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Overall Survey Sample Size Description

Registered to Vote
Not Registered
Total

Total
6,024
4,121
10,145

Latino
1,816
1,187
3,003

Black
2,002
1,100
3,102

Asian
1,503
1,503
3,006

White
703
331
1,034

As mentioned, this survey was administered on the web. Some might argue web
surveys have problems because not all of the U.S. population has internet access and
because of possible issues with sampling strategies of online surveys (Couper and Miller
2008; Dillman 2006; Bethlehem 2010). Surveys administered online can experience
limitations since the entire population can lack internet access (Couper 2000). Even
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though there are potential concerns with web-based surveys, there are also benefits of
web-based surveys. Some of those benefits specifically with regards to collecting large
amounts of responses and targeting various segments of the population (Bethlehem
2010). But with regards with the validity of this survey, the principal investigators
themselves attest to the accuracy of the data and support its use for scholarly work
(Barreto et al. 2018). The PI’s used the following sampling method coined the randomrecruit-to-web (RRW) (Barreto et al. 2018). This method uses the “official voter file of
registered voters, which now contains about 40% of respondents with an email address
either volunteered or matched through external databases” (Barreto et al. 2018, p. 3).
These scholars then went through these records and sorted them by racial and ethnic
group, age, and SES and then asked randomly selected participants (Barreto et al. 2018).
According to the PI’s this is almost the same tactic used in telephone surveys of
registered voters. In sum, even with issues with web-surveys, the sampling method and
methodical approach by the PI’s suggests that this survey is a valid instrument.
Next, is an overview of the total sample of millennials by race and ethnicity. The
total number of millennials is 4,515 out of 10,134.1 There is a lack of consensus with
regards to the cutoff point of the millennial generation, with some researchers ending
millennials in 1996 (Jiang 2018) and others in the early 2000s (Greenberg and Weber
2008). Thus, I distinguish millennials to be individuals born from 1981 to 1998 and is
consistent with research on millennials (Hayes-Bautista 2017; Fry 2016). Based on
research on millennials, my cut off meets the requirements for an adequate depiction of

1

I lost 12 cases due to missing data in the age variable.
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millennials. The sample break down for millennials by race and ethnicity in the CMPS
2016 is shown below in table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Millennial Sample Size Description
Total

Latino Millennials

Black Millennials

Asian Millennials

White Millennials

Registered to Vote

1,784

747

528

397

112

Not Registered

2,731

816

741

1,001

173

Total

4,515

1,563

1,269

1,398

285

Prior studies establish that group identity predicts political engagement among
racial and ethnic groups, which motivates further analysis on what shapes linked fate
among Latino millennials when compared to non-Latino millennials and Latino nonmillennials (Chong and Rogers 2005; Dawson 1994; Sanchez 2006a; Stokes-Brown
2003). To reiterate, I am examining linked fate and not group consciousness as scholarly
research establishes there are potential differences between the concepts of group
consciousness and linked fate and problems with applying these concepts to all racial and
ethnic groups (McClain et al. 2009). Also, due to differences in measurement of group
consciousness and linked fate, I maintain a focus on the predictors of linked fate
(Sanchez and Vargas 2016). Thus, I include the following variables in my analysis:
The dependent variable is the levels of linked fate. I combine the binary measure
of linked fate (coded 1=yes linked fate and 0=no linked fate) with the ordinal variable of
how much linked fate (coded 0=not very much, 1=some and 3=a lot). The two questions
on linked fate that I combine are: “do you think what happens generally to people in this
country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” and “Will it affect
you.” I opt for this coding scheme to be consistent with several studies on linked fate
(Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Dawson 1994). This variable is used for
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both the full model and the constrained models by race. Finally, table 2.3 shows the
summary statistics of the linked fate variable and for the rest of the controls.2

2

For a full list of original question wording and variable coding see Appendix A.
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics
Variables

Observations

Mean

Min.

Max

2.38079
.339155
.466844

Standard
Deviation
1.161638
.473446
.4989241

Linked Fate
Media Post
Experienced Racial
Discrimination
Millennials
Non-Millennials
Perceived Immigrant
Discrimination
Political Interest
CA
TX
NY
Female
Education
Income
Employed
Age
Spanish
Generational Status
Blacks Doing Economically
Better
Latino
Black
Asian
White
Mexican
Cuban
Puerto Rican
Asian Language
Chinese
Indian
Japanese
Filipino
Anti-Latino Rhetoric
Perceived Latino Discrimination
Perceived Black Discrimination
Perceived Asian Discrimination
Perceived White Discrimination

10,134
10,134
10,134

1
0
0

4
1
1

10,134
10,134
9,452

.445529
.554470
3.32776

.4970487
.4970487
.8255134

0
0
1

1
1
4

10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,116
10,134
9,234
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,128
3,099

2.77047
.199329
.099467
.081113
.653420
4.27363
5.18421
.864515
40.6319
.035524
2.22195
2.55856

.9134091
.3995156
.299303
.2730222
.475904
1.16396
3.47524
.3422572
15.52016
.1851092
.8147837
1.147332

1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
18
0
1
1

4
1
1
1
1
6
12
1
98
1
3
5

10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
2,997
2,997
2,997
10,134
3,005
3,005
3,005
3,005
2,698
9,321
9,541
9,097
9,245

.295737
.305802
.296526
.101934
.499165
.053386
.163496
.009571
.318469
.160732
.120798
.136439
3.40289
3.03068
3.34786
2.56051
1.75868

.4563959
.4607691
.4567484
.3025765
.5000827
.2248409
.3698801
.0973707
.4659601
.3673448
.3259474
.3433115
1.332831
.8391714
.8217707
.8618858
.9215564

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
4
4
4
4

For the full model the key independent variables are millennial generation and
social media post. Since, my theory examines if millennials that post on social media are
more likely to have higher levels of linked fate. I interact millennials and social media
post to examine the potential effects of generational status and social media use as
predictors of linked fate. The variable for millennials is constructed by using the age
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variable to code millennials as those born between 1981 and 1998 and non-millennials as
those born from 1980 and below. Social media post is a binary measure (coded 1=yes
posted on social media and 0=no did not post on social media) and is based on the
following question “Discussed a candidate or political issue on social media like
Facebook or Twitter?” In sum these two variables are used to measure social media
engagement and generational status.
The key independent variables for the constrained models for the comparisons of
race and ethnicity are perceived discrimination against immigrants and social media post.
As previously described, social media post is a binary measure, while perceived
immigrant discrimination is an ordinal measure (coded 1=not very much, 2=a little,
3=some, and 4=a lot) and is based on the following question “How much discrimination
is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? Immigrants?”
These two variables are interacted in the models to assess whether posting on social
media and perceived discrimination against immigrants heightens linked fate among
Latino millennials, and to compare if there are indeed different predictors of linked fate
for non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials.
While I do not include experienced racial discrimination as a key independent
variable, this measure is included as a control variable in the analysis due to racial
discrimination being an important predictor for linked fate and this is a binary measure
(coded 1=yes, experienced racial discrimination and 0=no, did not experience racial
discrimination) (Dawson 1994; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Masuoka 2006). I also
include measures of perceived discrimination by race and ethnicity, meaning that there
are measures included for Latinos, Asians, Blacks, and whites assessing how much
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discrimination they believe there is against these groups and this is an ordinal measure.
These measures are included as several scholars argue the importance of discrimination
as a predictor of linked fate (Dawson 1994; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010).3 With regards
to Latino threat, I add a measure for anti-Latino rhetoric (this question was only asked of
Latinos) as a proxy to measure racial threat among Latinos (Chavez 2013). Also included
are standard controls of socioeconomic status (SES), which are income, employment and
education, since previous research on linked fate includes SES (Dawson 1994; Masuoka
2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Besides SES, I also include other demographic
variables, such as gender and age. For the Latino and Asian millennial models, I include
variables on national origin and language. For Blacks, I include a variable assessing
whether Blacks are doing economically better (Dawson 1994). In order to mediate the
role of social media as a political participation variable, I include a variable for political
interest. To account for geography, I include three dummies for California, New York
and Texas to examine if a place of residence for Latinos influences linked fate, as
previous scholarship also controls for geography (Dawson 1994). These geographic
locations are chosen because of the high population levels of Latinos in these three states.
I propose that large populations of Latinos should indicate that Latinos are more likely to
be surrounded by other Latinos and this should result in higher levels of linked fate for
Latinos living in these states. Lastly, these same geographic locations are also included
for non-Latino millennials for an accurate comparison of predictors of linked fate within
the millennial generation.

3

For correlations of all the discrimination measures see Appendix D.
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I explore millennial and Latino millennial linked fate through a multivariate
regression analysis. Since, the dependent variable of linked fate is an ordinal measure, I
use an ordered logistic modeling approach (Long and Freese 2003). Following the
multivariate analysis, I include post estimation results to interpret the coefficients of the
ordered logistic regressions.
ANALYSIS
Prior to the discussion on the multivariate analysis, I address the descriptive
results from data on millennials and non-millennials to paint a clear picture of the data.
Figure 2.1 presents data on the levels of linked fate for millennials and non-millennials.
The figure shows that 35 percent of millennials report not having linked fate when
compared to 39 percent of non-millennials stating they do not have linked fate. When
examining the “a lot” of linked fate, figure 2.1 suggests that 22 percent of millennials
have linked fate in comparison to 16 percent of non-millennials with “a lot” of linked
fate. The results suggest that linked fate is highest among millennials than nonmillennials.
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Figure 2.1: Linked Fate among Millennials and Non-Millennials
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Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
Note: Tabulation is significant and numbers are rounded and might not add up to 100 percent.

In addition to this analysis, figure 2.2 demonstrates that varying levels of social
media posts among millennials and non-millennials. Figure 2.2 shows that 41 percent of
millennials post on social media in comparison to 28 percent of non-millennials that post
on social media. With regards to those who do not post on social media, 59 percent of
millennials do not post in social media and 72 percent of non-millennials do not post on
social media. In short, millennials are more likely to engage in social media use for
political purposes than non-millennials.
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Percent who post on Social Media

Figure 2.2: Social Media Post among Millennials and Non-Millennials
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Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
Note: Tabulation is significant.

When viewing the results for linked fate by race and generational status, the
results suggest potential differences among groups. First the frequencies of linked fate
among Latino millennials and non-Latino millennials are discussed before segueing to a
discussion of the multivariate analysis. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of linked fate
among racial and ethnic millennials. For the most part, millennials have a similar
distribution of linked fate, but the two groups that have the highest levels of linked fate
are Latino (23%) and Black millennials (29%). White millennials are in the middle with
15 percent having “a lot” of linked fate. On the contrary, Asian millennials (15%) have
the lowest percentages of linked fate. When examining millennials who have no linked
fate, white (37%) and Asian (36%) millennials are the two groups with no linked fate
when compared to Black (34%) and Latino (35%) millennials. These results match
previous research on linked fate, showing that blacks have the highest levels of linked
fate of all racial and ethnic groups (Sanchez and Vargas 2016).

42

When examining non-millennials levels of linked fate by race and ethnicity,
figure 2.3 points to variations among groups. The highest levels of linked are observed
among Black non-millennials (22%), followed by white non-millennials (17%), Latino
non-millennials (13%), and Asian non-millennials (10%). With regards to “no linked
fate”, Latino non-millennials have the highest levels of “no linked fate” (50%), followed
by Asian non-millennials (41%), white non-millennials (33%), and Black non-millennials
(32%). This falls in line with studies showing Blacks have higher levels of linked fate
when compared to other groups (Sanchez and Vargas 2016).
Figure 2.3: Liked Fate by Race and Ethnicity/ Generations
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Note: All tabulations are significant; except for the white millennials.

Moreover, when investigating social media use by race and generational status,
there are also differences among millennials and non-millennials by race. Figure 2.4
shows that for millennials, 44 percent of Latino and white millennials post on social
media for political purposes. While, 42 percent of blacks post on social media, followed
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by 36 percent of Asian millennials that post on social media for political purposes. When
compared to not posting on social media, 64 percent of Asian millennials do not post on
social media, followed by 58 percent of Black millennials who do not post on social
media. In sum, Latino and white millennials are more likely to engage in social media
than Black and Asian millennials.
For non-millennials the results for social media use are different. Figure 2.4
shows Latino non-millennials use social media than any other group (34%). Black nonmillennials follow in social media use (32%). While 30 percent of white millennials post
on social media and Asian non-millennials have the lowest levels of posting on social
media (18%). The highest levels for non-millennials posting on social media are 82
percent for Asian non-millennials and 70 percent for white non-millennials. Overall,
figure 2.4 suggests that Latino and Black non-millennials are more inclined to post on
social media for political purposes than Asian and white millennials.
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Figure 2.4: Social Media Post by Race and Ethnicity/Generational Status
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Note: All tabulations are not significant for the Asian millennials and Latino non-millennials.

In short, the descriptive analysis points to differences in levels of linked fate and
social media use by race and generational status. First off, figures 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that
millennials have higher levels of linked fate and social media use than non-millennials.
Secondly, linked fate is higher among millennials than non-millennials when examining
millennials and non-millennials by race and ethnicity. Lastly, social media use is higher
among millennials then non-millennials when examining generational differences by race
and ethnicity. Thus, this shows that potential differences in identity attachment and social
media use are present among millennials and non-millennials.
While the descriptive analysis points to differences in linked fate and social media
use among generations and racial and ethnic groups, to test my theoretical framework, I
commence by analyzing the first portion of the multivariate analysis. The full model in
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table 2.4 shows that the key independent variable for posting on social media is positively
and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). The other key
independent variable for millennials is also positive and significantly correlated with
higher levels of linked fate (p<0.05). In other words, millennials are more likely to have
higher levels of linked fate than non-millennials, and if you post on social media you are
more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than those who do not post on social
media. This finding supports my first hypothesis that millennials will have higher levels
of linked fate than non-millennials. I also find support for my theory that social media use
increases linked fate.
When examining the post estimation results for posting on social media and
millennials, I find interesting differences. For posting on social media, the predicted
probabilities find that posting on social media increases the probability of having “no
linked fate” by 32 percent and that posting on social media increases the probability of
having “a lot” of linked fate by 19 percent. When comparing the predicted probabilities
for those who do not post on social media, I find that not posting on social media
increases the probability of having “no linked fate” by 38 percent and increases the
probability of having “a lot” of linked fate by 16 percent. When comparing “a lot” of
linked fate for those who post on social media and those who do not post on social media
there is a 3 percent difference from not posting on social media to posting on social
media. While the effect is small it still shows that posting on social media increases
linked fate. This finding ultimate supports my theory that posting on social media will
increase individuals’ levels of linked fate.
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Moreover, the predicted probabilities for millennials also show differences for in
linked fate for millennials and non-millennials. Table 2.5 shows that if you are a
millennial there is an increase in the probability of having “no linked fate” by 34 percent
and if you are a non-millennial there is an increase in the probability of having “no linked
fate by 37 percent. When examining the category of “a lot” of linked fate, if you are a
millennial there is an increase in the probability of having “a lot” of linked fate by 19
percent and for non-millennials there is an increase in the probability of having “a lot” of
linked fate by 16 percent. For both levels of linked fate, there is a 3 percent difference for
millennials and non-millennials. Even though 3 percent might be perceived as a small
effect it does shows that millennials are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate
than non-millennials. This finding further supports my theory that millennials will have
higher levels of linked fate than non-millennials.
In addition to the key independent variables, there are other variables that are
correlated with higher levels of linked fate. For instance, experienced racial
discrimination, political interest, education, employment, income, gender, race and
ethnicity, and generational status all predict higher levels of linked fate. Experienced
racial discrimination is positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked
fate (p<0.01). Individuals who have experienced racial discrimination are more likely to
have higher levels of linked fate than individuals who have not experienced racial
discrimination. Political interest is positively and significantly correlated with higher
levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Individuals who are interested in politics are more likely to
have higher levels of linked fate than individuals who are not interested in politics.
Education is positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate
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(p<0.01). Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to have higher levels
of linked fate than individuals with lower levels of education. Employment is positively
and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.05). Individuals who
are employed are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than individuals who are
not employed. Generational status is positively and significantly correlated with higher
levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Individuals from later generations are more likely to have
higher levels of linked fate than individuals who are from recent generations. Gender is
positively and marginally correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.10). Females
are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than males. Income is negatively and
significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Individuals who have
higher levels of income are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate than individuals
who have lower levels of income. With regards to race and ethnicity, Latinos negatively
and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Latinos are less
likely to have higher levels of linked fate when compared to whites. Asians and blacks
are negatively and marginally correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.10).
Asians and blacks are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate when compared to
whites. The finding for blacks is surprising since research shows that linked fate is more
pronounced for blacks than any other group (McClain et al. 2009; Sanchez and Vargas
2016).
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Table 2.4: Ordinal Logistic Regressions Predicting Linked Fate for Generational Cohort
VARIABLES
Media Post
Millennials
Media Post X Millennials
Latino
Black
Asian
White (reference category)
Racial Discrimination
Political Interest
Female
Education (low to high)
Income (low to high)
Employed
Age
Generational Status
/cut1
/cut2
/cut3

Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared

Full Model
Coef. Linked Fate

Interaction Model
Coef. Linked Fate

0.280***

0.213***

(0.046)

(0.055)

0.167**

0.083

(0.074)

(0.084)

--

0.196**

--

(0.092)

-0.293***

-0.294***

(0.073)

(0.073)

-0.122*

-0.124*

(0.068)

(0.068)

-0.213*

-0.216**

(0.109)

(0.109)

--

--

--

--

0.750***

0.750***

(0.049)

(0.049)

0.421***

0.419***

(0.026)

(0.026)

0.082*

0.080*

(0.042)

(0.042)

0.091***

0.089***

(0.020)

(0.020)

-0.026***

-0.026***

(0.007)

(0.007)

0.170**

0.168**

(0.068)

(0.068)

-0.000

-0.001

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.142***

0.143***

(0.037)

(0.037)

1.636***

1.587***

(0.177)

(0.179)

1.848***

1.799***

(0.178)

(0.179)

3.955***

3.907***

(0.182)

(0.183)

9,213

9,213

-9568.6713

-9566.4007

0.0423

0.0426

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Predicted Probabilities for Full model

No linked fate
Not much
Some
A lot

Media post
Yes
No
0.32
0.38
0.04
0.05
0.44
0.42
0.19
0.16

Millennials
Yes
No
0.34
0.37
0.04
0.05
0.43
0.42
0.19
0.16

Furthermore, the second full model with the interaction of millennials X media
post shown in table 2.4 also supports my hypothesis that millennials who post on social
media will have higher levels of linked fate. Millennials who post on social media are
positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.05).
Millennials who post on social media are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate
than non-millennials who post on social media. Additionally, posting on social media is
also positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01).
Posting on social media makes individuals more likely to have higher levels of linked fate
than those who do not post on social media. Additionally, millennials in this model is not
significant, but the interaction is, and this further supports my theory regarding social
media and generational differences. In short, generational status and posting on social
media impact higher levels of linked fate.
Furthermore, the post estimation results in table 2.5 show differences in levels of
linked fate among millennials and non-millennials that post on social media. For
millennials that post on social media, there is an increase of 28 percent in having “no
linked fate” when compared to non-millennials who have a 34 percent probability of an
increase of “no linked fate.” When examining the highest level of linked fate, millennials
who post on social media have a 22 percent increase in the probability of having “a lot”
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of linked fate in comparison to non-millennials who post on social media that have an 18
percent probability of having “a lot” of linked fate. Overall, the predicted probabilities
show that millennials who post on social media have higher levels of linked fate than
non-millennials who post on social media and that this four percent difference shows an
interesting generational difference in the levels of linked fate.
Table 2.6: Predicted Probabilities for Interaction model for Posting on Social Media

No linked fate
Not much
Some
A lot

Millennials Non-millennials
0.28
0.34
0.04
0.05
0.45
0.43
0.22
0.18

In addition to the interaction and the key independent variables, there are several
other measures that are also correlated with higher levels of linked fate. Racial
discrimination, political interest, education, employment, income, gender, race and
ethnicity, and generational status are all associated with higher levels of linked fate.
Experienced racial discrimination is positively and significantly correlated with higher
levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Individuals who have experienced racial discrimination are
more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than individuals who have not
experienced racial discrimination. Political interest is positively and significantly
correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Individuals who are interested in
politics are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than individuals who are not
interested in politics. Education is positively and significantly correlated with higher
levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely
to have higher levels of linked fate than individuals with lower levels of education.
Employment is positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate
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(p<0.05). Individuals who are employed are more likely to have higher levels of linked
fate than individuals who are not employed. Generational status is positively and
significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Individuals from later
generations are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than individuals who are
from recent generations. Gender is positively and marginally correlated with higher levels
of linked fate (p<0.1). Females are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than
males. Income is negatively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate
(p<0.01). Individuals who have higher levels of income are less likely to have higher
levels of linked fate than individuals who have lower levels of income. With regards to
race and ethnicity, Latinos negatively and significantly correlated with higher levels of
linked fate (p<0.01). Latinos are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate when
compared to whites. Asians are negatively and significantly correlated with higher levels
of linked fate (p<0.05). Asians are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate when
compared to whites. Blacks are negatively and marginally correlated with higher levels of
linked fate (p<0.1). Blacks are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate when
compared to whites. The finding for blacks is surprising since research shows that linked
fate is more pronounced for blacks than any other group (McClain et al. 2009; Sanchez
and Vargas 2016).
In addition to the full models, there is also an assessment of the differences
among Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials predictors of linked fate. Table 2.6
shows two models examining predictors for Latino millennials and non-millennials. For
the first model on Latino millennial linked fate, the model shows that the interaction for
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perceived immigrant discrimination X media post is insignificant for Latino millennials.4
This finding does not support my theory that posting on social media and perceptions of
immigrant discrimination on social media impacts higher levels of linked fate among
Latino millennials than it would for non-millennials. Posting on social media is also not
correlated with higher levels of linked fate and does not support my hypothesis that social
media use would not be pronounced among Latino millennials than Latino nonmillennials. Also, perceived immigrant discrimination is not correlated with higher levels
of linked fate for Latino millennials. This finding does not support my hypothesis that
perceived immigrant discrimination would have a more pronounced effect on shaping
Latino millennials linked fate than on Latino non-millennials and non-Latino millennials.
However, anti-Latino rhetoric does support my hypothesis that the anti-Latino climate
would be correlated with linked fate for Latino millennials and not for older Latinos and
non-Latino millennials. Anti-Latino rhetoric is also positively and significantly correlated
with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.05). Latino millennials who are exposed to antiLatino rhetoric are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Latino millennials
who were not exposed to anti-Latino rhetoric. In short, not all of my hypotheses are
supported in my study, but Latino millennials do have their unique predictors of linked
fate when compared to older Latinos and non-Latino millennials.
Other variables in the Latino millennial model that are strongly and positively
correlated with higher levels of linked fate are experienced racial discrimination, political

4

Note: I also conducted an analysis of Latino non-millennials, foreign-born Latino
millennials, native-born Latino millennials, and sub-age categories of Latino millennials.
Results for the interaction of perceived immigrant discrimination and social media post
do not vary, and the only differences are with regards to certain control variables. These
tables are not included in the chapter.
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interest, gender, language and geography. The predicted probabilities for the controls in
the Latino millennial model are presented in table 2.7. Experienced racial discrimination
is positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Latino
millennials who experience racial discrimination are more likely to have higher levels of
linked fate than Latino millennials who have not experienced racial discrimination. The
finding on experienced discrimination is interesting due to varying results in the literature
about the role of discrimination in predicting linked fate for Latinos. Some studies point
towards a strong impact of discrimination on linked fate for Latinos (Masuoka 2006),
while other studies show the opposite (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). However, I find that
experienced discrimination is a strong predictor for linked fate among Latino millennials.
Political interest is also positively and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked
fate (p<0.01). Latinos millennials who are interested in politics are more likely to have
higher levels of linked fate than Latino millennials who are not interested in politics.
Gender is also positively and marginally significant with higher levels of linked fate
(p<0.1). Latina millennials are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Latino
millennials. This is finding supports previous research on Latino linked fate showing that
Latinas to have higher levels of linked fate than Latinos (Masuoka 2006). With regards to
geography, California is positive and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked
fate (p<0.01). Latino millennials living in California are more likely to have higher levels
of linked fate when compared to Latino millennials who do not live in California. This
can be due to California having a greater sense of group activism than other states and the
large population of Latinos residing in the state and due to the most welcoming
immigration policies (Martinez 2008; Carroll 2015). Lastly, the measure for Spanish

54

language is negative and significantly correlated with linked fate among Latino
millennials (p<0.01). Latino millennials who speak Spanish are less likely to have higher
levels of linked fate when compared to Latino millennials who do not speak Spanish.
This result goes counter to previous research on Latino linked fate, which points to
language as a predictor of linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). This can be a result
of Latino millennials being overwhelmingly U.S.-born, unlike their foreign-born
counterparts, and difficulty of language maintenance across generations. In short, Latino
millennials linked fate is constructed by these measures.
When comparing Latino millennials to Latino non-millennials, the results suggest
potential differences. As with Latino millennials, table 2.6 shows that the interaction for
perceived immigrant discrimination X media post is not correlated with higher levels of
linked fate for Latino non-millennials. Posting on social media is also not correlated with
higher levels of linked fate and supports my hypothesis that social media use would not
be pronounced among Latino non-millennials. As for perceived immigrant
discrimination, this variable is not correlated with higher levels of linked fate for Latino
non-millennials. However, my hypothesis on anti-Latino rhetoric is supported by the
results as they suggest that anti-Latino rhetoric is not correlated with the linked fate for
Latino non-millennials. These results point to differences in predictors of linked fate
among Latino millennials and non-millennials.
In addition to these measures, there are other variables that also point to higher
levels of linked fate among Latino non-millennials, which are experienced racial
discrimination, perceived Latino discrimination, political interest, gender, and geography.
The predicted probabilities for the controls are included in table 2.8. Experienced racial
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discrimination is positive and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate
(p<0.01). Latino non-millennials who have experienced racial discrimination are more
likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Latino non-millennials who have not
experienced racial discrimination. Perceived Latino discrimination is positive and
significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Latino non-millennials
who perceived there is discrimination against Latinos are more likely to have higher
levels of linked fate than Latino non-millennials who do not perceive discrimination
against Latinos. As with Latino millennials, this finding supports studies demonstrating
that discrimination, whether it be experienced or specific for Latinos, is a predictor for
linked fate for Latinos (Masuoka 2006) but goes counter to older research showing that
discrimination did not influence linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Political
interest is also positive and marginally correlated with higher levels of linked fate
(p<0.1). Latino non-millennials who are interested in politics are more likely to have
higher levels of linked fate than Latino non-millennials that are not interested in politics.
Gender is negative and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01).
Latina non-millennials are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate when compared
to Latino non-millennials. This finding supports research on Latino linked fate, showing
that Latinas hold lower levels of linked fate when compared to Latinos (Sanchez and
Masuoka 2010). The measure for geography, California, is positive and marginally
correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.1). Latino non-millennials who live in
California are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Latino non-millennials
who do not live in California. The two models on Latino millennials and Latino non-
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millennials demonstrate differences in the predictors of linked fate for Latino millennials
and non-millennials.
To adequately compare the significant predictors of linked fate for both Latino
millennials and Latino non-millennials, included in the analysis are the predicted
probabilities for the control variables for the models of Latino millennials and Latino
non-millennials.5 To summarize, the predictors for linked fate among Latino millennials
include the following: racial discrimination, anti-Latino rhetoric, gender (female),
political interest, Spanish language, and geography (residing in California). For Latino
non-millennials, the predictors of linked fate for this group include: racial discrimination,
perceived Latino discrimination, gender (female), political interest and geography
(residing in California). However, when examining the post, estimation results in tables
2.7 and 2.8 that are the same predictors of linked fate for Latino millennials and nonmillennials, the results show that for Latino millennials who have been racially
discriminated against there is a .34 percent probability in the increase of “a lot” of linked
fate when compared to Latino non-millennials who have been racially discriminated who
have a .21 percent probability in the increase of “a lot” linked fate. This shows that racial
discrimination is more pronounced among Latino millennials. Next, when examining
gender, among Latina millennials there is a .28 percent probability in the increase of “a
lot” of linked fate when compared to Latina non-millennials who have a .14 percent
decrease in the probability of “a lot” of linked fate. This suggests that being a Latina
among millennials has a more pronounced effect on higher levels of linked fate than for

5

For a more detailed depiction see table 2.10 for a full comparison of the predictors for
linked fate among Latino millennials, non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials.
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Latina non-millennials. For political interest, Latino millennials who are very interested
in politics there is a .35 percent probability in the increase of “a lot” of linked fate when
compared to Latino non-millennials who are very interested in politics who have a .17
percent probability in the increase of “a lot” of linked fate. Lastly, when examining
geography, in this case those living in California, Latino millennials who live in
California there is a .32 percent probability in the increase on “a lot” of linked fate when
compared to Latino non-millennials who have a .20 percent probability in the increase of
“a lot” of linked fate. Overall, these results suggest that higher levels of linked fate are
more pronounced among Latino millennials than non-millennials and suggest that there
are indeed differences in the predictors of linked fate among Latino generations and
substantive differences in the common predictors of linked fate among Latino
generations.
Table 2.7: Ordered Logistic Regressions for Latino millennials and Non-millennials
Predicting Linked Fate

VARIABLES
Perceived Immigrant Discrimination X Media Post
Perceived Immigrant Discrimination
Media Post
Experienced Racial Discrimination
Anti-Latino Rhetoric
Perceived Latino Discrimination
Political Interest
Female
Education (low to high)
Income (low to high)
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Latino Millennials

Latino Non-Millennials

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

0.184

0.070

(0.252)

(0.222)

0.216

-0.008

(0.179)

(0.163)

-0.557

0.312

(0.921)

(0.811)

0.999***

0.855***

(0.189)

(0.165)

0.157**

0.085

(0.074)

(0.062)

0.122

0.330***

(0.142)

(0.128)

0.381***

0.181*

(0.108)

(0.103)

0.333*

-0.472***

(0.180)

(0.163)

0.090

0.059

(0.091)

(0.076)

-0.030

-0.043

Table 2.7: Ordered Logistic Regressions for Latino millennials and Nonmillennials Predicting Linked Fate (Cont.)

VARIABLES
Employed
Age
Spanish
Generational Status
Mexican
Cuban
Puerto Rican
CA
TX
NY

Latino Millennials

Latino Non-Millennials

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

(0.037)

(0.030)

0.257

-0.223

(0.228)

(0.252)

-0.001

-0.008

(0.018)

(0.007)

-0.917***

-0.233

(0.262)

(0.240)

-0.172

-0.114

(0.129)

(0.120)

-0.282

0.027

(0.229)

(0.219)

-0.319

-0.261

(0.532)

(0.399)

-0.067

-0.132

(0.408)

(0.293)

0.562***

0.381*

(0.217)

(0.202)

0.159

-0.060

(0.246)

(0.239)

-0.013

-0.087

(0.442)

(0.304)

/cut1

2.602***

1.338

(0.864)

(0.831)

/cut2

2.859***

1.573*

(0.865)

(0.832)

4.647***

3.297***

(0.883)

(0.839)

/cut3

Observations

1,218

1,162

Pseudo R-squared

0.0893

0.0754

-545.89484

-705.28543

Log Likelihood
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Predicted Probabilities for Latino Millennials
Variables
Racial Discrimination

Anti-Latino Rhetoric

No linked fate

Not much

Yes

0.24

0.05

0.38

0.34

No

0.43

0.17

0.44

0.06
0.05

0.34

No, not at all

0.33

0.18

0.35

0.22

0.35

0.23

0.36

0.26

0.36

0.29

0.35

0.22

0.36

0.28

0.33

0.17

0.34

0.20

0.36

0.27

Yes, a little

0.36

Yes, a lot

0.34

Yes, a great deal
Gender

Political Interest

Spanish Language

Geography (CA)

0.05

0.37

Yes, some

0.05
0.05
0.05

0.30

Male

0.38

Female

0.31

Not at all

0.45

Not that interested

0.41

Some

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

A lot

Somewhat

0.32

Very interested

0.24

0.04

0.37

0.35

Other

0.31

0.05

0.36

0.28

Spanish

0.49

0.05

0.31

0.15

Other

0.37

0.05

0.35

0.22

California

0.27

0.05

0.37

0.32

Table 2.9: Predicted Probabilities for Latino Non-millennials
Variables
Racial Discrimination

Perceived Latino Discrimination

Gender

Political Interest

Geography

No linked fate

Not much

Some

A lot

Yes

0.38

0.05

0.36

0.21

No

0.57

0.05

0.27

0.11

Not very much

0.56

0.05

0.27

0.12

A little

0.58

0.05

0.26

0.11

Some

0.48

0.05

0.31

0.15

A lot

0.42

0.05

0.34

0.19

Male

0.43

0.05

0.33

0.19

Female

0.53

0.05

0.29

0.14

Not at all

0.50

0.05

0.30

0.15

Not that interested

0.57

0.05

0.26

0.11

Somewhat

0.47

0.05

0.31

0.17

Very interested

0.43

0.05

0.33

0.19

Other

0.50

0.05

0.30

0.15

California

0.42

0.05

0.33

0.20
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Following the analysis of Latino millennials and non-millennials, I move forward
to assess what predicts linked fate for non-Latino millennials. The interaction for
perceived immigrant discrimination X media post is not significant for Asian millennials.
Neither are posting on social media and perceived immigrant discrimination. These
findings support my theory that perceptions of immigrant discrimination and social media
posts do not predict higher levels of linked fate for non-Latino millennials. Moreover,
among Asian millennials variables that predict linked fate are shown in table 2.9 and
suggest that the predictors of linked fate for Asian millennials are experienced racial
discrimination, perceived Asian discrimination, and political interest. Experienced racial
discrimination is positive and marginally correlated with higher levels of linked fate
(p<0.1). Asian millennials who have experienced racial discrimination are more likely to
have higher levels of linked fate than Asian millennials who have not experienced racial
discrimination. Perceived Asian discrimination is positive and marginally correlated with
higher levels of linked fate (p<0.1). Asian millennials, who perceived discrimination
against Asians, are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Asian millennials
who do not perceive discrimination against Asians. The findings for both discrimination
measures in the study are consistent with research on Asian linked fate (Masuoka 2006).
Another finding that is positive and marginally significant is political interest (p<0.1).
Asian millennials, who are interested in politics, are more likely to have higher levels of
linked fate than Asian millennials who are not interested in politics.
However, national origin and perceived as immigrant do not shape Asian
millennial identity, which I would have expected to influence their identity as this group
is a new population and based on previous research demonstrating national origin to be
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influential (Masuoka 2006; Wong et al. 2011; Hayes and Skulley 2015). As shown in
table 2.10, this finding supports my hypotheses that social media engagement and
perceived discrimination against immigrants are not predictors of linked fate for Asian
millennials when compared to Latino millennials. Overall, these results show that Latino
millennial linked fate is shaped by different predictors when compared to non-Latino
millennials.
Table 2.10: Ordered Logistic Regressions for non-Latino millennials Predicting
Linked Fate

VARIABLES
Perceived Immigrant Discrimination X
Media Post
Perceived Immigrant Discrimination
Media Post
Experienced Racial Discrimination
Perceived Asian Discrimination
Political Interest
Female
Education (low to high)
Income (low to high)
Employed
Age
Asian Language
Generational Status
Chinese
Indian

Asian Millennials

Black Millennials

White Millennials

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

0.192

-0.028

-0.140

(0.372)

(0.240)

(0.132)

-0.038

0.023

-0.076

(0.279)

(0.168)

(0.094)

-0.699

0.489

1.128**

(1.230)

(0.859)

(0.454)

0.613*

0.715***

0.553***

(0.333)

(0.222)

(0.146)

0.434*

--

--

(0.233)

--

--

0.361*

0.223*

0.324***

(0.213)

(0.115)

(0.069)

-0.030

0.154

0.270**

(0.316)

(0.208)

(0.119)

0.133

0.078

-0.131**

(0.139)

(0.093)

(0.053)

0.005

-0.006

0.009

(0.051)

(0.038)

(0.019)

-0.168

0.299

0.956***

(0.479)

(0.237)

(0.162)

-0.039

-0.025

0.040***

(0.031)

(0.021)

(0.010)

-0.128

--

--

(0.775)

--

--

0.010

0.193

0.011

(0.309)

(0.144)

(0.128)

0.341

--

--

(0.483)

--

--

0.053

--

--

(0.421)

--

--
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Table 2.10: Ordered Logistic Regressions for non-Latino millennials Predicting
Linked Fate (Cont.)
VARIABLES
Japanese
Filipino
CA
NY
TX
Perceived Black Discrimination
Blacks Doing Economically Better
Perceived White Discrimination
/cut1
/cut2
/cut3

Asian Millennials

Black Millennials

White Millennials

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

1.010

--

--

(1.137)

--

---

0.515

--

(0.434)

--

--

-0.103

0.020

0.009

(0.358)

(0.420)

(0.177)

-0.559

0.118

0.424*

(0.543)

(0.358)

(0.250)

-0.282

0.047

-1.127***

(0.651)

(0.438)

(0.279)

--

0.243

--

--

(0.166)

--

--

-0.112

--

--

(0.091)

--

--

--

0.081

--

--

(0.060)

1.001

1.368

1.968***

(1.454)

(0.921)

(0.632)
2.134***

1.254

1.602*

(1.454)

(0.922)

(0.633)

3.553**

3.258***

4.708***

(1.482)

(0.935)

(0.644)

Observations

1,110

1,051

237

Pseudo R-squared

0.0566

0.0583

0.0558

-179.04105

-411.8928

-1413.3342

Log Likelihood
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.11: Comparison of Predictors of Linked Fate for Millennials by Race and
Ethnicity with Average Marginal Effects for “A Lot” of Linked Fate
Latino Millennials
Experienced Racial
Discrimination = .17

Latino Non-millennials
Experienced Racial
Discrimination = .10

Anti-Latino Rhetoric = .03

Perceived Latino
Discrimination = .04

Political Interest = .07

Political Interestt = .02

t

Gender (female) = .06

Gender (female) = -.01

Geography (CA) = .10
Spanish = -.16

Geography (CA)t = .05

Asian Millennials
Experienced Racial
Discrimination t =
.10
Perceived Asian
Discrimination t =
.04
Political Interest t =
.02

Black Millennials
Experienced Racial
Discrimination =
.14
Political Interest =
.04

Notes: The t symbol states that the result is marginally significant.
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White Millennials
Media Post = .13

Experienced Racial
Discrimination = .06
Political Interest =
.04
Gender (female) =
.03
Education = -.02
Employed = .11
Age = .00
NY t = .05
TX = -.13

Moreover, table 2.9 also shows the predictors of black millennial linked fate.
Once again, the interaction for perceived immigrant discrimination X media post is not
significant for black millennials. Neither are posting on social media and perceived
immigrant discrimination. These findings support my theory that perceptions of
immigrant discrimination and social media posts do not predict higher levels of linked
fate for non-Latino millennials. The results highlight that only experienced racial
discrimination and political interest serve as predictors for black millennial linked fate.
Experienced racial discrimination is positive and strongly correlated with linked fate
(p<0.01). In other words, black millennials who experience racial discrimination are more
likely to have higher levels of linked fate than black millennials who have not
experienced racial discrimination. This finding is supported by previous research on
black identity that demonstrates racial discrimination influences black identity due to the
position of blacks in American society (Dawson 1994). Political interest is positive and
marginally correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.1). Black millennials that are
interested in politics are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than black
millennials who are not interested in politics. When comparing Latino millennial identity
to black millennials their identity in table 2.10, the results show that identity for both
groups is shaped by distinct factors. These results support my theory that Latino
millennials identity is constructed differently for Latinos than non-Latino millennials.
Lastly, table 2.9 shows the model for white millennial linked fate. With regards to
white millennials, the interaction for perceived immigrant discrimination X media post is
not significant for white millennials. Neither is perceived immigrant discrimination.
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These findings support my theory that perceptions of immigrant discrimination do not
predict higher levels of linked fate for non-Latino millennials. This model shows that
white millennial linked fate varies from Latino millennial identity in some respects. First,
engaging in social media positively and is significantly correlated with higher levels of
linked fate (p<0.05). Therefore, white millennials who post on social media are more
likely to have higher levels of linked fate than white millennials who do not post on
social media. This finding can be attributed to higher levels of SES, which are associated
with certain groups having more internet access (Milner 2010). In short, these results
support my hypothesis that perceived immigrant discrimination will not shape non-Latino
millennial linked fate when compared to Latino millennials.
Other variables that predict linked fate among white millennial are experienced
racial discrimination, political interest, gender, education, employment, age, geography.
Experienced racial discrimination is positive and significantly correlated with higher
levels of linked fate (p<0.01). White millennials who experience racial discrimination are
more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than white millennials who have not
experienced racial discrimination. This finding can be attributed to reverse discrimination
against this group (Jardina 2019). In other words, discrimination against white
millennials from other racial and ethnic groups can fuel a higher sense of linked fate for
this group. Jardina (2019) argues that whites knowing they are becoming a minority is a
form racial threat and serves as a motivator for racial identity and thus is a reason racial
discrimination shapes white identity. Political interest is positive and significantly
correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). White millennials that are interested
in politics are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than white millennials that
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do not have higher levels of linked fate. Gender is also positive and significantly
correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.05). White female millennials are more
likely to have higher levels of linked fate when compared to white male millennials.
Additionally, education is negative and significantly correlated with higher levels
of linked fate (p<0.05). White millennials with higher levels of education are less likely
to have higher levels of linked fate when compared to white millennials with lower levels
of education. This finding is supported by studies on white identity that shows that less
educated whites have greater levels of group identity than more educated whites (Jardina
2019). Employment is positive and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked
fate (p<0.01). White millennials who are employed are more likely to have higher levels
of linked fate than white millennials who are not employed. Age is also positive and
significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). Older white millennials
are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than younger white millennials. When
examining geography, New York and Texas are correlated with linked fate. The measure
for New York is positive and marginally correlated with higher levels of linked fate
(p<0.1). White millennials residing in New York are more likely to have higher levels of
linked fate than white millennials not residing in New York. The measure for Texas is
negative and significantly correlated with higher levels of linked fate (p<0.01). White
millennials who reside in Texas are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate than
white millennials who do not reside in Texas. This finding can be due to different
political cultures found in various states that shape different individuals’ identities and
different results might be found when controlling for different geographic locations
where whites reside at higher rates or have a more pronounced white identity (Jardina
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2019). In sum, as illustrated in table 2.10 white millennial identity is constructed by
different predictors when compared to Latino millennials.6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I try to examine what predicts linked fate for Latino millennials
and whether predictors of linked fate vary among Latino millennials when compared to
non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials. I argue that engagement in social
media and perceptions of discrimination against immigrants, in addition to the anti-Latino
political climate, will increase Latino millennial linked fate when compared to nonLatino millennials. Overall, the results show that Latino millennials are not necessarily
impacted by social media and discrimination against immigrants, but what is found is that
there is some variation in what variables shape linked fate among Latino millennials and
non-Latino millennials.
When only assessing predictors of linked fate for millennials and non-millennials,
my theory is supported that social media use is a predictor of linked fate among
millennials. In other words, social media use among millennials results in higher levels of
linked fate than it does for non-millennial social media use. The high usage of social
media by millennials leads them to share and expose racial content to other social media
users (Rainie and Perrin 2016). This same effect is not present for non-millennials, as
they do not use social media to the same degree as millennials. Thus, this finding is
fascinating because it shows the strong influence of social media in shaping identity
among millennials.

6

For results on non-Latino non-millennials please see Appendix D.
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Specifically, when examining Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials,
there are interesting results suggesting variation in predictors shaping linked fate for
Latinos by generations. First, experienced racial discrimination results in higher levels of
linked fate for Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials. For Latino millennials,
anti-Latino rhetoric is a mobilizing factor shaping their linked fate (Perez 2015; Ramírez
2013). While this finding predicts Latino millennial linked fate, it does not predict Latino
non-millennial linked fate. This finding is interesting because it suggests that the current
anti-Latino climate does not have the same effect for all Latinos and that it has distinct
impacts by generations of Latinos. Another interesting finding is perceived Latino
discrimination, which does not influence Latino millennial linked fate, but it does
influence Latino non-millennial linked fate. As a result of persistent discrimination
witnessed over time by older generations of Latinos this might be the reason why Latino
millennials are not impacted by perceptions of Latino discrimination. Gender is another
interesting result suggesting a possible gender gap across generations. Latina millennials
are more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Latino millennials. Additionally,
Latina non-millennials are less likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Latino nonmillennials. These results do not follow previous research on Latino linked fate as one
study poses that Latinas have lower levels of linked fate than Latinos (Sanchez and
Masuoka 2010). While another study shows that Latinas have higher levels of linked fate
than Latinos (Masuoka 2006). My study adds to the study of linked fate among Latinos to
show that the gender gap might be a result of differences in generations.
Differences among linked fate for Latino generations is the role of Spanish
language and geography. Only for Latino millennials does Spanish language result in a
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lower likelihood of having higher levels of linked fate. For Latino non-millennials,
Spanish language does not shape linked fate. Lastly, with regards to geography, living in
California has a more pronounced impact on higher levels of linked fate for Latino
millennials than Latino non-millennials. This shows that for Latino millennials,
geography is highly important in resulting in higher levels of linked fate when compared
to Latino non-millennials. Ultimately, linked fate is predicted by different factors for
Latino millennials, when compared to Latino non-millennials, and demonstrates that
linked fate varies to some extent among Latino generations.
Moreover, when comparing Latino millennial predictors of linked fate to nonLatino millennials, I find differences in what variables shape linked fate among racial and
ethnic groups of millennials. Among the similarities of Latino millennials and non-Latino
millennial are experienced racial discrimination and political interest. Experienced racial
discrimination is a result of past and current racial tensions that continues to be prevalent
in American society (Gonzales 1993). The differences among millennials emerged due to
anti-Latino rhetoric from the 2016 presidential election, which was specifically targeted
against Mexican immigrants (Sanchez and Gomez Aguinaga 2017). This same effect was
not present for non-Latino millennials and supports my theoretical framework of antiLatino political climate and the persistent racialization of Latinos as immigrants. Some
noteworthy results among non-Latino millennials is the role perceived Asian
discrimination has on increasing linked fate among Asian millennials. Discrimination, in
general, has been a consistent predictor for Asian American linked fate (Masuoka 2006).
In addition to Asian millennials, some interesting results are due to only two measures
predicting linked fate for black millennials. However, these finding are consistent with
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the literature that discrimination is one of the driving factors for blacks linked fate in
American politics as it was previously noted in the literature (Dawson 1994; McClain et
al. 2009). This finding varies from Latino millennials because the anti-Latino political
climate is a strong predictor for this groups linked fate. When examining white
millennials as the compare to Latino millennials, the results suggest that differences
between these groups are present as a result of social media engagement among whites
and not Latinos, differences in SES, age, geography and the anti-Latino climate. For
white millennials, SES plays a role in predicting linked fate, which it does not for Latino
millennials. Also, age, and living in Texas and New York shape the linked fate of white
millennials. This does not hold for Latino millennials, as SES and age do not shape
linked fate among this group but living in California does result in higher levels of linked
fate for Latino millennials. In sum, Latino millennial’s linked fate is shaped by distinct
factors than they are for non-Latino millennials, which shows that identity varies among
the millennial generation.
Moreover, further research needs to assess the role of exposure to racial content
on social media when compared to traditional media platforms. Expanding on this can
yield to new insights of understanding how the amount of racial content on the media
impacts the predictors of linked fate among racial and ethnic groups. Additionally,
studies need to further examine exposure to social media content that is specific to
gender. In this study, I found differences among Latinas and Latinos, which needs to be
explored further to assess whether there is a variation of linked fate as it pertains to
gender and how this can play out politically among the Latino community. These are just
a few areas that can be expanded upon from this study.
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Chapter 3
Linked Fate and Latino Millennial Political Participation
INTRODUCTION
The millennial generation is composed of 80 million individuals who were born
between 1981 and 1998 (Fry 2016; Hayes-Bautista 2017). This generation surpasses
generation X, baby boomers, and the silent generation (Winograd and Hais 2011). Based
on the large numbers some might believe that this generation would be adequately
represented in American politics; however, that is not necessarily the case. Millennials
may have strength in numbers, but their size is not reflected by their turnout rates. These
young adult voters air towards a preference for protest politics rather than voting
(Milkman 2017; Twenge 2006; Winograd and Hais 2011). Out of the millennial
generation 62 percent are eligible to vote in comparison to 70 percent of baby boomers
and 57 percent of generation X (Fry 2016). Upon examination of the turnout rates of
these eligible voters into actual votes, the Pew Research Center (2016), highlights that in
the 2016 presidential election only 51 percent of millennials voted when compared to 69
percent of baby boomers and 51 percent of generation X (Fry 2016).
This gap in political participation among generations is primarily a result of age.
As research in political behavior finds that younger adults tend to vote at lower rates than
older adults due to a variety of factors that include lower levels of socioeconomic status
that creates a barrier for young adults starting out in life to become more involved in
politics (Plutzer 2002; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone
1980).These low levels of turnout among young adults is not a new concern among
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scholars of political behavior, but what makes this generation much more interesting,
revolves around other characteristics of the millennial generation not exclusive to age.
The intriguing characteristic of this generation is based on their racial and ethnic
diversity. Millennials have a racial and ethnic breakdown of 38 percent Latino, 34
percent black, 31 percent Asian, and 25 percent white (Frey 2016). This characteristic
deserves more scholarly attention due to the lack of examination of race and ethnicity
with regards to generational cohorts. Studies in racial and ethnic politics point to potential
differences in political participation patterns among racial and ethnic groups, when
compared to whites, which in most cases arise from racial and ethnic minorities having
lower levels of turnout than whites (Verba et al. 1995; Sanchez 2006a; Stokes-Brown
2003; Valdez 2011; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Ramakrishnan 2005; Wong 2006).
These differences in political participation have been measured in these studies in terms
of electoral and non-electoral political activities. As a result of the racial and ethnic
diversity of millennials and general low levels of turnout among this generation, this
study explores whether previous trends of political participation, measured as both
electoral and non-electoral activities, among racial and ethnic minorities are still present
among millennials. Specifically, I inquire if engagement in politics varies by racial and
ethnic groups? Lastly, I ask if Latino millennials are motivated to participate in politics
due to immigrant-based linked fate when compared to non-Latino millennials.
Furthermore, studies in identity politics show a connection between racial and
ethnic identity and political behavior of racial and ethnic minorities (Sanchez 2006a;
Masuoka 2008; Valdez 2011; Stokes-Brown 2003; Dowe et al. 2018; Sanchez and
Medeiros 2016; Chong and Rogers 2005; Dawson 1994; Verba and Nie 1972; Valenzuela
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and Michelson 2016; Vargas, Sanchez, and Valdez 2017). Based on studies in racial and
ethnic politics demonstrating variation in political behavior by race and ethnicity due to
an individual’s identity, this study focuses on the role of identity as a motivator for
potential distinctions among millennials political behavior, which would demonstrate that
millennials are not a monolithic generational cohort. Also, previous research in racial and
ethnic politics suggests that linked fate may operate differently for Latinos and Asian
when compared to Blacks (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Sanchez and Vargas 2016;
Masuoka 2006; Junn and Masuoka 2008), and a lack of work connecting linked fate to
participation for other racial and ethnic groups. This study attempts to understand the
relationship between linked fate and political participation among Latino and non-Latino
millennials. This research is contributing to literature in political participation,
generational research, and racial and ethnic politics by examining the association of
linked fate with political behavior of Latino and non-Latino millennials and if potential
differences are present among millennials.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Traditional Models of Political Participation
Several scholars in political behavior and race and ethnicity have conducted
studies on the political behavior of minority groups (Hero 1992; Leighley 1990; Leighley
and Vedilitz 1999; Verba and Nie 1972; Sanchez 2006a; Shingles 1981; Stokes-Brown
2003; Valdez 2011). Most studies of political behavior use dominant theories of
participation to explain why Americans engage in politics. Broadly speaking, political
participation is defined as the engagement in a variety of activities citizens participate in
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to influence government, elect public officials, and governmental policies (Conway
2001).
Dominant theories of political participation are centered on the role
socioeconomic status (SES) and political orientations play in contributing to higher levels
of engagement in political activities (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978;
Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995). The socioeconomic model which states that
higher levels of income and education translate into higher levels of participation among
a variety of political activities (Verba and Nie 1972; Kenny 1992; Leighley 1990). In
addition to SES, political attitudes are found to have a positive impact on higher levels of
political participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Liu 2001). Some of the political
attitudes used to explain higher levels of engagement in political activities are trust in
government, political interest, external and internal efficacy (Campbell et al. 1976).
Additionally, research shows that partisanship and party strength contribute to political
participation because they lower the cost of voting among constituents (North 1990;
Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). In other words, partisan attachment and strength has is
a resource to reduce costs among the electorate and promote voting because individuals
will use their partisan attachment as a heuristic for voting. However, while these theories
of political participation explain patterns of participation for whites, they do not all
applied equally to racial and ethnic minorities.
A consistent finding in several studies of political participation is the lower levels
of participation among racial and ethnic minorities when compared to whites (Leighley
and Vedlitz 1999; Leighley 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005; Verba et al. 1995). For instance,
Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) conducted a study examining several models of political
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participation and found interesting differences across racial and ethnic minorities. Some
of the similarities were that overall SES, psychological resources and social
connectedness theories all predicted participation among whites and racial and ethnic
minorities (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Additionally, the study found that group
consciousness did not apply to Blacks and Asians and that group conflict only explained
white participation (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). However, other studies on group
consciousness applied to Latino participation finds the opposite effect and that group
consciousness does influence political participation among Latinos (Sanchez 2006a;
Masuoka 2008). In short, political participation among racial and ethnic minorities varies
across groups.
In addition to all the previous models of political participation, many scholars find
political mobilization to be a strong motivator of political participation (Gerber and
Green 2000; Ramirez 2005; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Research shows that the
decline in turnout is a result of a lack of mobilization strategies aimed at Americans and
particularly among racial and ethnic minorities (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Leighley
2001; Ramirez 2005; Gerber and Green 2000). For instance, this model of political
participation highlights the importance of reaching out to voters and enticing them to
attend the polls (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Some of the avenues used to target and
mobilize voters is through non-political and political campaigns aimed at registering
voters to vote or asking voters if they are aware of an upcoming political campaign
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Leighley 2001; Ramirez 2005; Gerber and Green 2000;
Michelson 2005). Specific strategies for voter mobilization are asking voters to register to
vote, phone banks, door-to-door canvasing efforts, and direct mail (Gerber and Green
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2000; Ulbig and Waggener 2011). However, concerns with political mobilization emerge
from discrepancies among racial and ethnic minority voters and the low levels of
mobilization efforts aimed at mobilizing this segment of the electorate (Leighley 2001;
Ramirez 2005). Other issues with political mobilization are based on lack of English
proficiency, nativity, and deciding who to send as a messenger to mobilize the Latino
electorate (Michelson 2005; Michelson and Garcia Bedolla 2014; Garcia Bedolla and
Michelson 2012). Each of these models explaining political participation do not apply
equally to all racial and ethnic minorities. In short, these models of political participation
ultimately tap in to the motivators of why some individuals participate in politics and
why others do not.
Group Identity and Political Behavior
Moreover, SES, political orientations, and political mobilization are not the only
predictors of political participation. Among one other predictor for political participation
is the group consciousness. Group consciousness is the in-group identification politicized
by several ideological beliefs about one’s group’s social standing, as well the perception
that collective action is the appropriate action groups can take to improve its status and
promote its interests (Jackman and Jackman 1973; Gurin et al. 1980, Miller et al. 1981,
Conover 1988, Chong and Rogers 2005; McClain and Stewart 2006). Studies on group
consciousness and political participation suggest that certain minority groups have higher
levels of political participation because of group consciousness, which is not predicted by
traditional models of participation (Miller et al.1981; Sanchez 2006a; Stokes-Brown
2003; Leighley 2001; Shingles 1981). While studies of group consciousness first emerged
as an explanation for Black political participation in comparison to whites (Olsen 1970;
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Verba and Nie 1972), recent research applies group consciousness as motivator for
Latino political participation and shows that group consciousness indeed influences
political participation for various minority groups (Sanchez 2006a; Stokes-Brown 2003;
Valdez 2011; Masuoka 2008). In other words, disadvantaged groups political engagement
is best explained by the concept of group consciousness (Leighley 2001; Olson 1965;
Verba and Nie 1972). Due to several studies pointing to the role of racial and ethnic
minority identity as an explanation for political participation among these groups, it is
necessary to address how non-traditional theories of political participation influence
political participation among minority groups.
Besides higher levels of political participation, group consciousness encourages
coalition formation among racial and ethnic minorities (Garcia 2000; Kaufmann 2003;
Sanchez 2008; Uhlaner 1991; Dowe et al. 2018) and influences public opinion among
minority groups (Dawson 1994; Hochschild 1995; Sanchez 2006b; Sanchez and
Medieros 2016; Vargas et al. 2017). Whereas traditional theories of political behavior
examine the role of SES as explanations for the participation of Americans as a whole,
recent enlightenments from race and ethnicity points to the importance of applying
identity politics into the study of political behavior of historically disadvantaged groups,
such as Blacks, Latinos, and Asians. Therefore, emphasize is fixed on examining
millennials through a racial and ethnic lens to shed light on potential new avenues that
can lead to unlocking other ways of promoting the political engagement and behavior of
this generation.
Before providing a discussion of linked fate and political behavior, a brief
clarification is needed on the differences between group consciousness and linked fate.
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Both concepts are not one in the same. Group consciousness and linked fate vary in terms
of measurement and conceptualization. For instance, group consciousness, as previously
noted, is based on in-group identification of ideological beliefs about the individuals
group standing in society (Sanchez and Vargas 2016). Additionally, group consciousness
has been measured in several ways. For instance, Uhlaner (1989) uses only one measure
to account for group consciousness, which consists of whether a respondent is a member
of an American ethnic or nonethnic organization. While other scholars use several
measures to capture the various dimensions of group consciousness (Sanchez 2006a;
Miller et al. 1981; Garcia 2003). The dimensions used to measure group consciousness
are group identity, recognition of disadvantaged status, and the desire for collective
action to overcome the disadvantage status (Garcia 2003; Miller et al. 1981). This is a
summary of the conceptualization and measurement of group consciousness.
On the other hand, linked fate emerges from African American’s scholarship and
finds that Blacks who perceive that their fates are tied to other Blacks will lead them to
think about their own racial group and will make political choices based on their racial
group (Dawson 1994). Dawson (1994) operationalizes linked fate by using a different
measurement strategy than group consciousness. He asks respondents a two-step question
about their fates being linked to their racial group and follows up by asking to what
extent their fates are linked. Therefore, both concepts capture and measure different
aspects of group identity and linked fate should not be confused with group
consciousness.
Linked Fate and Political Behavior
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Literature has established that group consciousness and linked fate is correlated
with political participation. Linked fate is a theory primarily developed to explain why
African Americans’ have political cohesion in American politics even when they have
varying socioeconomic levels (Dawson 1994; Hochschild 1992). Linked fate in the
African American context is defined by Dawson (1994) as African Americans who
perceive their individual fates to be tied to those of their racial group are more likely to
rely on group-based interests when they make political decisions. In other words, African
Americas who feel their fate is tied to other blacks will be more likely to vote for certain
policies or political candidates that have the best interests of their community. Several
studies on linked fate and African Americans point towards a clear relationship between
linked fate and political participation (Dawson 1994; Simien 2006; Tate 1993; McClain
et al. 2009; Chong and Rogers 2005).
However, scholars argue that linked fate should only be used among the Black
population and not applied to other racial and ethnic groups (McClain et al. 2009). One
argument stems from using linked fate, a concept primarily developed for African
Americans, on other racial groups, but this is not necessarily the case as not all racial and
ethnic groups have been racialized in the same manner as African Americans have in
America (McClain et al. 2009; Kim 1999). In other words, other groups such as Latinos
and Asians, have different experiences with discrimination and socialization into
American society that yield different experiences of identity construction in comparison
to African Americans (McClain and Stewart 2006). Additionally, immigration impacts
the levels of assimilation into American society of Asians and Latinos, which produce
different constructions of identity among these two groups not necessarily experienced by

79

African Americans (McClain et al. 2009). Therefore, caution should be used when trying
to employ linked fate among other groups other than African Americans.
Even though scholars argue that concepts of linked fate should be carefully
evaluated before they are transferred to other groups (McClain et al. 2009), other studies
do use linked fate among other populations and find that linked fate is a prevalent
concept among other populations (Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Barreto,
Masuoka, and Sanchez 2008; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Sanchez and Vargas 2016). One
study in particular, tests whether linked fate can be applied to other racial groups other
than Blacks (Sanchez and Vargas 2016). The study by Sanchez and Vargas (2016) finds
that the measures and conceptualization of linked fate is efficient for studying Blacks.
However, when studying non-Hispanic whites, Asians, and Latinos, these measure of
linked fate does not squarely fit among these populations. Additionally, studies on linked
fate and political participation among non-Blacks shows that linked fate is a predictor for
political participation for non-Blacks, such as Asians (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2003,
2008). Even with several studies examining linked fate among minority groups, less is
still known about the implications of linked fate on political participation for other racial
and ethnic groups, such as Latinos and generational cohorts, in this case the millennial
generation.
Gaps in the Literature
Some gaps this study attempts to fill are those with regards to literature in
political participation and linked fate. First, research on linked fate and political
participation is scant with regards to Latinos and particularly with regards to generational
differences among Latinos. Secondly, research on linked fate tends to specifically use the
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measures of linked fate developed by Dawson (1994). While using Dawson’s measure is
essential, there needs to be an expansion of this measure to assess other potential
dimensions of group connectedness experienced by Latinos. Through the implementation
of an immigrant-based linked fate measure there will be a more comprehensive analysis
of Latino identity and political participation. As will be further discussed in the next
section, Latinos are gravely affected by the role immigration plays in their lives, even if
they are not themselves immigrant or know someone who is an immigrant. Thus, using a
measure of immigrant-based linked fate to assess whether connectedness to the
immigrant community influences political participation among Latino millennials who
are targets of anti-Latino and anti-immigrant rhetoric is merited and a contribution to
Latino politics.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Historically the way Americans racialize immigrants has shifted in recent
decades. In the current U.S. political climate when individuals visualize an immigrant,
they are primed to envision a Latino or an individual of Mexican origin (Chavez 2013).
These patterns of racialization have extended in to the present; through current political
elites and trickling down to the masses. The most recent presidential campaign serves as
an example of the current racialization of Latinos (Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga 2017).
Then, Republican presidential candidate Trump, specifically attacked Mexicans by
describing them with derogatory terms (White 2016; Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga
2017). These attacks on the Mexican community transcend to Latinos and perpetuate
negative perceptions of Latinos. The negative connotations of Latinos not only apply to
various sub-national groups of Latinos but also impacts Latinos regardless of their levels
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of assimilation. In other words, Latinos who are second-generation and beyond also feel
the effects of being fitted into the image of Latino immigrants by American society, even
when they themselves are U.S. born citizens. The racialization of Latinos intersects with
nativity and ethnicity to create more discrimination of this group.
Present studies on belonging of Latinos millennials in U.S. context examine how
assigned and perceived race impacts the lives of these individuals (Flores-Gonzalez
2017). Latino millennials in a recent study describe the way individuals will perceive
them and, in some cases, attack them due to their ethnic background (Flores-Gonzalez
2017). Several of these vignettes discuss in-depth how having darker or lighter skin
influence racial perceptions of these individuals. For instance, one of the interviewees
illustrates a situation where a white individual tells them to go back to Mexico even when
this individual is a U.S. citizen (Flores-Gonzalez 2017). This interviewee, however, is not
of Mexican descent. This story illustrates how the racializing immigrants as Mexicans
affects other Latinos who do not identify as Mexican or of Mexican descent and how
these perceptions of Latinos also apply toward Latinos who are U.S. citizens.
Furthermore, this racialization of Latinos as immigrants regardless of nativity and
national origin should serve as motivator for linked fate among Latino millennials. In
other words, when examining Latino millennials, specifically, I expect that the measure
for linked fate will impact political participation for Latino millennials as a result of the
anti-Latino climate during the 2016 election. With regards to non-Latino millennials, I
argue that linked fate should also impact political behavior among non-Latino
millennials, but that there should be differences as a result of the racial and ethnic identity
of each group. Linked fate should still matter the most for Black millennials as this is a
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measure derived from the African American experience (Dawson 1994). Based on this
discussion, I employ linked fate as a theoretical explanation for Latino millennial
political participation and for other millennials. Studies on linked fate have shown that
having greater attachments to one’s group is positively correlated with greater levels of
civic engagement. First, I aim to test the role of the traditional measure of linked fate to
examine this measure still holds in contemporary studies of Latino millennial political
participation and compare it to non-Latino millennials to assess potential differences
among racial and ethnic millennials.
Literature on linked fate presents a clear relationship between Blacks with higher
linked fate and an increase in their levels of political participation (Dawson 1994;
McClain and Stewart 2006). Scholarship in Black politics demonstrates that blacks with
higher levels of linked fate are more inclined to be civically engaged (Dawson 1994).
Traditionally, linked fate has been measured by providing respondents questions
assessing their attachments to their groups. Primarily surveys present individuals with
one question “Do you think what happens generally to [insert race of individual] people
in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” This question
when answered with an affirmation, the respondent is then followed by a question
assessing the levels a respondent is connected to their group: “Will it affect you a lot,
some, or not very much?” Based on these questions, linked fate is quantified and
examined for this portion of the analysis.
Moreover, following the use of the traditional measure of linked fate, there is a
sub analysis examining a variation of the traditional linked fate measure by including a
measure of immigrant-based linked fate. From the traditional measure of linked fate is
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drawn a new measure of linked fate that aims to tap into immigrant-based group
connectedness. Immigrant-based linked fate is measured using the following question,
“What happens generally to immigrants in this country will have something to do with
what happens in your life?” The only difference with this question that is does not follow
the same two-step question approach. In other words, Dawson’s (1994) linked fate
questions, as discussed previously, askes respondents to identify with a racial group then
askes to what degree. This immigrant-based linked fate question dives right into asking
respondents to what degree they feel connected to immigrants in general. While, the
traditional measures of linked fate and immigrant-based linked fate follows a similar
scheme, the immigrant-based measure directly asks about attachments to immigrants and
does not differentiate between the racial and ethnic background of the immigrant. Thus,
this measure provides an appropriate understanding of immigrant-based linked fate and
adequately operationalizes immigrant-based linked fate that can be used to distinguish
potential differences among racial and ethnic groups as a result of immigration.
I argue that immigrant-based linked fate should be strongest among Latino
millennials due to the perceptions of Latinos as immigrants. Non-Latino millennials,
therefore, should not have a strong degree of immigrant-based linked fate because nonLatinos are not racialized as immigrants to the same gradation as Latinos (Hurwitz,
Peffley, and Mondak 2015). Less is known about other dimensions of group
connectedness, such as immigrant group connectedness with regards to its relationship to
political participation. Thus, this theoretical framework aims to address the potential
differences among Latino millennials and non-Latino millennials, by examining them
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through the angles of immigrant-based linked fate. Based on these theoretical
expectations, I develop the following hypotheses:
H1: Millennials with higher levels of linked fate will be more likely to participate
in more political activities than millennials with lower levels of linked fate, regardless of
race and when controlling for other factors.
H2: Immigrant-based linked fate will be higher among Latino millennials than it
will be for non-Latino millennials and have a more pronounced relationship with
political participation for Latinos.
DATA AND METHODS
To test the role of linked fate on the political participation among millennials, I
employ the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016 (Barreto et al.
2017). The CMPS 2016 is an adequate dataset due to its inclusion of variables of linked
fate, several political participation variables, and the large ethnic and racial samples. The
total number of observations in the dataset are 10,145 and were collected online between
the dates of December 3, 2016 to February 15, 2017. The survey is available in six
different languages which are English, Spanish, Chinese (simplified), Chinese
(traditional), Korean, and Vietnamese.
This survey also samples both registered and non-registered voters. The full data
are weighted within each racial group to match the adult population in the 2015 Census
ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration
status. A post-stratification raking algorithm was used to balance each category within +/1 percent of the ACS estimates. Data are not weighted to their national combined racial
average. That is, Whites account for 10 percent of all cases, and each racial group
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roughly 30 percent. Additionally, appended to this survey is the validated voter measure
for years 2008 to 2016 for respondents in the survey. In other words, individuals who
reported that they voted where verified through voter records to assess if these
individuals did indeed vote. The total sample across different racial and ethnic groups are
displayed in table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Overall Survey Sample Size Description

Registered to Vote
Not Registered
Total

Total
6,024
4,121
10,145

Latino
1,816
1,187
3,003

Black
2,002
1,100
3,102

Asian
1,503
1,503
3,006

White
703
331
1,034

As mentioned, this survey was administered on the web. Some might argue web
surveys have problems because not all of the U.S. population has internet access and due
to possible issues with sampling strategies of online surveys (Couper and Miller 2008;
Dillman 2006; Bethlehem 2010). Surveys administered online can experience limitations
since the entire population can lack internet access (Couper 2000). Even though there are
potential concerns with web-based surveys, there are also benefits of web-based surveys.
Some of those benefits specifically with regards to collecting large amounts of responses
and targeting various segments of the population (Bethlehem 2010). But with regards
with the validity of this survey, the principal investigators themselves attest to the
accuracy of the data and support its use for scholarly work (Barreto et al. 2018). The PI’s
used the following sampling method coined the random-recruit-to-web (RRW) (Barreto
et al. 2018). This method uses the “official voter file of registered voters, which now
contains about 40% of respondents with an email address either volunteered or matched
through external databases” (Barreto et al. 2018, p. 3). These scholars then went through
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these records and sorted them by racial and ethnic group, age, and SES and then asked
randomly selected participants (Barreto et al. 2018). According to the PI’s this is almost
the same tactic used in telephone surveys of registered voters. In sum, even with issues
with web-surveys the sampling method and methodical approach by the PI’s suggests that
this survey is a valid instrument.
Next, is an overview of the total sample of millennials by race and ethnicity. The
total number of millennials is 4,515 out of 10,134.7 There is a lack of consensus as to
when to end the millennial generation, with some researchers ending millennials in 1996
(Jiang 2018) and others in the early 2000s (Greenberg and Weber 2008). Thus, I
distinguish millennials to be individuals born from 1981 to 1998 (Hayes-Bautista 2017;
Fry 2016). Based on research on millennials my cut of meets the requirements for an
adequate depiction of millennials. The sample break down for millennials by race and
ethnicity in the CMPS 2016 is shown below in table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Millennial Sample Size Description
Total

Latino Millennials

Black Millennials

Asian Millennials

White Millennials

Registered to Vote

1,784

747

528

397

112

Not Registered

2,731

816

741

1,001

173

Total

4,515

1,563

1,269

1,398

285

Prior studies demonstrate that group identity predicts political engagement among
racial and ethnic groups, which serves as a motivator for further analysis on racial
identity among millennials (Chong and Rogers 2005; Dawson 1994; Sanchez 2006a;
Stokes-Brown 2003). While research on group identity shows that political participation
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I lost 12 cases due to missing data in the age variable.
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influences political behavior, I decide to focus on another aspect of identity politics,
which is linked fate. One reasoning for this is that linked fate and group consciousness
differ in conceptualization and measurement (McClain et al. 2009; Sanchez and Vargas
2016). Another reason behind using linked fate is the lack of research on the relationship
between linked fate and political participation among Latinos. Additionally, a new
measure readily available from the CMPS 2016 on immigrant-based linked fate allows
for new examination of other dimensions of linked fate and political participation.
Therefore, the traditional linked fate measure and its new counterpart are included as key
independent variables of this study.
The key independent variables are both based on linked fate measures. The first
key independent variable is linked fate constructed by using the binary measure of linked
fate (coded 1=yes linked fate and 0=no linked fate) with the ordinal variable of how
much linked fate (coded 1=not very much, 2=some and 3=a lot). The two questions on
linked fate that I combine are “do you think what happens generally to people in this
country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” and “Will it affect
you.” I opt for this coding scheme to be consistent with several studies on group identity
and linked fate (Sanchez 2006a; Stokes-Brown 2003; Sanchez and Vargas 2016). The
second key independent variable is immigrant-based linked fate and is an ordinal measure
(coded 1= not at all, 2= not much, 3= some, and 4= a lot) derived from the question
“What happens generally to immigrants in this country will have something to do with
what happens in your life.”8 This question also follows the adequate coding scheme used
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For original question wording and variable coding see Appendix B.
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in the literature and in table 3.3 the summary statistics are shown for the linked fate
variables.9
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variables

Observations Mean

Min. Max

1.743043
2.380797
2.500924

Standard
Deviation
2.132419
1.161638
0.971707

Political Activities
Linked Fate
Immigrant-Based
Linked Fate
Combined Linked Fate
Millennials
Non-Millennials
Voter Mobilization
Political Interest
Party Strength
Internal Efficacy
External Efficacy
Female
Education
Income
Employed
Age
Spanish
Generational Status
Perceived as Immigrant
Latino
Black
Asian
White
Mexican
Cuban
Puerto Rican
Asian Language
Chinese
Indian
Japanese
Filipino

10,134
10,134
8,117

0
1
1

10
4
4

10,134
10,134
10,134
9,087
10,134
6,640
10,134
10,134
10,116
10,134
9,234
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,128
2,997
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
2,997
2,997
2,997
10,134
3,005
3,005
3,005
3,005

2.733373
.4455299
.5544701
.2649939
2.770476
0.5783133
3.181764
3.486185
.6534203
4.273633
5.184211
.8645155
40.63193
.035524
2.221959
2.835502
.2957371
.3058022
.2965265
.1019341
.4991658
.0533867
.1634968
.0095717
.3184692
.1607321
.1207987
.1364393

1.031507
.4970487
.4970487
.4413543
.9134091
0.4938661
1.144249
1.01063
.475904
1.16396
3.47524
.3422572
15.52016
.1851092
.8147837
1.404967
.4563959
.4607691
.4567484
.3025765
.5000827
.2248409
.3698801
.0973707
.4659601
.3673448
.3259474
.3433115

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
18
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

4
1
1
1
4
1
5
5
1
6
12
1
98
1
3
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

9

Additional analysis was conducted by using a combined 4-point scale of both the
original linked fate measure and immigrant-based linked fate measure for Latinos,
Asians, and blacks by generational cohorts. For additional information see Appendix E
for supplemental tables. These tables are not included in the paper or the modeling
approach.
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Moreover, the dependent variable is a count variable of the cumulative score of
the amount of political activities engaged in by individuals. This variable is constructed
by using the following political activities: voting (validated measure), working for a
candidate, contributing money for a campaign, wearing a campaign button or pin,
contacting a public official, protesting, boycotting, working to solve a community
problem, and attending a community meeting. The validated vote measure when
compared to the self-reported voter measure shows differences in the distribution of both
variables. Figure 3.1 shows the self-reported vote measure compared to the validated vote
measure and depicts that turnout is higher for the self-reported measure. However, when
cross-checking the self-reported measure with the voter files of the respondents in the
survey, we find that those who reported that they voted did not vote. In the self-reported
measures 92 percent of respondents mentioned they voted and in the validated vote
measure 70 percent said they voted. Specifically, there is a 20 percent difference in those
who self-reported they voted when compared to the validated vote measure of those who
voted. This is an important contribution to the literature because actual voter rates are
being accounted for in the population.
The intent of the scale for political activities variable is to quantify and measure
political participation beyond the mere scope of voting and to include a wide variety of
political activities. The distribution of the variable consists of a scale from 0 to 10 and
consists of the amount of participation in political activities.10 Table 3.4 shows the
distribution of the dependent variable, the mean of the scale, and the distribution by race

Cronbach’s alpha for the dependent variable of political activities represents 80% of the correlation between these set
of political variables, insuring the reliability of the scale and has a mean of 1.74.
10
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and ethnicity. This variable construction is based on several studies in political
participation that use this similar measure when assessing political participation (Sanchez
2006a; Stokes-Brown 2003).
Figure 3.1: Self-reported Vote Measure vs. Validated Vote Measure
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

92%
70%

30%
8%
Yes

No

Yes

Self-reported Vote

No

Validated Vote

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016

Table 3.4: Distribution of Dependent Variable Amount of Political Activities
Number of Political Activities
0-Political Activities
1-Political Activity
2-Political Activities
3-Political Activities
4-Political Activities
5-Political Activities
6-Political Activities
7-Political Activities
8-Political Activities
9-Political Activities
10-Political Activities
Total Sample
Mean of Variable = 1.74

Total
3,830
2,336
1,276
855
667
403
291
206
127
106
37
10,134

Latino
1,138
696
389
230
196
109
80
71
49
32
7
2,997

Black
1,103
703
394
305
206
140
108
60
39
27
14
3,099

Asian
1,276
734
352
221
179
96
48
42
22
27
8
3,005

White
313
203
141
99
86
58
55
33
17
20
8
1,033

Also included in this analysis are standard controls of socioeconomic status
(SES), since previous research in political participation includes SES as a factor
associated with political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978).
The specific measures of SES included are income, education, and employment. In
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addition to measures of SES, I include measures on political attitudes, which are external
and internal efficacy as variables that predict political participation (Almond and Verba
1963; Verba et al. 1995; Campbell et al. 1976). Political interest is also a measure
included due to studies finding a clear association between interest and engagement in
political activities (Verba et al. 1995; Liu 2001). Voter mobilization is also included as a
measure, since political mobilization is known to be an essential component in promoting
turnout (Ulbig and Waggener 2011; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Partisan strength is
also included as a measure for political participation. The original measure is a binary
measure asking respondents if they identify strongly with the Republican or Democratic
parties.11 This measure is included due to previous studies adding this measure as a
control in studies of political behavior and based on previous research examining partisan
attachments as a heuristic for increasing voting among the electorate (North 1990;
Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). For Latinos and Asians, measures of cultural factors
(i.e. language) and national origin are included due to impact these characteristics have in
explaining political involvement (Hero 1992; Uhlaner et al. 1989; Hero and Campbell
1996; DeSipio 1996). Generational status is also included because research in Latino
politics shows the importance of assimilation on political behavior (Santoro and Segura
2011). For Latinos the only control included is perceived as immigrant due to the
theoretical claims presented in this paper stemming from the anti-Latino and antiimmigrant rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election (Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga
2017). The perceived as immigrant control is not added for other groups since this

11

For information on coding for the partisan strength measure see summary statistics
table below and for information on the original question wording see Appendix B on
variable construction.
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question was only asked of Latinos on the survey. Lastly, demographic variables, such as
gender and age are added to the analysis as additional controls.
I explore millennial linked fate by race and ethnicity through a multivariate
regression analysis. Since, the dependent variable of political activities is a count
variable; I use negative binomial regression as the appropriate modeling approach (Long
and Freese 2003; Hilbe 2011). Additionally, studies in political science have employed
this modeling approach for political participation variables that are the dependent
variables (Sanchez 2006a). The models included in the study are done for each racial and
ethnic group. In other words, both the traditional measure of linked fate and the
immigrant-based linked fate measures are included in each model for Latino millennials,
Black millennials, and Asian millennials, but not for white millennials since the
immigrant-based linked fate measure is not asked for whites, this sums up a total of four
models for millennials. Following the multivariate analysis, I include predicted
probabilities to interpret the coefficients of the negative binomial regressions, since it is
difficult to directly interpret the coefficients for these models.
ANALYSIS
Prior to delving into the multivariate analysis, I will commence with a discussion
of the descriptive analysis. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the tabulation of the dependent
variable, number of political activities, by race and ethnicity and generational cohort. In
table 3.5 the groups who participates in zero political activities at higher rates are Asian
millennials (51%), which are followed by white millennials (48%). The two groups that
have the lowest percentage for participating in zero activities are Black millennials (45%)
and Latino millennials (45%). When examining those who participate in at least one
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political activity the group that participates more in at least one political activity are
Asian millennials (22%) followed by Black millennials (20%) and Latino millennials
(20%) participate in at least one political activity. When compared to white millennials
(16%) participate in at least one political activity. As the scale goes up the amount of
political activities millennials participate in shrinks.
Table 3.5: Cross Tabulation of Dependent Variable among Racial and Ethnic Millennials
Number of Political Activities
0-Political Activities
1-Political Activity
2-Political Activities
3-Political Activities
4-Political Activities
5-Political Activities
6-Political Activities
7-Political Activities
8-Political Activities
9-Political Activities
10-Political Activities

Latino
45%
20%
11%
7%
6%
3%
3%
3%
2%
1%
0.19%

Black
45%
20%
10%
9%
6%
3%
3%
1%
1%
0.39%
0.24%

Asian
51%
22%
9%
6%
5%
3%
2%
1%
1%
1%
0.07%

White
48%
16%
12%
6%
5%
5%
4%
1%
1%
1%
0%

Note: All tabulations are significant.

When analyzing the data on political activities for non-millennials by race and
ethnicity, the results vary slightly from millennials. Asian non-millennials have the
highest rates of not participation in any political activities when compared to Latinos,
Blacks, and white non-millennials. Once you get past the mark of participating in four or
more political activities, the results show that white non-millennials outpace Latino,
Black, and Asian non-millennials in participating in more political activities. Overall, this
data shows potential differences in political participation by generations and race.
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Table 3.6: Cross Tabulation of Dependent Variable among Racial and Ethnic NonMillennials
Number of Political Activities
0-Political Activities
1-Political Activity
2-Political Activities
3-Political Activities
4-Political Activities
5-Political Activities
6-Political Activities
7-Political Activities
8-Political Activities
9-Political Activities
10-Political Activities

Latino
30%
26%
15%
9%
8%
4%
3%
2%
2%
1%
0.28%

Black
29%
25%
15%
10%
7%
5%
4%
3%
1%
1%
0.60%

Asian
35%
27%
14%
9%
7%
4%
2%
1%
1%
1%
0.44%

White
24%
21%
14%
11%
10%
6%
6%
4%
2%
2%
1%

Note: All tabulations are significant.

Moreover, when examining the key independent variables by race, ethnicity and
generational cohort, there are also differences among millennials. In figure 3.2, the two
groups with higher percentages of “no linked fate” are Asian millennials with 36 percent
and White millennials with 37 percent. Black and Latino millennials have a slightly
smaller percentage of “no linked fate” with 34 percent for Black millennials and 35
percent for Latino millennials. When examining the percentages for “a lot” of linked fate,
only 15 percent of Asian millennials have a lot of linked fate and 15 percent of white
millennials have “a lot” of linked fate. With regards to Blacks and Latinos, 29 percent of
Black millennials have “a lot” of linked fate and 23 percent of Latinos have “a lot” of
linked fate. In sum, Black millennials have the highest percentage of linked fate when
compared to other racial and ethnic millennials and supports Dawson’s (1994) findings of
linked fate among Blacks.
With regards to the new measure of immigrant-based linked fate among
millennials, figure 3.3 shows that Black millennials have the highest percentage “no
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immigrant linked fate” with 19 percent. Asian millennials have the lowest percentage
with “no immigrant linked fate” with 9 percent and 17 percent of Latinos have “no
immigrant linked fate.” However, when examining “a lot” of immigrant-based linked
fate, Latino millennials have the highest percentage of immigrant-based linked fate with
22 percent. Black millennials follow with 19 percent of “a lot” of immigrant-based linked
fate and Asian millennials end with 17 percent of “a lot” of linked fate. Overall, in line
with my theoretical framework, Latino millennials have the highest levels of immigrantbased linked fate when compared to other racial and ethnic millennials.
As for non-millennials, figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that Latinos (50%) and Asians
(41%) have the highest percentages of “no linked fate.” Whites follow with 33 percent of
“no linked fate” and Blacks have the lowest percentage of “no linked fate” at 32 percent.
When comparing these percentages to the category of “a lot” of linked fate, Blacks have
the highest percentages of “a lot” of linked fate with 22 percent, and whites are in the
middle category with 17 percent having “a lot” of linked fate. Latino (13%) and Asian
non-millennials (10%) have the lowest percentages of “a lot” linked fate. When
examining the traditional measure of linked fate, Black non-millennials have the highest
levels of linked fate, which corroborates Dawson’s (1994) theory on linked fate.
To conclude the discussion of the descriptive analysis of immigrant-based linked
fate, the results show that Black non-millennials have the highest percentages of
immigrant-based linked fate with 16 percent, when compared to the two largest
immigrant populations, Latino (12%) and Asian non-millennials (11%). In addition,
Latino non-millennials have the highest percentages of “no linked fate” at 31 percent.
While Black and Asian non-millennials have the lowest percentages of “no linked fate.”
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In sum, this shows a distinct pattern in immigrant-based linked fate, with Black nonmillennials having higher percentages of immigrant-based linked fate when compared to
Asian and Latino non-millennials.
Figure 3.2: Liked Fate by Race and Ethnicity
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Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
Note: All tabulations are significant; except for the white millennials.
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White

Figure 3.3: Immigrant Linked Fate by Race and Ethnicity
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Note: All tabulations are significant.

In order to determine if linked fate indeed predicts the involvement of Latino
millennials in political activities, I analyze the following negative binomial regressions.
Table 3.7 shows that linked fate is not significantly correlated with higher rates of
engagement in political activities. With regards to my first hypothesis, I do not find
support that Latino millennials with higher levels of linked fate participate more in
politics. With regards to immigrant-based linked fate, the results suggest that immigrantbased linked fate is positive and significantly correlated with higher levels of political
participation (p<0.05). This shows that Latino millennials that have a high level of
immigrant-based linked fate will be more likely to engage in political activities when
compared to Latino millennials with low levels of immigrant-based linked fate. This
finding suggests the importance of immigration among the Latino community, as well as
the connectedness to immigration among Latinos. This result supports my theory and
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hypothesis that Latino millennials with higher levels of immigrant-based linked fate will
be more likely to participate in politics. I also find that immigrant-based linked fate is a
motivator for political participation among Latino millennials than it is for non-Latino
millennials. 12
When examining the post estimation results, I find that immigrant-based linked
fate among Latino millennials has a .24 unit increase in the immigrant-based linked fate
variable translating into an increase in participating in political activities. Additionally,
when assessing the predicted probabilities for immigrant-based linked fate predicted
probabilities, figure 3.4 shows that Latino millennials with “a lot” of immigrant-based
fate have an increase in the probability of engaging in political activities by 1.8 percent.
For Latino millennials with “no linked fate” there is an increase in the probability of
engaging in political activities by .92 percent. When comparing Latino millennials with
“no immigrant-based linked fate” and “a lot” of immigrant-based linked fate there is an
88 percent difference in engaging in political activities. The predicted probabilities
demonstrate the large impact immigrant-based linked fate has on the political
participation of Latino millennials. Overall, immigrant-based linked fate is an important
predictor for Latino millennials political participation.
Among the key independent variable in the model, other variables predicting
higher levels of political participation are voter mobilization, party strength, political

12

When examining Latino non-millennials, the results show that the immigrant-based
measure of linked fate does not impact political participation among Latino nonmillennials, but that the traditional measure impacts political participation. This finding is
distinct from Latino millennials, as the traditional measure of linked fate does not
influence political participation for Latino millennials. For more information see
Appendix E for supplemental tables on participation for non-millennials.
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interest, gender, education, income, age, and perceived as immigrant. Voter mobilization
is positively and significantly correlated with political participation (p<0.01). Latino
millennials that are mobilized to register to vote are more likely to participate in politics
than Latino millennials that are not mobilized. Showing that voter mobilization for Latino
millennials has a .66 unit increase in the voter mobilization variable that increases the
probability of engaging in political activities. In line with research on political
mobilization showing that Latinos who are mobilized are more likely to engage in
political activities (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Party strength is positive and
significantly correlated with political participation (p<0.01). Latino millennials that have
stronger party attachments are more likely to participate in politics than Latinos who do
not have strong party attachments. Political interest is positive and significantly
correlated with political participation (p<.01). Latino millennials that are more interested
in politics are more likely to participate than Latino millennials who are not interest in
politics. Research on political orientations also shows that political interest is a motivator
for political participation (Almond and Verba 1963). Gender is also negatively and
marginally correlated with political participation (p<0.1). Latina millennials are less
likely to participate in politics than Latino millennials. Research on Latinos also suggests
the presence of a gender gap present between Latinos and Latinas, since Latinas were less
likely to participate in politics, which is consistent with the literature on the subject
(Bejarano 2013). Age is also negatively and significantly correlated with political
participation (p<0.01). Older Latino millennials are less likely to participate in politics
than younger Latino millennials. Education and income are also positively and
marginally significant with political participation (p<0.1). Latino millennials with higher
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levels of education and income are more likely to participate in politics than Latino
millennials with lower levels of education and income. Research on socioeconomic status
also show a relationship between education and income with higher levels of political
participation (Verba et al. 1995; Almond and Verba 1963). Perceived as immigrant is
also positively and marginally correlated with political participation (p<0.1). Latino
millennials who are perceived as an immigrant are more likely to participate in politics
than Latino millennials who are not. This is a fascinating finding because the anti-Latino
and anti-immigrant political climate are actively influencing political participation among
Latino millennials. Even when controlling for other factors of political participation
among Latino millennials, immigrant-based linked fate is still an essential predictor for
political participation among this group.
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Table 3.7: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political
Participation among Latino Millennials
Marginal Effectsa

Coef. Political participation

SE

0.201**

(0.094)

.24

-0.026

(0.077)

-.03

Voter Mobilization

0.564***

(0.158)

.66

Party Strength

0.474***

(0.156)

.56

Political Interest

0.408***

(0.101)

.48

Internal Efficacy

-0.034

(0.070)

-.04

External Efficacy

0.055

(0.077)

.06

Female

-0.279*

(0.149)

-.33

Education (low to high)

0.150*
0.051*

(0.078)
(0.029)

.18

Income (low to high)

0.252

(0.227)

.30

-0.052***

(0.015)

-.06

Spanish

-0.143

(0.236)

-.17

Generational Status

0.129

(0.117)

.15

Perceived as Immigrant

0.100*

(0.060)

.12

Mexican

0.132

.15

Cuban

0.365

(0.183)
(0.433)

Puerto Rican

0.430

(0.331)

.50

-1.914***

(0.673)

VARIABLES
Immigrant Linked Fate
Linked Fate

Employed
Age

Constant
Observations

719

Pseudo R-squared

0.107

Log Likelihood

.06

.43

-422.41827

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of the explanatory
variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means. Marginal effects for binary variables are
the discrete change from 0 to 1.

Figure 3.4: Predicted Probabilities of Immigrant-Based Linked Fate for Latino
Millennials
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When examining linked fate as a predictor of Asian millennial political
participation, table 3.8 shows that linked fate is positive and marginally correlated with
higher levels of political participation for Asian millennials (p<0.1). In other words,
Asian millennials who have higher levels of linked fate are more likely to participate in
political activities when compared to Asian millennials with lower levels of linked fate.
This result supports previous research on Asians and political participation (Lien,
Conway, and Wong 2003, 2008). The post estimation results for Asian millennials show
that when holding all variables at their mean there is a .21 unit increase in political
activities for the linked fate measure. With regards to the predicted probabilities, figure
3.5 shows that for Asian millennials with “no linked fate” there is an increase in the
probability of participating in political activities by .87. When compared to Asian
millennials with “a lot” of linked fate there is an increase in probability of 1.6 percent of
engaging in political activities. This accounts for a difference 73 percent between Asian
millennials that have “no linked fate” and Asian millennials with “a lot” of linked fate.
When compared to other millennials, especially Latino millennials, the original measure
of linked fate is correlated with Asian millennial political participation and not for Latino
millennials. However, it is essential to point out that for Black millennials, linked fate
does not impact political participation, which is contrary to research on Black identity
(McClain et al. 2009; Dawson 1994). This finding supports my first hypothesis that
linked fate will result in higher levels of political participation for millennials. Ultimately,
this is an important finding for researchers in race and ethnicity and political behavior.
When examining the second key independent variable for immigrant-based linked
fate as a predictor for engaging in political activities, I find that there is not a significant
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impact on political participation among Asian millennials. This is one of the most
interesting findings, since Asians in general have one of the largest immigrant
populations (López, Ruiz, and Patten 2017). Additionally, research on Asians in
American politics finds that the original measure of linked fate is puzzling and at times
confusing when it comes to the Asian context (Hayes and Skulley 2015). Research also
finds that linked fate appears to be non-existent for Asians, but there might be variation
for Asian millennials, with regards to immigrant-based linked fate as the original measure
of linked fate holds (Wong et al. 2011; Hayes and Skulley 2015). This same argument is
still present with regards to the immigrant-based linked fate measure as it appears to not
impact political participation among Asian millennials. It might be that this measure
needs to be examined through a distinct lens, such as through a national origin viewpoint
to determine the presence of immigrant-based linked fate among Asians (Wong et al.
2011; Hayes and Skulley 2015). In sum, this finding supports my second hypothesis since
immigrant-based linked fate would be more pronounced for Latino millennials than
Asian millennials.
Other than the key independent variable of linked fate, the other measures that
predict engagement in political activities among Asian millennials are voter mobilization,
party strength, and political interest. Voter mobilization is positive and significantly with
political participation (p<0.05). Asian millennials who are mobilized to vote are more
likely to participate in political activities when compared to Asian millennials who are
not mobilized to vote. For voter mobilization there is a .65 unit increase in the engaging
in political activities. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) state that mobilizing voters is
essential for the political participation of individuals. Thus, further efforts to mobilize
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racial minorities, will yield fruitful results in higher levels of political engagement among
Asian millennials and Asians more generally. Party strength is also positive and
significantly correlated with political participation (p<0.05). Asian millennials that have
strong party ties are more likely to participate in politics than Asian millennials with
weaker party ties. Political interest is also positive and significantly correlated with
political participation (p<0.05). Asian millennials with higher levels of political interest
are more likely to participate in politics than Asian millennials with lower levels of
political interest. This finding is consistent with the literature on political interest
(Almond and Verba 1963). When comparing the control variables for Asian millennials
to Latino millennials, all three of these control variables have a stronger substantive
effect on political participation than they do for Latino millennials. Overall, patterns for
political participation among Latino millennials vary from those of Asian millennials,
with linked fate predicting political participation for Asian millennials, but not for Latino
millennials.13

13

When comparing Asian millennials to Asian non-millennials, the results show that the
immigrant linked fate measure does not predict political participation among these two
samples. However, when examining the original linked fate measure among Asian nonmillennials is not significant, which is not the case for Asian millennials where it is a
strong predictor. For more information see Appendix E.
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Table 3.8: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among Asian Millennials
Coef. Political participation
0.064

SE

Marginal Effectsa

(0.182)

.06

Linked Fate

0.235*

(0.141)

.21

Voter Mobilization

0.738**

(0.309)

.65

Party Strength

0.627**

(0.287)

.55

Political Interest

0.529**

(0.221)

.46

Internal Efficacy

-0.062

(0.135)

-.05

External Efficacy

-0.076

(0.153)

-.07

Female

-0.013

(0.275)

-.01

Education (low to high)

0.017

(0.119)

.01

Income (low to high)

0.022

(0.046)

.02

Employed

0.808

(0.560)

.71

Age

-0.018

(0.027)

-.02

Asian Language

0.248

(0.680)

.22

Generational Status

0.348

(0.261)

.31

Chinese

-0.079

(0.422)

-.07

Indian

0.300

(0.357)

.26

Japanese

-0.119

(1.385)

-.10

Filipino

0.190

(0.394)

.17

Constant

-3.272**

(1.319)

VARIABLES
Immigrant Linked Fate

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

640
0.122
-124.62615

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of the explanatory
variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means. Marginal effects for binary variables are
the discrete change from 0 to 1

Figure 3.5: Predicted Probabilities of Linked Fate for Asian Millennials
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Table 3.9 shows that among Black millennials linked fate and immigrant-based
linked fate are not correlated with political participation. Based on literature on Black
politics, it is surprising that linked fate is not a motivator for political participation among
Black millennials which is not consistent with literature on Black politics which shows
that linked fate is strongest for Blacks than any other group (Dawson 1994; McClain et
al. 2009; Sanchez and Vargas 2016). With regards to linked fate, my first hypothesis is
not supported. However, my finding on immigrant-based linked fate is supported and
shows that immigrant-based linked fate is more pronounced for Latino millennials than
Black millennials. 14
While linked fate and immigrant-based linked fate do not predict political
participation for Black millennials, there are other measures that do predict political
participation among Black millennials which are political interest, external efficacy, and
age. Political interest is positive and significantly correlated with political participation
(p<0.01). Black millennials who have higher levels of political interest are more likely to
participate in political activities when compared to Black millennials with lower levels of
political interest. For political interest there is a .68 unit increase in the engaging in
political activities. External efficacy is positive and marginally significant with political
participation (p<0.1). Black millennials with higher levels of external efficacy are more
likely to participate in politics than Black millennials with lower levels of political

14

When examining black non-millennials, the results show that the original measure of
linked fate is not as strong as it is for black non-millennials, which is the same for black
millennials. The immigrant linked fate measure, however, is a predictor for black nonmillennials political participation, but not for black millennials, which can mean that
black non-millennials felt like immigrant or outsiders due to segregation and
discrimination.
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efficacy. Age is also negative and marginally correlated with political participation
(p<0.1). Black millennials who are older are less likely to participate in politics than
Black millennials who are younger. These findings as with Latino and Asian millennials,
show the important role that traditional models of political participation (i.e. political
orientations) influence engagement in political activities of racial and ethnic minorities
(Campbell et al. 1976; Almond and Verba 1963). Overall, linked fate and immigrantbased linked fate do not support either of my hypotheses.
Table 3.9: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among Black Millennials
Coef. Political participation

SE

Marginal Effectsa

Immigrant Linked Fate

0.064

(0.090)

.11

Linked Fate

0.052

(0.076)

.09

0.170

(0.180)

.28

0.255

(0.180)

.42

Political Interest

0.413***

(0.112)

.68

Internal Efficacy

0.052

(0.071)

.09

0.151*

(0.085)

.25

Female

-0.041

(0.171)

-.07

Education (low to high)

0.057

(0.078)

.09

Income (low to high)

0.041

(0.031)

.07

0.224

(0.212)

.37

-0.027*

(0.016)

-.04

0.168

(0.125)
(0.762)

.28

VARIABLES

Voter Mobilization
Party Strength

External Efficacy

Employed
Age
Generational Status
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

-2.088***
610
0.0503
-360.24594

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of the explanatory
variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means. Marginal effects for binary variables are
the discrete change from 0 to 1
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Lastly, table 3.10 shows that linked fate is positive and significantly correlated
with political participation for white millennials (p<0.01).15 White millennials with
higher levels of linked fate are more likely to engage in political activities when
compared to white millennials with lower levels of linked fate. This positive correlation
with linked fate and political activities shows that whites are also influenced by racial
identity when engaging in politics. This finding supports my first hypothesis that
millennials with higher levels of linked fate are more likely to engage in political
activities than those with lower levels of linked fate. When examining the post estimation
results for linked fate there is an increase in the rate white millennials engage in political
activities by .24 for each unit increase of linked fate, when all variables are held at their
means. When comparing the marginal effects of white millennials to Asian millennials,
the substantive impact of linked fate on political participation is higher for white
millennials than Asian millennials. Additionally, when comparing linked fate and
political participation to Latino millennials, linked fate does predict political participation
for white millennials, but not for Latino millennials.
Moreover, figure 3.6 shows the predicted probabilities for White millennials with
“no linked fate” have a 1.5 percent increase in probability of engaging in political
activities, when compared to white millennials with “a lot” of linked fate who have 2.3
percent increase in the probability of being politically active. While there is a growing
interest in white identity politics in American politics there is a lack of research on linked
fate as a predictor for political participation among whites. This finding adds to previous

15

When comparing white millennials to white non-millennials, linked fate is still a
predictor for political participation among both groups, suggesting there are not
generational differences.
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research using SES, political orientations, and resources as explanations for political
participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Almond and Verba 1963;
Verba et al. 1995; Campbell et al. 1976).
Other measures that also predict engagement in political activities are voter
mobilization, political interest, external efficacy, gender, age and SES (education and
employment). Voter mobilization is positive and significantly correlated with political
participation (p<0.01). White millennials that are mobilized are more likely to participate
in politics than white millennials that were not mobilized. This finding is consistent with
research on political mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Political interest is also
positive and significantly correlated with political participation (p<0.01). White
millennials that have higher levels of interest in politics are more likely to participate in
politics than white millennials with lower levels of interest in politics. Also consistent
with research in political orientations is this finding on political interest (Almond and
Verba 1963). External efficacy is negatively and significantly correlated with political
participation (p<0.01). White millennials with higher levels of external efficacy are less
likely to participate in politics than white millennials with lower levels of external
efficacy. Gender is also negatively and significantly correlated with political participation
(p<0.01). White female millennials are less likely to engage in political activities when
compared to white male millennials. Education, employment and age are all positively
and significantly correlated with political participation (p<0.01). White millennials who
have higher levels of education, are employed and are older are more likely to participate
in politics than white millennials with lower levels of education, who are not employed
and are younger. These findings are consistent with literature on SES and demographics
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(Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al.
1995; Campbell et al. 1976). Lastly, these results suggest that ultimately having a higher
sense of linked fate among white millennials is highly important for engaging in politics.
This finding is fascinating because it would be expected that whites might not have the
same sense of racial connectedness as Black millennials, but this finding provides
insights into race in American society and its place in political participation.
Table 3.10: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among White Millennials
Coef. Political participation

SE

Marginal Effectsa

Linked Fate

0.142***

(0.042)

.24

Voter Mobilization

0.597***

(0.085)

.99

0.026

(0.087)

.04

Political Interest

0.505***

(0.065)

.84

Internal Efficacy

0.043

(0.035)

.07

VARIABLES

Party Strength

External Efficacy

-0.199***

(0.045)

-.33

Female

-0.236***

(0.083)

-.39

Education (low to high)

0.178***

(0.040)

.30

0.009

(0.014)

.02

Employed

0.522***

(0.164)

.87

Age

0.029***

(0.008)

.05

-0.141

(0.088)

-.23

-2.555***

(0.443)

Income (low to high)

Generational Status
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

139
0.0929
-1356.9392

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of the explanatory
variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means. Marginal effects for binary variables are
the discrete change from 0 to 1
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Figure 3.6: Predicted Probabilities of Linked Fate for White Millennials

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study began by discussing the way political research on generations lacks
focus on the way racial and ethnic minorities within a generation behave politically.
While there is much analysis on the apathetic nature many scholars use to describe the
millennial generation (Rankin 2013), less is known about whether conventional theories
of political participation explain how new generations of racial and ethnic groups behave.
In this case, there has been a neglect of understanding on what drives millennial political
participation by racial and ethnic group.
My theory is centered on using linked fate as a theoretical explanation for
millennial political participation. My theory has two components: 1) being that original
concepts of linked fate should apply to all millennials, including whites, as a predictor for
engagement in political activities, and 2) that immigrant-based linked fate will be a strong
predictor for linked fate among Latino millennials when compared to non-Latino
millennials due to the heightened salience of immigration among Latinos when compared
to non-Latinos. For the first portion of my theory, the findings suggest that only Asian
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and white millennials are more likely to engage in political activities if they have higher
levels of linked fate. This is not the case for Black and Latino millennials. There are,
however, differences in the level of substantive impact of linked fate for white and Asian
millennials. Asian millennials have the smallest substantive effect of linked fate on
participation with .22 and whites have the largest with .28. The substantive effects are
captivating because for white millennials linked fate has the strongest influence on
political participation and is an area of study that needs to be examined further to
continue our understanding of white identity politics and its impact on political
participation.
Moreover, the second component of my theory is supported by my results and
suggest that for Latino millennials, immigrant-based linked fate has the strongest impact
on political participation when compared to non-Latino millennials. For Asian
millennials immigrant-based linked fate does not have an influence on political
participation. This shows that there are potential differences among two of the ethnic
groups with the largest immigrant population. Some of these differences are a result of
the prevalence of racialization of Latinos as immigrants than it is for Asians (Chavez
2013; Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga 2017). Thus, the continued framing of immigrants
as primarily Latino is more impactful for Latinos than other racial groups.
As for Asian millennials, there were only a few factors that serve as motivators
for political engagement. The role of linked fate on Asian political participation is also in
line with previous studies on the subject (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2003, 2008). These
findings are somewhat consistent with studies on Asian American political participation
that show this group is less likely to participate in politics as a result of SES (Wong et al.
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2011; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Ramakrishnan 2005; Wong 2006). As previously
noted, immigrant-based linked fate is not a motivator an increase in political participation
as it is for Latino millennials, demonstrating differences. This is another puzzling finding
due to Asians having a large immigrant population. As stated more research needs to
disentangle national origin differences in the Asian community and whether this might be
the contributing factor for a lack of immigrant-based linked fate. Additionally, examining
patterns of assimilation into American society by the Asian community, might be another
avenue to understand the existence or lack thereof of immigrant-based linked fate among
Asians. Thus, Asian millennials are motivated for their shared affinity with their own
group only with regards to the traditional measure of linked fate and not with the novel
measure of immigrant-based linked fate.
With regards to Black and white millennials racial identity also serves as an
explanation of political participation for these two groups. Not consistent with research in
Black politics is the finding that linked fate motivates Black political participation
(Dawson 1994; Tate 1993; Simien 2006). Yet, contrary to expectation, linked fate does
not motivate political participation as it does for white and Asian millennials. This is an
important finding as it would be expected that Black millennials would have higher levels
of linked fate than would other groups as a result of their historical oppression in
America and that this would translate to higher levels of political participation (Dawson
1994). Another finding to highlight is the role linked fate has in influencing political
behavior for white millennials. White millennials constitute the smallest racial group of
millennials, which might serve as an explanation for this group possibly believing that
they might lose political power. This possible belief in the reduction of political power
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might then result in white millennials having higher levels of linked fate that motivate
their political engagement in order to maintain their status in society (Jardina 2019). In
sum, linked fate is not a motivator for Black millennials but serves to be a strong
predictor for white millennial political participation.
More research must examine the casual mechanisms for the development of racial
identity. This study shows a clear relationship between identity and political
participation, but what is less clear is why this relationship exists and what motivates
these individuals to participate in politics. In other words, by using a qualitative analysis
of racial and ethnic millennials and non-millennials a more comprehensive understanding
of the role of identity, race, and political participation can be achieved. Additionally,
more research needs to examine differences in immigrant-based linked fate as the only
motivator for political participation among groups to tease out the role of immigrantbased linked fate on its own.

115

Chapter 4
Linked Fate and Online Political Participation among Millennials and Non-millennials
INTRODUCTION
From the emergence of digital technology came discussions regarding the impact
of digital media on politics. These discussions stem directly from the development of the
internet and its transformation of American society. Mixed views on the role of digital
media and democracy emerged among researchers and prompted arguments against
digital media, due to concerns that uninformed citizens might not read as much about
politics online as individuals relying on traditional media (Althaus and Tewksbury 2002).
In contrast, other scholars highlight digital media as a useful political tool for citizens, as
it provides the electorate with new avenues for political interactions, political activism,
and encourages engagement in politics (Earl and Kimport 2011; Ellison and Hardey
2014). While the verdict is still out on whether digital media is a benevolent source or not
for democracy, what is clear is that there is still more room for research on digital media
and politics.
There is a plethora of studies examining the relationship between digital media
use and offline political participation as well as research examining predictors of online
political participation (Bimber and Copeland 2013; Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Bimber
2001, 2003; Boulianne 2009, 2011; Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 2008; Shah, Cho,
Eveland, and Kwak 2005; Shah et al. 2007; Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Xenos and Moy
2007; Feezell and Jones 2017, Feezell 2016). Yet even with the abundance of research
exploring the relationship between digital media and political participation, there are still
questions that need answering and topics that need exploring with regards to online
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political participation studies. The areas needing scholarly attention are 1) examining
generational cohorts’ degrees of online political participation, 2) racial and ethnic groups
by generational cohort and their degree of online political participation and 3) whether a
shared generational political identity among millennials serves as a predictor for online
political participation and how online participation compares to traditional online forms
of political participation. This study adds to literature on online political participation by
answering the following questions: 1) do millennials have higher levels of online political
participation when compared to previous generations, 2) are there variations by race and
ethnicity? and 3) does linked fate lead to higher levels of online political participation
among millennials and how does this compare to the role of linked fate on traditional
online forms of political participation? Studying the patterns of online political
participation by generational cohort and race augments to our holistic understanding of
online political participation. Also, examining the role of a possible generational political
identity among millennials enriches our knowledge of other predictors that encourage our
youth to engage in politics.
In this study, I argue that the digital divide, due to generational and cultural
differences, is an explanation for variations in online political participation by
generational cohort and race. The digital divide is defined as the access to technology due
to various social conditions, such as income, education, employment, generational
differences, and race and ethnicity (Norris 2001; Myers 2016). One study finds that
adults 18 to 29 are more likely to use the internet and to be socialized to new
technological devices (Myers 2016). Since, younger adults are more inclined to engage in
internet use and digital media, I argue that millennials will be more prone to participate in
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online political participation than generation X and baby boomers. For instance, 89% of
millennials use social media sites, such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram compared to
73% of Generation X, 54% young baby boomers, 45% of older baby boomers, and 29%
of the Silent Generation (Rainie and Perrin 2016). Additionally, more millennials use
smartphones than non-millennials (Rainie and Perrin 2016). The percentage of
millennials who own a smartphone is 88% when compared to 77% of Generation X and
59% of baby boomers who own a smartphone (Rainie and Perrin 2016). Given the
increase in usage of smartphones among millennials than non-millennials, millennials are
more likely to use social media on their phones, which should translate in a higher
percentage of millennials engaging in online political participation than non-millennials.
In addition to analyzing the digital divide among millennials, there is an
assessment of the impact of identity on online (this includes both discursive politics and
online activities) and traditional online forms of political participation among millennial
youth. The argument I put forth is that linked will be a predictor for both online and
traditional online forms of political participation among millennials. Rouse and Ross
(2018) assert that millennials have their own generational political identity. Therefore,
due to millennials own generational identity, I pose that millennials shared generational
identity will be a motivator for participation in online and traditional online political
activities.
To test my theoretical claims, I first examine online political participation by
generational cohorts and race and ethnicity. Following this analysis there is a second
analysis on linked fate as a predictor for online participation among millennials. The first
set of results from the multivariate analysis demonstrates potential differences among
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generational cohorts and their online political participation and suggests that millennials
are more likely to participate in online politics than non-millennials. The second set of
results also shows that linked fate is a predictor for both online and traditional online
forms of political participation among millennials.
In short, this study builds on existing literature on online political participation,
generational cohorts, and identity. This study is novel with regards to examining online
participation among various generations. As well as examining the role of linked fate on
online and traditional online forms of political participation over time through a panel
study of millennials. The inclusion of various datasets and samples makes for a more
comprehensive study of online political engagement. Lastly, this study will provide
important content for future and current researchers of online political participation and
generational cohorts.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Offline and Online Political Participation
When thinking about political participation what would come to mind for most
individuals is voting. However, one definition of political participation is that citizens use
various types of activities to influence government, the selection of government officials,
or government policies (Conway 2001). From the definition of political participation one
can gather that political participation involves the partaking of other activities other than
just voting, some of these activities include: donating to a campaign, contacting a public
official, attending political meetings, working for a campaign, among many others. Much
of the research surrounding why Americans engage in these political activities is
extensive and past research tends to focus more on offline political activities (Verba and
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Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995). The
previously described political activities would be considered offline political
participation.
While prior studies examine offline political participation, there has been an
uptake of studies examining online political participation. Studies on online political
participation tend to focus on why individuals participate in politics online (Feezell 2016;
Feezell and Jones 2017) or focus on the role of online political participation on offline
political behavior (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Bennet 2008; Best and Krueger 2005;
Boulianne 2009, 2015; Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2013; Gibson and Cantijoch 2013;
Linton 2015; Lin 2016; Kruikemeier et al. 2014; Bimber and Copeland 2013). Online
political participation encompasses how individuals engage with the internet by posting
on social media, writing blogs, organizing campaigns online, sharing information online
and accessing political information (Kruikemeier et al. 2014; Lin 2016; Feezell and Jones
2017). In sum, this provides a summary of what constitutes online political participation.
Predictors of Online Political Participation
Literature on offline political participation suggest that models of socioeconomic
status (SES), resources, political interest, external and internal efficacy serve as
explanations for offline political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim
1978; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995). These theories serve as explanations
to what predicts offline political participation, but these theories do not always apply as
perfect explanations of what predicts online political participation (Anduiza, Gallego and
Cantijoch 2010). However, some studies find that online participation and internet use is
predicted by political interest, income, education, employment, and online civic skills
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(Best and Krueger 2005; Norris 2001). Among other predictors for online political
participation are access to political information through the internet, engaging in political
discussion online, using social networking sites for political information access, and
political expressions online (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Ekström and Östman 2013; Gil
de Zúñiga et al. 2010; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012; Gil de Zúñiga,
Molyneux, and Zheng 2014). Another study examines the role of selective exposure, or
viewing only content of interest to the individual, as a predictor for online participation
(Feezell 2016). These studies suggest that what predicts online political participation
varies slightly from what predicts offline political participation.
Types of Online Political Participation
Within the area of online political participation more research has determined that
there is not a sole way to conceptualize and measure online political participation
(Kruikemeier et al. 2014; Lin 2016; Bakker and de Vreese 2011). These studies suggest
that certain online political activities fall under passive forms of online political
participation and others fall under active forms of online political participation
(Kruikemeier et al. 2014; Lin 2016). Passive forms of online political participation are
characterized as consuming news or encountering information online (Kruikemeier et al.
2014; Lin 2016). Active forms of online political participation are viewed as contributing
to online content or becoming actively engaged in the online community (Kruikemeier et
al. 2014; Lin 2016). In sum, these definitions encompass the broad definitions of online
political participation.
These forms of active and passive online political participation are often studied
in relation to offline political activities. One study found that participating in online
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discussions was more beneficial for engaging in political behavior than individuals using
the internet in a more passive manner (Hardy and Scheufele 2005). Another study found
that actively commenting on blogs and publishing blogs influenced political participation
more than passively reading blogs (De Zúñiga 2009). When examining other forms of
online activities other research found that online expressions on social media led to
political engagement when compared to browsing on social media (Kushin and
Yamamoto 2010). However, Kruikemeier et al. (2014) find mixed results regarding
active and passive forms of online political participation with relation to offline political
participation. Most research in the area of passive and active forms of political
participation tend to use the measures of active and passive political participation as
independent variables and not as dependent variables. Overall, more research needs to
assess what predicts various forms, in this case active and passive online political
participation, of online political participation.
However, in relation to these studies on two forms of online political
participation. Other research measures and examines online political activities in other
ways. Specifically, Feezell and Jones (2017) use exploratory factor analysis to analyze
which measures load together into latent concepts. Their results show that commenting
on online political news, contributing their own individual media, writing a blog or email,
sharing political art online, sharing political news online, and showing support on social
networking sites, all constitute online political participation (Feezell and Jones 2017).
Also, from their analysis, they find that attending a meeting, rally, speech, working on a
campaign, raising or donating money, raising and donating money (online), participating
in a protest, wearing a button, bumper sticker, and participating in an event to share
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political views resulted in the measure for traditional political participation. One
interesting note made by these scholars is that raising money online theoretically falls
under the category for traditional political participation. These distinctions in
measurement approaches shows that certain measures that might be considered online,
can be perceived as more traditional forms of political participation. Thus, showing that
there is more work that needs to examine the appropriate measurement of online
participation and labeling for these measures also has to be correct and consistent.
Digital Media Use among Populations
While research in digital media and politics is expanding, more research in this
area focuses on examining the internet and politics among youth populations (Bennett
2008; Milner 2010). Scholars found that since 2000 there has been an uptake in digital
media use by campaigns and elections to mobilize the electorate (Foot and Schneider
2006; Howard 2006). The individuals that are more susceptible to internet targeting are
young adults and the youth (Bennett 2008). This is a result of the socialization into
technology at a younger age and the likelihood of younger adults using social networking
sites (American Press Institute 2015; Jennings and Zeitner 2003). The use of social media
sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, resulted in a shift in the ways newer generations
engage in politics (Garcia-Castanon et al. 2011). Thus, making online use for political
purposes among younger individuals the norm.
With regards to race and ethnicity, few studies examine the use of digital media
among racial and ethnic minorities. Of those studies that do look at digital media, they
tend to focus on the role social media plays in social movements and political elections
(Garcia-Castanon et al. 2011; Bonilla and Rosa 2015). First, Garcia-Castanon et al.
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(2011) highlights the importance of the internet for the Obama 2008 presidential
campaign to mobilize the youth, and particularly youth of color, to vote. The internet was
instrumental for the Obama campaign because it targeted youth of color at a more
aggressive rate and helped the Obama campaign (Garcia-Castanon et al. 2011). The
tactics used to target youth through the internet is partially due to younger adults using
the internet at larger rates than older adults (Fry 2016). The second piece by Bonilla and
Rosa (2015) demonstrates the role of social media sites as platforms for mobilization
against racial injustices. This study states that twitter was instrumental for proliferating
information of the Ferguson shooting (Bonilla and Rosa 2015). The fact that #Ferguson
went viral and appeared on twitter more than 8 million times on twitter demonstrates the
mobilizing role of the internet on social justice and race issues (Bonilla and Rosa 2015).
The internet is now a platform aimed at engaging large segments of the population at
larger rates than ever before. These studies give insight as to the ways that racial and
ethnic groups use the internet for political reasons.
Linked Fate and Political Behavior
Moreover, when examining literature on identity and political participation, the
literature points to a relationship between linked fate and offline political participation
(Dawson 1994). Linked fate is a theory primarily developed to explain why African
Americans’ have political cohesion in American politics even when they have varying
levels of socioeconomic status (Dawson 1994; Hochschild 1992). Linked fate in the
African American context is defined by Dawson (1994) as African Americans who
perceive their individual fates to be tied to those of their racial group are more likely to
rely on group-based interests when they make political decisions. In other words, African
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Americas who feel their fate is tied to other blacks will be more likely to vote for certain
policies or political candidates that have the best interests for their community. Several
studies on linked fate and African Americans point towards a clear relationship between
linked fate and offline political participation (Dawson 1994; Simien 2006; Tate 1993;
McClain et al. 2009; Chong and Rogers 2005). But less is known about the role of linked
fate on online political participation.
However, scholars argue that linked fate should only be used among the black
population and not applied to other racial and ethnic groups or other contexts (McClain et
al. 2009). One argument stems from using linked fate, a concept primarily developed for
African Americans, on other racial groups because other groups have not been racialized
in the same manner as African Americans have in America (McClain et al. 2009; Kim
1999). In other words, other groups such as Latinos and Asians, have different
experiences with discrimination and socialization into American society which results in
a different manner identity is shaped for these groups when compared to African
Americans (McClain and Stewart 2006). Additionally, based on some Asians and Latinos
coming from an immigrant backgrounds their levels of assimilation into American
society will shape their identities differently than those of African Americans (McClain et
al. 2009). Therefore, these scholars state that caution should be used when trying to
employ linked fate among other groups other than African Americans.
Even though scholars argue for concepts of linked fate should not be applied to
other groups other than African Americans (McClain et al. 2009), other studies do use
linked fate among other populations and find that linked fate can be applied to an extent
to other racial and ethnic groups (Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Barreto,
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Masuoka, and Sanchez 2008; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Sanchez and Vargas 2016). One
study examines whether linked fate can be applied to other racial groups other than
blacks (Sanchez and Vargas 2016). The study by Sanchez and Vargas (2016) finds that
the measures and conceptualization is efficient for studying blacks. However, when
studying non-Hispanic whites, Asians, and Latinos, but that these measures do not
squarely fit when examining non-blacks. Additionally, studies on linked fate and political
participation among non-blacks shows that linked fate is a predictor for political
participation for non-blacks, such as Asians (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2003, 2008).
Even with several studies examining linked fate among minority groups, less is still
known about the implications of linked fate on political participation for generational
cohorts, in this case the millennial generation.
Gaps in the Literature
Some gaps in the literature are centered on the lack of examination of potential
differences in online political participation by generational cohort. By analyzing patterns
in online political participation by generational cohorts’ light will be shed on how
influential online political participation is among the entire American population and not
just youth. Many studies on online political participation focus on youth and their rates of
online political participation, but there needs to be an expansion of online political
participation among older populations. Also, assessments on the patterns of online
political participation among racial and ethnic groups and generational cohorts enriches
our understanding pertaining to potential distinctions in the rates of online political
participation by racial and ethnic groups.
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Lastly, building on our understanding of generational political identity on online
political participation of millennials will add to which factors predict online political
participation. Linked fate is used as proxy for a millennial political identity, I test if
linked fate will lead millennials to participate in online political participation. Another
advancement of this study lies in a comparison of online and traditional online political
participation. This is an important contribution to the study of online political
participation because there is a more comprehensive analysis of what predicts online
political participation among various groups and an expansion of measurement with
regards to how we measure online political participation.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Technological advancements and interconnectedness through new forms of
communication lend themselves to new forms of political integration among millennials
not experienced to the same degree with non-millennials. This is not to say that
millennials are the digital natives they are described to be, but they were born and raised
during a time with rapid technological development and in an era with a greater use of
digital technology than previous generations (Bennett et al. 2008). When it comes to
assessing potential differences among generations the one primarily used to characterize
millennials is digital technology. For instance, generation X witnessed the conception of
the first computer, but computer use was not widely available nor was the internet (Myers
2016; Milner 2010). The socialization into technology experienced by millennials is one
of the most differentiating characteristics of this generation from past generations.
Not only is the socialization into technology of millennials an explanation for
generational differences in technology use, but so is the digital divide. The “digital
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divide” is widely used to explain differences in digital media use among individuals
(Norris 2001). Norris (2001) suggest that there are many aspects that comprise the digital
divide, such as income, occupation, education, gender, race and generational differences.
While it might seem in contemporary society that some of these gaps have shrunk, the
digital divide still exits.
First, the digital divide is still present among generations and resulting in
differences in technology use by generations. One study by Hargittai and Hinnant (2008)
finds ages 18 to 29 are more likely to use the internet than older individuals.
Additionally, current reports from the Pew Research Center (2018) highlight that
millennials overall are more likely to use technological devices and digital platforms than
non-millennials (Jiang 2018). Specifically, millennials are more likely to use smartphones
(92%) when compared to generation X (85%), baby boomers (67%) and the silent
generation (30%) (Jiang 2018). In addition to digital devices, millennials are more likely
to use social media (85%) when compared to generation X (75%), baby boomers (57%)
and the silent generation (23%) (Jiang 2018). These rates of digital media use and devices
by generations points to a clear digital divide in by generations. Because of a digital
divide among generational cohorts, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1a: Millennials will be more likely to engage in social media based political activities
when compared to Generation X and Baby Boomers, even when controlling for other
factors.
Moreover, when assessing differences among racial and ethnic groups, new
reports on technology and digital media use among racial and ethnic groups suggests the
digital divide exists among racial and ethnic groups (Census 2017; Cohen et al. 2018;
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Hargittai and Hinnant 2008). Data from the census on the digital divide finds the lack of
computer ownership and internet access is higher for Blacks (36%) and Latinos (30%)
when compared to whites (21%) and Asians (12%). These recent percentages
demonstrate the digital divide is not only present among generations but is also affects
racial and ethnic groups.
As for millennials and race and ethnicity, a report from an ongoing survey on
millennials titled GenForward by Cohen et al. (2018), reports that computer ownership is
lowest among Blacks (69%) and Latinos (69%) when compared to Asians (83%) and
whites (87%). However, when examining smartphone ownership, Asians (97%) and
whites (93%) have higher rates of smartphone ownership than Blacks (88%) and Latinos
(92%) (Cohen et al. 2018). While inequities are present with regards to computer
ownership, the inequalities do decrease with regards to smartphone ownership among
millennials by race. When examining internet access among racial and ethnic millennials,
once more internet access is highest among Asians (92%) and whites (90%) and is lowest
among Blacks (77%) and Latinos (75%) (Cohen et al. 2018). The digital divide is also
present among racial and ethnic groups but within generations. Because of both
generational and racial status, I argue generational differences in technological access and
use and by racial and ethnic groups will also contribute to the digital divide. Thus, I
propose the next hypothesis:
H1b: I anticipate that racial and ethnic groups who are millennials will engage in
social media based political activities due to their age and because of their early
socialization into digital media when compared to racial and ethnic groups who are nonmillennials.
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Moreover, literature on linked fate presents a clear relationship between Blacks
with higher linked fate and an increase in their levels of offline political participation
(Dawson 1994; McClain and Stewart 2006). Scholarship in Black politics demonstrates
that Blacks with higher levels of linked fate are more inclined to be civically engaged
(Dawson 1994). Since, African Americans who perceive their individual fates to be tied
to those of their racial group are more likely to rely on group-based interests when they
make political decisions (Dawson 1994), I argue that millennials will also have some sort
of shared generational group interests that will guide both their online and traditional
political participation.
I draw on linked fate to serve as a proxy for a generational political identity
among millennials. The millennial political identity is not one that emerges due to racial
and ethnic prejudices but arises from the political challenges and unique formative
experiences that this generations experiences. Recent research on millennials by Rouse
and Ross (2018) argues that there is a generational identity present among millennials.
This generational identity was formed due to various formative events and trends
millennials have experienced (Rouse and Ross 2018). Some of the formative events
shaping the millennial identity are: “the Clinton impeachment, Columbine shooting, 9/11
terrorist attacks, war on terror, Hurricane Katrina, and the Great Recession” (Rouse and
Ross 2018, p. 28-29). The formative trends associated with this generation are:
“increasing diversity of this generation, proliferation of digital technologies, globalization
of the world economy, unemployment and underemployment, and detachment from
traditional institutions” (Rouse and Ross 2018, p.29). These distinct experiences among
millennials results in a unique generational political identity.
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Based on this argument by Rouse and Ross (2018) of generational identity among
millennials, I use linked fate a proxy for “identity” among millennials to examine if a
millennial identity will result in higher levels of online discursive politics, online, and
traditional political participation. I examine online political participation because
millennials are more prone to use digital media as means for political change and because
millennials are more prone to discuss politics online. Additionally, linked fate has been
found among several segments of the population to lead to higher levels of traditional
forms of political participation (Dawson 1994; Sanchez 2006a; Masuoka 2008), thus
fueling my argument that linked fate should also influence traditional online political
participation among millennials Based on this argument, I develop the last hypotheses:
H2a: Linked fate will be positively correlated with on-line/social media based
political participation for millennials.
H2b: Linked fate will be positively correlated with traditional online political
participation for millennials.
H2c: Linked fate will be positively correlated with online discursive politics for
millennials.
DATA AND METHODS
For this study I use two datasets to analyze online political participation across
generations and the role of a generational political identity among millennials on online
political participation. These two data sets are fielded from 2013, 2015, and 2016 and
these datasets capture the 2014 midterm election and the 2016 presidential election. The
first hypotheses, I test are H1a and H1b, which examine differences in online political
participation by generational cohort and race and ethnicity. For these hypotheses, I use
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the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016. The CMPS 2016 is an
adequate dataset due to its array of variables measuring social media based online
political participation, political variables, and has large samples of racial and ethnic
groups. The total number of observations in the dataset are 10,145 and were collected
online between the dates of December 3, 2016 to February 15, 2017. The survey is
available in six different languages which are English, Spanish, Chinese (simplified),
Chinese (traditional), Korean, and Vietnamese. This survey also samples both registered
and non-registered voters. The full data are weighted within each racial group to
matching the adult population in the 2015 Census ACS 1-year data file for age, gender,
education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration status. A post-stratification raking
algorithm was used to balance each category within +/- 1 percent of the ACS estimates.
Data are not weighted to their national combined racial average. That is, Whites account
for 10 percent of all cases, and each racial group roughly 30 percent. The total sample
across different racial and ethnic groups are displayed in table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Overall CMPS Sample Size Description

Registered to Vote
Not Registered
Total

Total
6,024
4,121
10,145

Latino
1,816
1,187
3,003

Black
2,002
1,100
3,102

Asian
1,503
1,503
3,006

White
703
331
1,034

As mentioned, this survey was administered on the web. Some might argue web
surveys have problems because of the representativeness of the U.S. population, equal
access to the internet across the population, and due to possible issues with sampling
strategies of online surveys (Couper and Miller 2008; Dillman 2006; Bethlehem 2010).
Surveys administered online can experience limitations since the entire population can
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lack internet access (Couper 2000). Even though there are potential concerns with webbased surveys, there are also benefits of web-based surveys. Some of those benefits are
with regards to collecting large amounts of responses and targeting various segments of
the population (Bethlehem 2010). But with regards with the validity of this survey, the
principal investigators themselves attest to the accuracy of the data and support its use for
scholarly work (Barreto et al. 2018). The PI’s used the following sampling method
coined the random-recruit-to-web (RRW) (Barreto et al. 2018). This method uses the
“official voter file of registered voters, which now contains about 40% of respondents
with an email address either volunteered or matched through external databases” (Barreto
et al. 2018, p. 3). These scholars then went through these records and sorted them by
racial and ethnic group, age, and SES and then randomly selected participants (Barreto et
al. 2018). According to the PI’s this is almost the same tactic used in telephone surveys of
registered voters. In sum, even with issues with web-surveys the sampling method and
methodical approach by the PI’s suggests that this survey is a valid instrument.
Next, is an overview of the total sample of millennials by race and ethnicity. The
total number of millennials is 4,515 out of 10,134.16 There is a lack of consensus with
regards to the cutoff point of the millennial generation, with some researchers ending
millennials in 1996 (Jiang 2018) and others in the early 2000s (Greenberg and Weber
2008). Thus, I distinguish millennials to be individuals born from 1981 to 1998 and is
consistent with research on millennials (Hayes-Bautista 2017; Fry 2016). Based on
research on millennials my cut off meets the requirements for an adequate depiction of

16

I lost 12 cases due to missing data in the age variable.
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millennials. The sample break down for millennials by race and ethnicity in the CMPS
2016 is shown below in table 4.2.
Table 4.2. CMPS Millennial Sample Size Description
Total

Latino Millennials

Black Millennials

Asian Millennials

White Millennials

Registered to Vote

1,784

747

528

397

112

Not Registered

2,731

816

741

1,001

173

Total

4,515

1,563

1,269

1,398

285

For the first portion of the analysis, I use social media based political activity as a
dependent variable for online political participation. Social media political activity is a
binary measure (coded 1=yes and 0=no) and is based on the question “Discussed a
candidate or political issue on social media like Facebook or Twitter?” In table 4.3 the
summary statistics for the dependent variable as well as other variables included in the
models are provided.17

17

For more information on the original question wording and variable coding see
Appendix C.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for CMPS 2016
Variables

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation
.4455299 .4970487
.2889284
.4532869
.234853
.4239278
.3391553 .473446
2.770476 .9134091
0.5783133 0.4938661
.6534203 .475904
4.273633 1.16396
5.184211 3.47524
.3690547 .4825726
.8645155 .3422572
40.63193 15.52016
.2957371 .4563959
.3058022 .4607691
.2965265 .4567484
.1019341 .3025765

Min. Max

Millennials
Generation X
Baby Boomers
Media Post
Political Interest
Party Strength
Female
Education
Income
South
Employed
Age
Latino
Black
Asian
White

10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
6,640
10,116
10,134
9,234
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134
10,134

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
18
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
4
1
1
6
12
1
1
98
1
1
1
1

The key independent variables used are generational cohorts. Generational
cohorts are measured by creating several dummies of various generations, in this case
millennials, generation X, and baby boomers. This measure is constructed from the age
variable. The variable for generation X based on those born from 1965 to 1980 and baby
boomers is for those born from 1946 to 1964 (Greenberg and Weber 2008). The years
used to define generation X and baby boomers are consistent with research on the
subject. Lastly, the reference categories for generational cohorts are the silent and
greatest generations due to the small number of observations of these two generations and
because these generations are less likely to use digital media. Greatest generation has 10
observations and the silent generations has 298 observations and data on older
generations suggests they are less likely to use social media (Jiang 2018). Thus, based on
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the lack of social media use this makes the silent generation and the greatest generation
adequate reference groups for this study.
The standard controls used for the first two hypothesis, I include socioeconomic
status (SES), income, education, and employment, all of which identified in the literature
of political participation to have a relationship with offline political participation and
online political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Feezell and
Jones 2017). Also added as controls are demographic variables of race and ethnicity and
gender (Norris 2001). Age is excluded from the analysis due to multicollinearity with
millennials, generation X and baby boomers. Political interest is also included due to
studies finding a clear association between interest and engagement in political activities
(Verba et al. 1995; Liu 2001). Party strength is also included as a proxy for partisan
intensity due to studies signaling it is a predictor of online political participation (Feezell
and Jones 2017). The southern region is included because it is one of the most rural
regions in the United States and there might be differences in online political
participation for those living in rural areas.18 However, one measure that is not included
in the analysis is household internet access due to the unavailability of this measure in the
CMPS 2016 dataset.
For the second portion of the analysis testing H2 or the relationship between
linked fate and online political participation among millennials, uses the Youth
Participatory Politics Survey administered by GfK. The YPP survey is a nationally

18

https://gisortal.data.census.gov/arcgis/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7a41374f6b03456e9d138
cb014711e01
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representative three-wave panel survey of youth in the United States conducted between
2011 and 2015. The surveys were administered in both English and Spanish languages
and includes and over sample of racial and ethnic minority youth. This study uses waves
2 and 3 of the full panel because these two waves surveyed the same respondents. Wave
2 was surveyed from July 2013 to November 2013 and has a total of 2,343 respondents.
Wave 3 was surveyed from June 2015 to November 2015 and retained 44% of the Wave
2 respondents and has a total of 1,033 respondents. The Wave 2-3 panel consists of 1,033
respondents age 17-29 years of age. The sample for racial and ethnic groups is 242
Latinos, 243 Blacks, 158 Asians, and 356 whites. This data set is used to supplement the
CMPS 2016 data because of the inclusion of several online political participation
measures that are not available in the CMPS 2016 and because of the millennial sample
included in the survey. The sample of this survey includes millennials in their youth.
Lastly, the panel data allows for the examination of millennial online political
participation over time through a panel study.
The YPP survey has an array of variables measuring online political participation.
Some of the variables were binary in nature and others were ordinal.19 In order to narrow
down which variables are most appropriate to use to construct an index variable
consisting of various online political activities, I opted to first use an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) to determine whether the dependent variables I identify as online political
participation activities would load onto the latent concept of online political participation
from Wave 2 and 3. For the factor analysis, I used the promax rotation to examine the

19

To allow me to run the EFA, I had to recode the ordinal measures into binary variables
because if not I would not be able to run the EFA appropriately. A list of the measures
that were used during the EFA are included in Appendix C.
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correlations of my variables of interest. The scree tests indicated that there was a
potential to retain two factors for each of the two Waves. Only the items that loaded
above 0.30 after the rotation were retained and only factors with more than three loading
items are used in the creation of two factor variables (Costello and Osborne 2005).
Removed from the factors were two measures “discussing politics online” and
“discussing politics with those opposing your views online” as these variables did not
load in the analysis and were removed from both Waves 2 and 3. This EFA began with a
total of 12 variables on online political participation and ended with only 10 variables
included in the construction of two factor variables measuring online political
participation.
Based on the variables that loaded together to construct the two factors for Waves
2 and 3, I decided to follow the labeling scheme proposed by Feezell and Jones (2017)
for factors 1 and 2. The factor 1 is labeled “online” political participation and factor 2 is
labeled online “traditional” political participation. Factor 1 is defined as online political
participation because these measures follow the same set of activities that compose online
political participation (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Feezell and Jones 2017). While factor
2 envelops more of the characteristics of traditional political participation. Factor 2 is
composed of joining a political group, contacting several entities and signing a petition.
All of these activities take place in an online setting but share several characteristics with
traditional political activities (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Feezell and Jones 2017). As a
result, factor two is labeled online traditional participation to clarify that these activities,
while traditional in nature take place in an online setting.20 Based on these arguments,

20

See Appendix C with original variable question wording and coding.
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factor 1 is characterized as online political participation and factor 2 as online traditional
political participation. The list of online political activities that comprise both measures
are listed in table 4.4 with a display of the overall percentages of participation for each
activity in the sample. The sample includes all youth under the age of 18 as youth do not
need to meet a certain age requirement to participate in politics online.21
Table 4.4: Online and Traditional Political Participation Activities
Type of
Participation
Online
Participation

Online Traditional
Participation

Activity

Wave 2

Wave 3

Liking a post/article

26%

23%

Sharing a post
Circulating a post/article
Commenting on a post/blog/article
Posting on social media

33%
17%
34%
29%

31%
14%
31%
24%

Joined a political group online

8%

5%

25%
10%
7%
6%

23%
8%
7%
7%

Signed an online petition
Contacted the government online
Contacted a company online
Contacted a community organization
online
Note: Full sample for Waves 2 and 3 is 1,033 respondents

The first factor is labeled online political participation for Wave 2 and is loaded
with five items that share the characteristics of online political participation (Cronbach’s
α = 0.88) and for the first factor for online political participation for Wave 3 it also
loaded with five items (Cronbach’s α = 0.88). The second factor for online traditional
political participation loaded with five items as well did the factor for Wave 2
(Cronbach’s α = 0.70) and Wave 3 (Cronbach’s α = 0.69). Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4

21

The models were also tested with an only 18 years and over sample and the results
were similar.
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all display the items and the loading values for each factor, as well as the Cronbach alpha
statistic. The distribution for online and online traditional political participation from
Wave 3 is shown in table 4.5.
Even though I dropped the two variables “discussing politics online” and
“discussing politics with those opposing your views online” from the factor variables, I
opted to keep them as a measure of online discursive politics as this measure is similar to
the social media based political activity variable from the CMPS 2016. Including this
measure as a third dependent variable allows for a comparison of the CMPS 2016 and
YPP survey measures on discussing politics online, which results in a more robust
analysis of online political participation. Both variables are ordinal measures and were
initially combined into one ordinal measures of online discursive politics.22 However,
upon examining the distribution of the ordinal measure of online discursive politics, I
decided to dichotomize the variable for online discursive politics (coded 1=yes and
0=no).23 These measures based on the following two questions 1) “How often do you
discuss politics online?” and How often do you discuss politics online with people who
do not share your views?” Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of the dependent variable for
online discursive politics. Lastly, table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the three
dependent variables and control variables in the models.

22

The original distribution of the combined measure of discursive politics is never (59%),
rarely (29%), sometimes (10%), and often (2%).
23
Those who said never were coded 0 for no and those who said rarely, sometimes and
often were coded 1 for yes. The models were also tested with the original combined
ordinal measure for online discursive politics and the results still hold. The supplemental
models for the ordinal measure are displayed in Appendix F.
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Figure 4.1: Online political participation factor items and loading values for Wave –3
Liking a post/article
online
Sharing a post online

0.40

0.85

Online Political
Participation
(Wave 3)
α = 0.88

0.46

Circulating a post/article online

0.81
Commenting on a post/blog/article
online
Posting on social media

0.76

Figure 4.2: Online political participation factor items and loading values for Wave—2
Liking a post/article
online
Sharing a post online
Circulating a post/article online

0.43

0.85
0.59
0.82

Commenting on a post/blog/article
online

Online Political
Participation
(Wave 2)
α = 0.88

Posting on social media
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0.81

Figure 4.3: Online traditional political participation factor items and loading values for
Wave—3
Joined a political group online
0.39
Signed an online petition

0.46
Online Traditional
Political
Participation
(Wave 3)
α = 0.69

0.77

Contacted the government online

0.70
Contacted a company online
0.63
Contacted a community organization
online

Figure 4.4: Online traditional political participation factor items and loading values for
Wave—2
Joined a political group online
0.42
Signed an online petition

0.40
Online Traditional
Political
Participation
(Wave 2)
α = 0.70

0.64

Contacted the government online

0.68
Contacted a company online
0.65
Contacted a community organization
online
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Table 4.5: Online and Online Traditional Political Participation Distribution Wave 3
Amount of Activities
Online Participation Factor
Traditional Participation
1
Factor 2
Zero
60%
71%
One
8%
18%
Two
6%
6%
Three
9%
3%
Four
10%
2%
Five
7%
1%
Note: Full sample for Factor 1 is 1,015 respondents and for Factor 2 is 994 respondents.

Figure 4.5: Distribution of Dependent Variable Online Discursive Politics—Wave 3
100
90
80
70
60

59

50

41

40
30
20
10
0
Yes

No

Note: Full sample for Online Discursive Politics is 1,029 respondents.
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics for YPP Survey
Variables
Online Participation Wave 3
Online Participation Wave 2
Traditional Participation Wave 3
Traditional Participation Wave 2
Online Discursive Politics Wave
3
Online Discursive Politics Wave
2
Linked Fate
Female
Age
Latino
Black
Asian
White
Household Internet Access
Income
Political Interest
Partisan Intensity
Education
Employed
South

Observations
1,015
980
994
969
1,029

Mean
1.226601
1.377551
.5090543
.5614035
.4052478

Standard Deviation
1.742236
1.822655
.9834576
1.043772
.4911787

Min.
0
0
0
0
1

Max
5
5
5
5
0

1,026

.4307992

.4954296

1

0

995
1,033
1,033
1,033
1,033
1,033
1,033
1,033
1,033
1,010
1,019
1,032
1,033
1,028

2.364824
.5498548
22.8577
.2342691
.2352372
.1529526
.3446273
.9477251
2.793804
2.268317
35.6212
2.742248
.6456922
.3326848

1.13237
.4977493
3.941933
.4237463
.4243524
.3601161
.4754768
.2226887
1.455103
.8714649
31.02521
.9826023
.4785347
.4714041

1
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

4
1
29
1
1
1
1
1
5
4
100
4
1
1

The key independent variable for the second portion of the analysis is linked fate.
I combine the binary measure of linked fate (coded 1=yes linked fate and 0=no linked
fate) with the ordinal variable of how much linked fate (coded 0=not very much, 1=some
and 3=a lot) to create a new ordinal measure of linked fate. The two questions combined
to create the new measure are: “Do you think that what happens generally to in this
country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” and “Will it affect
you.” I opt for this coding scheme to be consistent with several studies examining linked
and political participation (Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Dawson 1994).
This variable is used as the independent variable for the three models examining online
political participation.
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The control variables included in the models are socioeconomic measures of
household income, employment and education (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim
1978; Feezell and Jones 2017). Demographic variables of race, ethnicity, age, and gender
are also included due to potential differences among these groups regarding their levels
of online political activities (Norris 2001).24 As in the first portion of the analysis, the
southern region is also included because it is one of the most rural regions in the United
States and there might be a decrease in online political participation for those living in
rural areas.25 Household internet access is also included as a control in the model because
not everyone has access to household internet (Pew Research Center 2019).26 A measure
of party intensity is also included in the model as a predictor for online political
participation (Feezell and Jones 2017). This variable was constructed by taking the
absolute value of the difference between the two feeling thermometers (0-100) for
Republicans and Democrats. A high score indicates that a higher level of partisan
intensity, while a lower score results in a lower degree of partisan intensity. This measure
is also included based on prior studies on online political participation noting a
relationship between partisan intensity and online political participation (Feezell and
Jones 2017). Political interest is included as a control because studies in political
participation find that individuals that are interested in politics are more likely to
participate in political activities (Verba et al. 1995; Liu 2001). Lastly, there are three

24

White is the reference group for race and ethnicity.
https://gisortal.data.census.gov/arcgis/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7a41374f6b03456e9d138
cb014711e01
26
Since, this measure is not included in the CMPS 2016 dataset, but is available in the
YPP survey, household internet access will be included in the analysis for online political
participation and linked fate.
25
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lagged dependent variables from Wave 2 included in the analysis to examine the outcome
variables in the study. The lagged dependent variables have been used in prior panel
studies to examine changes over time in the primary outcome variables in American
politics (Bartels 2006).
Moreover, the first portion of the analysis, explores social media based political
activity by race and ethnicity and generational cohort through a multivariate regression
analysis. Since, the dependent variable is binary; I use logistic regressions as the
appropriate modeling approach (Long and Freese 2003). Following the multivariate
analysis, I include predicted probabilities to interpret the coefficients of the logistic
regressions.
For the second portion of the analysis, I used a poisson regression to test the role
of linked fate on the count variables for passive and active online political participation.
Based on the both of my dependent variables, the most appropriate regression method is
the poisson regression (Tutz 2012). For the third dependent variable on online discursive
politics, I use a logistic regression, as this is the most appropriate modeling approach for
a binary variable (Long and Freese 2003). As with logistics regressions, the coefficients
cannot be directly interpreted, and post estimation results are included.
ANALYSIS
CMPS 2016 Analysis
Prior to discussing the multivariate analysis on social media use by generations,
there is a brief discussion of descriptive results regarding generational cohorts and their
levels of social media based political activity. Figure 4.6 shows that millennials are more
inclined to post on social media for political reasons when compared to generation X and
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baby boomers. For instance, 41 percent of millennials post on social media for political
reasons when compared to 33 percent of generation X and 29 percent of baby boomers.
These differences demonstrate that there are differences in social media based political
activity by generations and suggests that younger generations use social media for
political reasons at a higher rate than older generations.
Figure 4.6: Posting on Social Media by Generational Cohort
100
90
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80

Percent

70
60
50

67
59
41
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33

30

29

20
10
0
Millennials

Generation X
No

Baby Boomers

Yes

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016

Moreover, the first portion of the multivariate analysis examines generational
cohorts use of social media based political activity to test if my theory on the digital
divide is an accurate explanation for differences in online political participation by
generations. Table 4.7 shows that millennials, generation X, and baby boomers all engage
in online political participation. Millennials are positive and strongly correlated with
social media based political activity (p<0.01). Millennials are more likely to engage in a
social media based political activity than non-millennials. Generation X is positive and
strongly correlated with social media based political activity (p<0.01). Generation X is
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more likely to engage in a social media based political activity than non-generation X.
Baby boomers is positive and strongly correlated with social media based political
activity (p<0.01). Baby boomers are more likely to engage in a social media based
political activity than non-baby boomers.
To assess the coefficients in the logistic regression predicted probabilities are
calculated and displayed in figure 4.7. Figure 4.7 shows that Millennials have a 24
percent probability of not engaging in a social media based political activity and a 63
percent probability of engaging in a social media based political activity. With regards to
generation X, figure 4.7 shows there is a 27 percent probability of not engaging in a
social media based political activity and a 59 percent probability in engaging in a social
media based political activity. Lastly, baby boomers have a 29 percent probability of not
engaging in a social media based political activity and a 44 percent probability of
engaging in a social media based political activity. While all generations are likely to
engage in a social media based political activity, millennials have a 39 percent difference
in the probability of engaging in a social media based political activity (24 to 63 percent)
when compared to generation X with a 32 percent difference in the probability of
engaging in a social media based political activity (27 to 60 percent) and baby boomers
with a 15 percent difference in the probability of engaging in a social media based
political activity (29 to 44 percent). These results support my first hypothesis that
millennials would be more inclined to post on social media for political reasons than
older generations.
Other variables that are also significant in the full model are race, SES,
demographics and political orientations. The variable for Asians is negative and
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marginally correlated with engaging in a social media based political activity (p<0.1).
Asians are less likely to engage in a social media based political activity than whites.
Political interest is positive and strongly correlated with engaging in a social media based
political activity (p<0.01). Individuals that have higher levels of political interest are
more likely to engage in a social media based political activity than individuals with low
levels of political interest. As with prior research on online political participation,
political interest is a predictor for online political behavior (Feezell and Jones 2017; Lin
2016). Party Strength is positive and strongly correlated with engaging in a social media
based political activity (p<0.01). Individuals with stronger partisan ties are more likely to
engage in a social media based political activity than individuals with weaker partisan
ties. This finding is consistent with previous research on online political participation
suggesting partisan intensity predicts online political participation (Feezell and Jones
2017). Gender is positive and strongly correlated with engaging in a social media based
political activity (p<0.01). Females are more likely to engage in a social media based
political activity than males. The results for gender are mixed with regards to prior
research. One camp of scholars finds that males are more likely to engage in online
activities (Norris 2001) and other scholars find females are more likely to engage in
online activities (Theocharis and Quintelier 2016). Additionally, the result on gender
differs from Feezell and Jones (2017) where gender was not a predictor for online
political participation across three various samples. Lastly, education is positive and
strongly correlated with engaging in a social media based political activity (p<0.05).
Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to engage in a social media
based political activity than individuals with lower levels of education. This finding is
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also consistent with research on online political participation (Feezell and Jones 2017). In
sum, there are various predictors for social media use.
Table 4.7: Logistic regressions predicting Online Political Participation by Generational
Cohort
Full Model

Interaction Model

Coef. Media Post

SE

Coef. Media Post

SE

Millennials

1.688***

(0.143)

1.810***

(0.171)

Generation X

1.340***

(0.144)

1.553***

(0.174)

0.653***

(0.139)

0.866***

(0.164)

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

0.090

(0.087)

0.748*

(0.397)

Black

-0.041

(0.090)

0.574

Asians

-0.251*

(0.145)

0.645

(0.408)
(0.613)

--

--

--

--

--

--

-0.687

(0.419)

Latino X Generation X

--

--

-0.641

(0.423)

Latino X Baby Boomers

--

--

-0.703

(0.432)

--

--

-0.376

(0.435)

--

--

-0.760*

(0.439)

Black X Baby Boomers

--

--

-0.818*

(0.436)

Asian X Millennials

--

--

-0.628

(0.646)

--

--

-1.237*

(0.676)

--

--

-1.285*

(0.709)

0.627***

(0.045)

0.628***

(0.045)

Party Strength

0.241***

(0.067)

0.243***

(0.067)

Female

0.237***

(0.062)

0.243***

(0.062)

0.065**

(0.029)

0.071**

(0.029)

0.001

(0.010)

0.000

(0.010)

Employed

-0.153

(0.106)

-0.156

(0.106)

South

0.066

(0.064)

0.070

(0.065)

-4.051***

(0.236)

-4.253***

(0.251)

VARIABLES
Generational Cohort

Baby Boomers
Silent Generation (reference category)
Greatest Generation (reference category)
Race and Ethnicity
Latino

White (reference category)
Interactions
Latino X Millennials

Black X Millennials
Black X Generation X

Asian X Generation X
Asian X Baby Boomers
SES, Political Variables, &
Demographics
Political Interest

Education (low to high)
Income (low to high)

Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

6,119

6,119

0.0743

0.0764

-3229.9637

-3222.4501

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
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Figure 4.7: Change in the Predicted Probability of Online Political Participation – Full
Model
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Note: Predictive probabilities are calculated while holding all variables at their means.

Table 4.7 includes the second model with interaction effects of race and
generational cohort status. This model shows that millennials, generation X, and baby
boomers all engage in online political participation. Millennial is positive and strongly
correlated with engaging in a social media based political activity (p<0.01). Millennials
are more likely to engage in a social media based political activity than the silent and
greatest generations. Generation X is positive and strongly correlated with engaging in a
social media based political activity (p<0.01). Generation X is more likely to engage in a
social media based political activity than the silent and greatest generations. Baby
boomers is positive and strongly correlated with engaging in a social media based
political activity (p<0.01). Baby boomers are more likely to engage in a social media
based political activity than the silent and greatest generations. Once more my initial
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hypothesis that millennials would be more likely to post on social media than older
generations is supported in the interaction model.
Figure 4.8 shows the post estimation results for the interaction model and
illustrates the substantive differences in engagement of a social media based political
activity by generations. Millennials have a 24 percent probability of not engaging in a
social media based political activity and a 62 percent probability of engaging in a social
media based political activity. Generation X, on the other hand, has 28 percent
probability of not engaging in a social media based political activity and a 58 percent
probability of engaging in a social media based political activity. Baby boomers have a
30 percent probability of not engaging in a social media based political activity and a 42
probability of engaging in a social media based political activity. Even though all
generations are likely to engage in a social media based political activity, millennials
have a 38 percent difference in engaging in a social media based political activity (24 to
62 percent) when compared to generation X with a 30 percent difference (28 to 58
percent) and baby boomers with a 12 percent difference (30 to 42 percent).
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Figure 4.8: Change in the Predicted Probability of Online Political Participation –
Interaction Model
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Note: Predictive probabilities are calculated while holding all variables at their means.

However, with regards to my second hypothesis regarding differences in
engagement in a social media based political activity by generations and race, I find that
my hypothesis is supported to some extent. The interactions for Latinos and generational
cohorts are insignificant and suggest that there are not any differences in engaging in a
social media based political activity among Latino generations. However, for Blacks and
Asians the interaction effects for generation X and baby boomers are negative and
marginally significant (p<0.1). Black gen Xers are less likely to engage in a social media
based political activity when compared to white gen Xers. Also, black baby boomers are
less likely to engage in a social media based political activity when compared to white
baby boomers. Asian gen Xers are also less likely to engage in a social media based
political activity when compared to white gen Xers. Asian baby boomers are also less
likely to engage in a social media based political activity when compared to white baby
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boomers. These results suggest that there are marginal differences in posting on social
media by race and ethnicity and generational cohort.
Moreover, other variables in the model that are significant are political
orientations, SES, and demographics. The variable for Latinos is positive and marginally
correlated with engaging in a social media based political activity (p<0.1). Latinos are
more likely to post on social media for political reasons than whites. Political interest is
positive and strongly correlated with posting on social media (p<0.01). Individuals with
higher levels of political interest are more likely to engage in a social media based
political activity than individuals with low levels of political interest. Once more political
interest is shown to have a relationship with online political participation (Feezell and
Jones 2017; Lin 2016). Party Strength is positive and strongly correlated with engaging in
a social media based political activity (p<0.01). Individuals with strong partisan ties are
more likely to engage in a social media based political activity than individuals with
weak partisan ties. This finding is consistent with previous research on online political
participation (Feezell and Jones 2017). Gender is positive and strongly correlated with
engaging in a social media based political activity (p<0.01). Females are more likely to
engage in a social media based political activity than males. As with the full model, the
results for gender are mixed with regards to prior research. One camp of scholars finds
that males are more likely to engage in online activities (Norris 2001) and other scholars
find females are more likely to engage in online activities (Theocharis and Quintelier
2016). Additionally, the result on gender differs from Feezell and Jones (2017) where
gender was not a predictor for online political participation across three various samples.
Lastly, education is positive and strongly correlated with engaging in a social media
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based political activity (p<0.05). Individuals with higher levels of education are more
likely to engage in a social media based political activity than individuals with lower
levels of education. This finding is also consistent with research on online political
participation (Feezell and Jones 2017). In sum, there are various predictors for online
political participation.
YPP Survey Analysis
Prior to examining the multivariate analysis, the distribution of the linked fate by
race and ethnicity is displayed in figure 4.9. The results suggest that 27 percent of Black
millennials have “a lot” of linked fate when compared to Asian millennials (18%), white
millennials (13%), and Latino millennials (10%) who have “a lot” of linked fate. Black
millennials have the highest levels of linked fate in the millennial generation. In
comparison to those with lower levels of linked fate, 57 percent of Latino millennials
have “no linked fate” when compared to white millennials (35%), Asian millennials
(30%), and Black millennials (26%). In sum, Black millennials have the highest levels of
linked fate and Latino millennials have the lowest levels of linked fate.
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Figure 4.9: Linked Fate of Millennials by Race and Ethnicity – Wave 3
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The multivariate analysis for second portion of the analysis is displayed in table
4.8 and suggests that for the first model linked fate is a predictor for online political
participation. Linked fate is positive and strongly correlated with passive online political
participation (p<0.01). Millennials with higher levels of linked fate are more likely to
participate in passive online political participation than millennials with lower levels of
linked fate. The post estimation results in figure 4.10 suggest that for millennials with “a
lot” of linked fate when holding other variables at their means, there is a 1.17 percent
probability in participating in passive online activities when compared to millennials with
“no linked” fate with an .73 percent probability of participating in passive online
activities. This accounts for a 44 percent difference from having “no linked fate” to
having “a lot” of linked fate. This suggests that linked fate has a large impact on online
political participation. In sum, hypothesis H2a stating that millennials with higher levels
of linked fate would participate in online political participation is supported.

156

In addition, in the online political participation model there are controls that are
significant and these controls include: race, age, and political interest. Political interest is
positive and strongly correlated with online political participation (p<0.01). Individuals
with higher levels of political interest are more likely to participate in online political
participation than individuals with lower levels of political participation. This finding is
also consistent with research on online political participation that finds a relationship
between political interest and online political participation (Feezell and Jones 2017; Lin
2016). The variable for Blacks is positive and strongly correlated with online political
participation (p<0.01). Blacks are more likely to participate in online political
participation when compared to whites. Lastly, age is negative and marginally correlated
with online political participation. Older millennials are less likely to participate in online
political participation when compared to younger millennials
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Table 4.8: Poisson and Logistic Regressions of Linked Fate Predicting Online Discursive
Politics, Online and Traditional Online Political Participation

VARIABLES
Linked Fate
Female

Poisson Model 1
Coef. Online Political
Participation T2

Poisson Model 2
Coef. Traditional Online
Political Participation T2

Logit Model 3
Coef. Online Discursive
Politics Participation T2

0.167***

0.144***

0.200***

(0.029)

(0.044)

(0.070)

-0.090

0.198*

0.173

(0.065)

(0.102)

(0.156)

Latino

0.142

-0.150

0.605***

(0.090)

(0.140)

(0.206)

Black

0.242***

-0.260*

0.041

(0.086)

(0.139)

(0.215)

0.069

0.073

0.398

(0.093)

(0.136)

(0.242)

--

--

--

Asian
White (reference category)

--

--

--

Partisan Intensity

0.001

0.003**

0.007***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.003)

Political Interest

0.408***

0.418***

0.780***

(0.042)

(0.066)

(0.098)

-0.156

1.224**

0.812*

(0.165)

(0.485)

(0.475)

-0.012

-0.072**

0.007

(0.023)

(0.034)

(0.058)

-0.004

0.011

-0.065

(0.039)

(0.060)

(0.095)

-0.018*

-0.008

-0.018

(0.010)

(0.014)

(0.023)

-0.093

0.129

-0.092

(0.067)

(0.103)

(0.166)

-0.009

-0.149

-0.150

Household Internet
Income
Education
Age
South
Employed
Passive Online Participation T1
Active Online Participation T1
Online Discursive Politics T1
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

(0.066)

(0.103)

(0.168)

0.309***

--

--

(0.017)

--

--

--

0.452***

--

--

(0.033)

--

--

--

1.426***

--

--

(0.155)

-1.358***

-3.503***

-4.050***

(0.304)

(0.625)

(0.821)

927

901

973

0.246

0.245

0.197

-1265.7016

712.05672

-516.76368

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: YPP Survey 2013-2015

158

Figure 4.10: Change in the Predicted Probability of Participating in Online Political
Participation –Model 1

Table 4.8 also shows the results for model 2 on online traditional political
participation and suggests that linked fate is once again a predictor the second outcome
variable. Linked fate is positive and strongly correlated with online traditional political
participation (p<0.01). Millennials with higher levels of linked fate are more likely to
participate in online traditional political activities than millennials with lower levels of
linked fate. The post estimation results in figure 4.11 for linked fate and online traditional
political participation suggest that millennials with “a lot” of linked fate have a 45
percent probability in participation in online traditional political activities when
compared to millennials with “no linked fate” that have a 30 percent probability of
participating in online traditional political participation. This accounts for a 15 percent
difference in having “no linked fate” to “a lot” of linked fate. This is a large impact of
higher levels of linked fate on online traditional political participation. These results once
again support my hypothesis H2b that there is a relationship between linked fate and
online traditional political participation.
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Figure 4.11: Change in the Predicted Probability of Participating in Traditional Online
Political Participation–Model 2

With regards to the controls in the second model, political orientations,
demographics and SES are significant predictors of traditional online political
participation. Partisan intensity is positive and strongly correlated with traditional online
political participation (p<0.05). Millennials with higher levels of partisan intensity are
more likely to participate in traditional online political participation than millennials with
lower levels of partisan intensity. Political interest is positive and strongly correlated with
traditional online political participation (p<0.01). Millennials with higher levels of
political interest are more likely to participate in traditional online political activities than
millennials with lower levels of political interest. Once more this finding is supported by
prior research indicating the important role of political interest in predicting traditional
political participation (Feezell and Jones 2017; Lin 2016). Gender is also positive and
marginally correlated with higher levels of traditional online political participation
(p<0.1). Females are more likely to participate in traditional online political participation
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than males. These results vary from research among youth and traditional political
participation that show females were not likely to participate in traditional political
activities (Feezell and Jones 2017). The variable for Blacks is negative and marginally
correlated with traditional online political participation (p<0.1). Blacks are less likely to
participate in traditional online political participation when compared to whites.
Household internet is positive and strongly correlated with traditional online political
participation (p<0.05). Millennials with household internet are more likely to participate
in traditional online political participation than millennials who do not have household
internet. Based on research by Norris (2001) access to the internet is necessary for
becoming engaged in online political activities and since these activities take place online
having internet access is imperative. Lastly, income is negative and strongly correlated
with traditional online political participation (p<0.05). Millennials with higher levels of
income are less likely to engage in traditional online political activities when compared to
millennials with lower levels of income. The finding for income is also supported by
prior research on online and traditional political participation (Feezell and Jones 2017).
Overall, these results show that there are different predictors for online and traditional
online political participation.
The last model in this analysis is for online discursive politics and is shown in
table 4.8. The third model on linked fate as a predictor for online discursive politics
shows that Linked fate is positive and strongly correlated with online discursive politics
(p<0.01). Millennials with higher levels of linked fate are more likely to participate in
online discursive politics than millennials with lower levels of linked fate. The post
estimation results in figure 4.12 suggest that for millennials with “a lot” of linked fate
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when holding other variables at their means, there is a .43 percent probability in
participating in online discursive politics when compared to millennials with “no linked”
fate with an .31 percent probability of participating in passive online activities. This
accounts for a 12 percent difference from having “no linked fate” to having “a lot” of
linked fate. This suggests that linked fate has a considerable impact on online discursive
politics. In sum, my hypothesis that millennials with higher levels of linked fate would
participate in online political participation is supported.
Figure 4.12: Change in the Predicted Probability of Participating in Online Discursive
Politics –Model 3

With regards to the controls in the third model, political orientations,
demographics and household internet are significant predictors for online discursive
politics. Partisan intensity is positive and strongly correlated with online discursive
politics (p<0.01). Millennials with higher levels of partisan intensity are more likely to
participate in online discursive politics than millennials with lower levels of partisan
intensity. Political interest is positive and strongly correlated with online discursive
politics (p<0.01). Millennials with higher levels of political interest are more likely to
participate in online discursive politics than millennials with lower levels of political
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interest. Once more this finding is supported by prior research indicating the important
role of political interest in predicting online political participation (Feezell and Jones
2017; Lin 2016). The variable for Latinos is positive and strongly correlated with online
discursive politics (p<0.01). Latinos are more likely to engage in online discursive
politics than whites. Household internet is positive and marginally correlated with online
discursive politics (p<0.1). Millennials with household internet are more likely to
participate in online discursive politics participation than millennials who do not have
household internet. Based on research by Norris (2001) access to the internet is necessary
for becoming active in online political activities. Overall, these results show that there are
different predictors for passive and active online political participation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study began with an assessment of online political participation by
generational cohorts and was followed by an examination of linked fate on online
political participation of millennials in their youth. Overall, this study adds to our
understanding of online political participation among generational cohorts and race and
ethnicity. When examining the first portion of the study on generational cohorts and
online political participation, this study finds that millennials, generation X and baby
boomers all partake in more online political participation when compared to older
Americans. However, the levels online political participation differs among generations
and is more pronounced among millennials when compared to generation X and baby
boomers. This portion of the study overall supports hypothesis H1a because indeed
millennials participate in online politics to a greater degree than generation X and baby
boomers. When examining H1b, the analysis on generational cohorts and race and
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ethnicity shows contrasting results but does fully support my hypothesis. For instance,
Asian and Black gen Xers and baby boomers are both less likely to participate in online
politics when compared to non-Asian and non-black gen Xers and baby boomers. These
results point toward differences in online political participation by race, ethnicity and
generational cohort. These first set of results support my theoretical expectations that the
digital divide would explain differences in online political participation by race, ethnicity
and generational cohort and supports prior research on the subject (Norris 2001; Cohen et
al. 2018).
Moreover, when examining the second portion of my study regarding the possible
relationship between linked fate and online political participation, I find that H2a, H2b
and H2c are supported. Millennials with higher levels of linked fate are more likely to
engage in online discursive politics, as well as in online and traditional online political
participation. These findings suggest that more research needs to explore the impact
generational identity on other forms of political participation. If millennials are voting or
engaging in non-electoral activities because they feel their generation is not being
considered by political elites, these results can continue to bolster our understanding of
how what gets this generation engaged in politics. Understanding other forms of identity
will shed light in our understanding of whether there is such a thing as a generational
identity and if it influences young adults’ political choices. This segment of my study
also supports the second portion of my theoretical framework that a millennial
generational political identity would result in higher levels of political participation in an
array of political activities.
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More research still needs to expand on research in online political participation
among non-millennials. While this study makes a dent on online political participation
research, this study was limited to only examining one type of online political
participation among non-millennials. Through acquiring more data on various types of
online political participation and testing them among non-millennials a more robust
understanding of which types of online political activities are preferred among older
populations. Even though millennials are more prone to use digital media for political
purposes when compared to non-millennials, there is still a considerable percentage of
non-millennials engaging in digital media, which merits further analysis on the subject.
Building on these areas will continue to add to our understanding of online political
participation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
INTRODUCTION
Throughout this dissertation, I attempt to evaluate whether millennials are distinct
in their political behavior and ideology from other generations, and if Latino millennials
differ from non-Latinos of that generation in a comprehensive way. In the first empirical
chapter examining the formation of linked fate, I asked if millennials are a monolithic
generation and whether the group identity of Latino millennials is distinct from nonLatino millennials. The second empirical chapter asked if linked fate resulted in varied
patterns of political participation among millennials as a result of their racial and ethnic
identities. The final empirical chapter assessed if online political participation differs by
generational cohort and racial and ethnic group and if linked fate has a relationship with
higher levels of online political participation among millennials.
These questions and chapters are used to answer broader questions, such as: Are
Latino millennials distinct in their political behavior from millennials of other racial and
ethnic groups? Do Latino millennials vary in their group identity from older Latinos, if
yes does this create different patterns in their political behavior when compared to other
racial and ethnic millennials? The findings overall suggest that Latino millennials are
unique politically from non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials in certain
respects. In the upcoming sections, I provide a discussion, summary of the findings, and a
section on the contributions from the dissertation. Lastly, I culminate with a discussion of
future research paths.
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REVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS
Chapter 2
The first empirical chapter evaluates if Latino millennial identity differs from that
of non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials. The theoretical framework I put
forth, claims that differences in posting on social media and perceived discrimination
against immigrants will predict Latino millennial linked fate, but that these factors will
not predict linked fate for non-Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials. The CMPS
2016 data is used to answer this question. The findings suggest that posting on social
media and perceptions of discrimination against immigrant does not predict linked fate
for Latino millennials and Latino non-millennials. Overall the theory that social media’s
proliferation of racial content would predict linked fate among Latino millennials is not
supported. However, the factors that predict linked fate for Latino millennials are not the
same as those for Latino non-millennials. These differences are a result of experienced
racial discrimination, perceived discrimination against Latinos, gender, language,
geography, anti-Latino rhetoric and political interest. Linked fate for Latino millennials is
predicted by anti-Latino rhetoric, which is not the case for Latino non-millennials, whose
linked fate is predicted by perceptions of discrimination of Latinos. This shows shifts in
factors that predict linked fate across generations of Latinos.
These findings also show differences among Latino millennials when compared to
non-Latino millennials. Asian millennials linked fate is only predicted by experienced
racial discrimination, perceived discrimination against Asians, and political interest.
While Black millennials linked fate is only shaped by experienced racial discrimination
and political interest. Lastly, white millennials linked fate is influenced by several
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factors, among them social media based political activity, experienced racial
discrimination, political interest, gender, age, geography, and SES. These findings
demonstrate millennials are not a monolithic generational cohort as a result of their racial
and ethnic identities. Even though my proposed theory is not fully supported, this
analysis does add to our knowledge of what factors shape linked fate and how the
predictors of linked fate have changed across Latino generations.
Chapter 3
The third substantive chapter examines how linked fate impacts political
participation among Latino millennials when compared to Latino non-millennials and
non-Latino millennials. The theory for this chapter is that immigrant-based linked fate
will have a pronounced effect on political participation among Latino millennials when
compared to non-Latino millennials and that the traditional measure of linked fate will
influence political participation among all millennials, regardless of their racial and
ethnic group. This theory stems from immigration being a salient issue among the Latino
community and not as salient among non-Latinos. I rely on two measures of linked fate
included in the CMPS 2016 dataset that measure immigrant-based linked fate and
traditional linked fate. The results show that immigrant-based linked fate does predict
political participation among Latino millennials, but that the traditional measure of linked
fate does not result in higher levels of political participation for this group.
When examining non-Latino millennials, the results for Asian millennials
demonstrate that immigrant-based linked fate is not a predictor for political participation
among this group, but that the traditional measure of linked fate marginally predicts
political participation for Asian millennials. For Black millennials, the findings paint
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another story, where neither immigrant-based linked fate nor the traditional measure of
linked fate result in higher levels of political participation. Lastly, for white millennials,
the traditional measure of linked fate influences higher levels of political participation.
From these results, several conclusions are drawn. For one, the racialization of
Latinos as immigrants and having family and friends which are undocumented is a factor
driving Latino millennial participation. This same result does not hold for other racial and
ethnic groups. For instance, the Asian population is largely composed of immigrants, but
immigrant-based linked fate is not a predictor for this group and demonstrates that Asians
are not racialized in the same manner as Latinos. This is true also for Black and white
millennials, in which linked fate impacts political participation differently.
Chapter 4
The last empirical chapter examines online political participation among
millennials and non-millennials by race and ethnicity and conducts a sub-analysis on the
role of linked fate on online political participation among millennials. I use the digital
divide as my theoretical explanation for the differences in online political participation
among millennials and non-millennials. Once more by using the CMPS 2016 data, the
results uncover that all generations participate in online political activities. However, the
degrees of online political participation vary by generations. Millennials are more likely
to participate in online political activities than generation X and baby boomers. When
looking for potential differences among race and ethnicity, I find that Black and Asian
gen Xers and baby boomers are less likely to participate in online political activities. In
sum, this portion of the analysis illustrates the potential differences of online political
participation among racial and ethnic groups by generational cohort.
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For the sub-analysis on linked fate and online political participation, I use the
YPP Survey to test my theory of linked fate as a predictor for online political
participation among millennials. The findings suggest that linked fate is a predictor for
online political participation among millennials. In short, the presence of a generational
political identity among millennials is the driving force for online political participation.
Summary of Findings
Overall, my study demonstrates millennials are not a monolithic generational
cohort with respect to their racial and ethnic identities. Also, Latino millennials political
participation is highly influence by immigrant-based linked fate due to their racial and
ethnic identities. This shows immigration is a relevant issue among Latino millennials,
but not for non-Latino millennials. As for online political participation, the results show
that all generations engage in online political activities, but that millennials are more
prone to participate in politics through digital platforms. I also find that a generational
political identity plays a role in explaining online political participation among
millennials. This summarizes the findings in all three empirical chapters.
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISCUSSION
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of 1) Latino ethnic identity by
generations, 2) adds to our knowledge of how the current racialization and socialization
of Latino millennials as immigrants impacts their political behavior, and 3) the role of a
generational political identity as a driver for online political participation among
millennial youth and a comprehensive examination of online political participation across
generations. These contributions are discussed in further depth in the next few
paragraphs.
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When we think about Latino identity, most scholars would say that there is a set
number of factors that specifically predict linked fate among Latinos (Sanchez and
Masuoka 2010; Sanchez and Vargas 2016; Masuoka 2006). However, one key finding
from this study shows that the factors predicting linked fate among Latinos have not
remained stagnant. The predictors of linked fate among Latino generations has shifted
with Latino millennial identity being affected by different factors when compared to
Latino non-millennials. Specifically, in chapter 2, I theorize that as a result of the
proliferation of content specific to Latino discrimination and hostility toward immigrants
on social media would serve as predictor for linked fate among Latino millennials, but
not for Latino non-millennials. I also theorize that the predictors of linked fate would
vary among Latino millennials and non-millennials as a result of the socialization of
Latino millennials in an anti-immigrant and anti-Latino climate. The findings did not
ultimately support my theory, but a key finding is that linked fate is not shaped by factors
put forth by previous research on linked fate for Latinos and that linked fate has changed
among Latino generations.
Sanchez and Masuoka (2010), for instance, find that linked fate is not driven by
discrimination. However, my study finds that experienced racial discrimination is a
strong predictor for linked fate for Latino millennials and non-millennials, but that
experienced racial discrimination is more pronounced for Latino millennials than Latino
non-millennials. Also, perceived discrimination against Latinos does not motivate Latino
millennial identity but shapes Latino non-millennial identity. Based on these two
findings, the evidence suggests that Latino millennials are experiencing more
discrimination than Latino non-millennials. The strong impact of discrimination shows
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how Latinos have become strong targets for hostility by the political establishment and
the masses.
Another important contribution of this study deals with the impact anti-Latino
political rhetoric has on shaping linked fate among generations of Latinos. The results
support the portion of my theory that attacks by political elites on Latinos and the
racialization of Latinos as immigrant, even though many Latino millennials are U.S.,
shapes linked fate for Latino millennials. However, while anti-Latino rhetoric motivates
linked fate for Latino millennials, it does not shape linked fate for Latino non-millennials.
These results are key because it shows that Latino millennials are being socialized and
racialized during a time of extreme political hostility towards the Latino community.
Another key finding deals with the impact of gender on Latino identity. Research
on what predicts linked fate for Latinos is mixed with regards to gender. For instance,
Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) find that Latinos are more likely to have higher levels of
linked fate when compared to Latinas, but before that Masuoka (2006) found that Latinas
were more likely to have higher levels of linked fate than Latinos. Yet, my study finds
that linked fate and gender vary by Latino generations. For instance, Latina millennials
have higher levels of linked fate than Latino millennials, but when looking at Latino nonmillennials, Latinos had higher levels of linked fate than Latinas. These results suggest a
gender gap with regards to linked fate among Latino generations. The fact that linked fate
operates differently among generations of males and females suggests that linked fate has
shifted among Latinos.
In sum, the predictors of linked fate have not remained stagnant across time and
for Latino generations. Previous research found that discrimination did not shape linked
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fate, but my study suggests otherwise. Additionally, anti-Latino rhetoric and the
racialization of Latino millennials as immigrants is shaping Latino millennial identity
when compared to Latino non-millennials. Lastly, the levels of liked fate among Latinas
and Latinos have not remained stagnant and varies among Latino millennials and nonmillennials. Thus, further supporting the second portion of my theory that the predictors
of linked fate for Latino millennials would not mirror the predictors of linked fate for
Latino non-millennials.
The second contribution encompasses the role of linked fate on the political
behavior of millennials. While linked fate has a meaningful influence on the political
behavior of all millennials, Latino millennials are also motivated by an immigrant-based
linked fate because of the racialization of Latinos during this generation’s socialization.
This sense of immigrant-based identity influences political participation among Latino
millennials, but not non-Latino millennials. Studies point out that millennials are
different from non-millennials because of specific formative events and trends
millennials were socialized in (Rouse and Ross 2018). This same thought process can be
applied to Latino millennials, as Latino millennials identity is formed because of
experienced discrimination and the anti-Latino political climate.
Research on political participation and identity suggests that linked fate is a
predictor for political participation among racial and ethnic minorities (Dawson 1994;
Simien 2006; Tate 1993; McClain et al. 2009; Chong and Rogers 2005; Masuoka 2006;
Sanchez 2006a). My study contributes to research on identity and political participation
by finding evidence that linked fate does influence political participation among all
millennials, but the biggest contribution stems from the use of an immigrant-based linked
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fate measure. This immigrant-based linked fate measure adds another component to our
understanding of linked fate among millennials because it examines the dimension of
immigration during a highly anti-immigrant political environment. The results support
my initial theory that immigrant-based linked fate would be a pronounced motivator for
political participation among Latino millennials, but not for non-Latino millennials.
Latino millennials are influenced strongly by their racialization as immigrants in
contemporary American society. These findings are particularly interesting because the
second largest immigrant group are Asian millennials. More interestingly, immigrantbased linked fate does not influence their political behavior. This adds to our
understanding of how immigrants are racialized in American society and how Latinos are
the ones facing the negative connotations of this racialization from the media and
political elites. This is one of the biggest contributions to American politics emerging
from this dissertation.
The last contribution comes from examining the role of digital media among
generations and millennials across time. Research in online political participation and
digital media tends to focus on youth online political participation with little focus on
older Americans (Feezell and Jones 2017; Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Milner 2010) or
this research will focus more on the impact of online political participation on offline
political participation (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Bennet 2008; Best and Krueger 2005;
Boulianne 2009, 2015; Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2013; Gibson and Cantijoch 2013;
Linton 2015; Lin 2016; Kruikemeier et al. 2014; Bimber and Copeland 2013).With few
studies examining the role of what predicts online political participation (Feezell 2016;
Feezell and Jones 2017). The final contribution of this study provides a comprehensive
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examination of online participation across generations and includes a new measure as an
explanation for online political participation among millennials.
First of all, while studies provide an understanding of youth participation in
online political activities (Feezell and Jones 2017; Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Milner
2010), I add to these studies by including older generations. This dissertation examines
the rates of online political participation among millennials, generation X and baby
boomers in comparison to the greatest and the silent generations. The results ultimately
support my theory that the digital divide, due to generational differences, is still present
in society and contributes to differences in online political participation among
millennials and non-millennials. The results show that millennials are more likely to
participate in online political activities than non-millennials.
The second portion of my analysis on digital media contributes to our knowledge
of a generational political identity. Linked fate is used as a proxy for a generational
political identity among millennials and contributes to existing measures predicting
online political participation. I theorize that due to the unique formative events and trends
that millennials, will have a unique political identity and that as a result of this
“millennial” identity, that this generational identity will predict online political
participation among millennials. The results support my theory that a generational
political identity among millennials results in online political participation among
millennials. The fact that millennials feel that they have shared interests that motivate
them to engage in online politics contributes to our knowledge on generational identities
and on new predictors for online political participation.
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From these results, one of the most interesting contributions to online political
participation research is that the socialization of millennials into digital technology has a
positive impact on millennial political behavior. Some arguments in scholarly research
are that millennials are apathetic toward politics (Bauerlein 2008; Twenge 2006).
However, this research shows that millennials are not apathetic toward politics, but rather
engage in other types of political activities that are non-electoral in nature. Also, this
dissertation shows that millennials are highly engaged in politics and that their shared
generational identity positively motivates political participation among millennials.
The contributions of this dissertation are to American politics, Latino politics,
generational studies, and digital technology studies. The first contribution is in Latino
politics and generational studies, where my chapter on the predictors of linked fate shows
that Latino identity is not stagnant and has shifted overtime among Latino generations as
a result of the salience of immigration and the anti-Latino political climate. The second
contribution is a result of the inclusion of a new measure of immigrant-based linked fate
as a predictor for Latino millennial political participation and shows that among Latino
millennials the racialization of Latinos as immigrants is a strong predictor of political
participation for Latino millennials, but not for non-Latino millennials. The final
contribution is in the area of digital technology in American politics. The third empirical
chapter shows that there is a digital divide among millennials and non-millennials digital
media use, with millennials using social media more than non-millennials. Also,
suggested in the third empirical chapter is that a generational political identity among
millennials is a strong predictor for online political participation among millennials and
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this adds to our knowledge of predictors for online political participation. In sum, my
dissertation adds to our knowledge on generations, Latinos, and digital media in politics.
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
From this dissertation, there are several emerging research streams related to
digital media use, identity formation, and expansion of methodological approaches in
political research. Some of the shortcomings of this dissertation have to do with a square
focus on young adults or millennials, but more research in online political participation
needs to expand and include how older segments of the population engage in digital
politics. Especially, since most research focuses on the use of digital media among youth.
Also, while this dissertation focuses on Latino millennials, my proposed research streams
would do well by examining all Latinos and not just narrowly focus on millennials.
The first research needs to expand in online political participation and needs to
examine how other predictors, such as political hostility and policy platforms can
motivate the electorate to participate online. For instance, what are the effects of current
political candidates’ hostility toward racial and ethnic minorities and how do their
policies motivate online political engagement and what types of online activities do these
political figures motivate. This dissertation focuses on Latino millennials, but it is
important to examine what are the patterns of the entire Latino population with regards to
online political participation and how Latinos compare to non-Latinos.
Secondly, more research needs to examine the role of social media as a driving
force for political mobilization among racial and ethnic minorities and not just focus on
Latino millennials. Due to increase proliferation of racial content on social media, more
research can examine how these types of content serve as mobilizing force for racial and
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ethnic groups into offline political activities. For example, assessing how a specific video
or image might trigger an individual to protest, vote or simply share media content can
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of online political
participation on offline political participation. Examining these differences can provide
scholars with a more in-depth analysis of the degree of influence that race-based social
media content has on various forms of political participation. Additionally, exploring
these questions by using experimental methods in surveys is particularly beneficial for
teasing out causal mechanisms that regression analysis cannot always do. In sum,
examining how online racial content might influence offline political activities by using
experiments in surveys is another future research area.
Thirdly, building on my study of the predictors of linked fate using qualitative
interviews will provide new insights into what causal mechanisms are shaping linked fate
among Latinos. Not only does using qualitative interviews add to our understanding of
causal mechanisms, but so does including a comprehensive sample of Latinos across
various generations. While examining young adult Latinos is important given their youth,
it is also imperative that we study what shapes identity among older Latinos to gauge
trends overtime and to continue adding to our knowledge of politics and race in the
Latino community.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Presentation of Survey Items and Variable Measures for Chapter 2
Dependent Variable
Linked Fate—The two questions on linked fate used to construct the measure are “Do
you think what happens generally to people in this country will have something to do with
what happens in your life?” and “Will it affect you.” The values for linked fate are 1) no
linked fate, 2) not very much, 3) some and 4) a lot.
Independent Variables
Social Media Post—Discussed a candidate or political issue on social media like
Facebook or Twitter?” The values for social media engagement are 0) no and 1) yes.
Perceived Discrimination against Immigrants— How much discrimination is there in the
United States today against each of the following groups? Immigrants. The values for
perceived immigrant discrimination are 1) none at all, 2) a little, 3) some, and 4) a lot.
Experienced Racial Discrimination—The following two questions were combined to
create this measure: Have you ever been treated unfairly or personally experienced
discrimination because of your race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, being an immigrant,
religious heritage or having an accent? and In your opinion, were you unfairly treated
because of your Racial background or ethnicity? The values for experienced
discrimination are 0) no and 1) yes.
Socioeconomic Status/Demographics
Income— What was your total combined household income in 2015 before taxes. This
question is completely confidential and just used to help classify the responses, but it is
very important to the research. The values for income are 1) Less than $20,000, 2)
$20,000 to $29,000, 3) $30,000 to $39,999, 4) $40,000 to $49,999, 5) $50,000 to
$59,999, 6) $60,000 to $69,999, 7) $70,000 to $79,999, 8) $80,000 to $89,999, 9)
$90,000 to $99,999, 10) $100,000 to $149,999, 11) $150,000 to $199,999, and 12)
$200,000 or more.
Education—What is the highest level of education you completed? The values for
Education are 1) grade 1-8, 2) some high school, 3) high school graduate or GED, 4)
some college, 2-year degree, 5) 4-year college graduate, and 6) Post-graduate education.
Gender— Gender? The values for gender are 0) male and 1) female.
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Work status— Are you currently…? The values for employed are 0) unemployed and 1)
employed.
Political Orientations
Political Interest— Some people are very interested in politics while other people can’t
stand politics, how about you? Are you…..? The values for political interest are 1) Not at
all interested in politics, 2) Not that interested in politics, 3) Somewhat, and 4) Very
interested in politics.
National Origin
Latinos National Origin—To account for national origin among Latinos, dummies are
constructed for Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans, with South and Central American
serving as the reference group. All variables are based on the following question:
Hispanics and Latinos have their roots in many different countries in Latin America. To
what country do you or your family trace your ancestry? The values for the each of the
dummies are the same, 0) non-Cuban, 1) Cuban, 0) non-Mexican, 1) Mexican, 0) nonPuerto Rican, 1) Puerto Rican.
Asian National Origin— To account for national origin among Asians, dummies are
constructed for Chinese, Indians, Filipino and Japanese, with other Asian countries
serving as the reference group. All variables are based on the following question: Asian
Americans come from a diversity of backgrounds. What do you consider to be your
primary ethnicity or family ancestry? The values for the each of the dummies are the
same, 0) non-Chinese, 1) Chinese, 0) non-Indian, 1) Indian, 0) non-Filipino, 1) Filipino,
0) non-Japanese, 1) Japanese.
Cultural Factors
Generational Status— This variable was constructed by using two questions. The first
question used is: Were you born in the United States, [if Latino “on the Island of Puerto
Rico,”] or another country? and the second question is: Were your parents born in the
United States, [IF LATINO “Puerto Rico:] or in another country? The values for
generational status are 1) 1st generation, 2) 2nd generation, and 3) 3rd generation.
Spanish Language—Record language of survey. The values for Spanish Language are 0)
not Spanish and 1) Spanish.
Asian Language—Record language of survey. The values for Asian Language are 0) not
an Asian language and 1) Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Korean, and
Vietnamese. This variable combines all Asian languages used in the survey due to small
sample sizes of certain languages used.
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Geography
California—Please select your current state of residence. The values for CA are 0) other
and 1) CA.
New York—Please select your current state of residence. The values for NY are 0) other
and 1) NY.
Texas—Please select your current state of residence. The values for TX are 0) other and
1 Texas.
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Appendix B: Presentation of Survey Items and Variable Measures for Chapter 3
Independent Variables
Linked Fate—The two questions on linked fate used to construct the measure are “Do
you think what happens generally to people in this country will have something to do
with what happens in your life?” and “Will it affect you.” The values for linked fate are
1) no linked fate, 2) not very much, 3) some and 4) a lot.
Immigrant Linked Fate— What happens generally to immigrants in this country will have
something to do with what happens in your life. The values for immigrant linked fate are
1) not at all, 2) not much, 3) some, and 4) a lot.
Socioeconomic Status/Demographics
Income— What was your total combined household income in 2015 before taxes. This
question is completely confidential and just used to help classify the responses, but it is
very important to the research. The values for income are 1) Less than $20,000, 2)
$20,000 to $29,000, 3) $30,000 to $39,999, 4) $40,000 to $49,999, 5) $50,000 to
$59,999, 6) $60,000 to $69,999, 7) $70,000 to $79,999, 8) $80,000 to $89,999, 9)
$90,000 to $99,999, 10) $100,000 to $149,999, 11) $150,000 to $199,999, and 12)
$200,000 or more.
Education—What is the highest level of education you completed? The values for
Education are 1) grade 1-8, 2) some high school, 3) high school graduate or GED, 4)
some college, 2-year degree, 5) 4-year
college graduate, and 6) Post-graduate education.
Gender— Gender? The values for gender are 0) male and 1) female.
Work status— Are you currently…? The values for employed are 0) unemployed and 1)
employed.
Age— In what year were you born? The values for age are a continuous measure
beginning at 18 to 98.
Political Orientations
Political Interest— Some people are very interested in politics while other people can’t
stand politics, how about you? Are you…..? The values for political interest are 1) Not at
all interested in politics, 2) Not that interested in politics, 3) Somewhat, and 4) Very
interested in politics.
Internal Efficacy— How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes
politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really
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understand what's going on. The values for internal efficacy are 1) strongly disagree, 2)
disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) agree, and 5) strongly agree.
External Efficacy— How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
public officials don’t care much what people like me think? The values for external
efficacy are 1) strongly disagree, 2) disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) agree, and
5) strongly agree.
Voter Mobilization—Over the past 12 months, were you asked to register or to vote by a
candidate for office or a person working for a candidate, a representative of a political
party, or someone from an organization working in your community? The values for
voter mobilization are 1) yes and 0) no.
Party Strength—Do you consider yourself to be a strong {Dem/Rep}, or not? The values
for party strength are 1) yes and 0) no.
National Origin
Latinos National Origin—To account for national origin among Latinos, dummies are
constructed for Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans, with South and Central America
serving as the reference group. All variables are based on the following question:
Hispanics and Latinos have their roots in many different countries in Latin America. To
what country do you or your family trace your ancestry? The values for the each of the
dummies are the same, 0) non-Cuban, 1) Cuban, 0) non-Mexican, 1) Mexican, 0) nonPuerto Rican, 1) Puerto Rican.
Asian National Origin— To account for national origin among Asians, dummies are
constructed for Chinese, Indians, Filipino and Japanese, with other Asian countries
serving as the reference group. All variables are based on the following question: Asian
Americans come from a diversity of backgrounds. What do you consider to be your
primary ethnicity or family ancestry? The values for the each of the dummies are the
same, 0) non-Chinese, 1) Chinese, 0) non-Indian, 1) Indian, 0) non-Filipino, 1) Filipino,
0) non-Japanese, 1) Japanese.
Cultural Factors
Generational Status— This variable was constructed by using two questions. The first
question used is: Were you born in the United States, [if Latino “on the Island of Puerto
Rico,”] or another country? and the second question is: Were your parents born in the
United States, [IF LATINO “Puerto Rico:] or in another country? The values for
generational status are 1) 1st generation, 2) 2nd generation, and 3) 3rd generation.
Spanish Language—Record language of survey. The values for Spanish Language are 0)
not Spanish and 1) Spanish.
Asian Language—Record language of survey. The values for Asian Language are 0) not
an Asian language and 1) Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Korean, and
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Vietnamese. This variable combines all Asian languages used in the survey due to small
sample sizes of certain languages used.
Discrimination Factors
Perceived as Immigrant—How accurately do you think non-HISPANIC/LATINO people
can guess your immigration status, such as if you are a citizen, non-citizen, U.S. born or
foreign-born? The values for perceived as immigrant are 1) not accurately at all, 2)
slightly accurately, 3) moderately accurately, 4) very accurately, and 5) extremely
accurately.
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Appendix C: Presentation of Survey Items and Variable Measures for Chapter 4
CMPS 2016
Independent Variables
Generational Cohort Variables—To measure various generational cohort dummies were
created from the age variable. In what year were you born? The values for age are a
continuous measure beginning at 18 to 98. The values for millennials are 0) nonmillennial and 1) millennial. The values for generation X are 0) non-generation X and 1)
generation X. The values for baby boomers are 0) non-baby boomers and 1) baby
boomers. The values for the silent generation are 0) non-silent generation and 1) silent
generation. The values for the greatest generation are 0) non-greatest generation and 1)
greatest generation.
Socioeconomic Status/Demographics/Region
Income— What was your total combined household income in 2015 before taxes. This
question is completely confidential and just used to help classify the responses, but it is
very important to the research. The values for income are 1) Less than $20,000, 2)
$20,000 to $29,000, 3) $30,000 to $39,999, 4) $40,000 to $49,999, 5) $50,000 to
$59,999, 6) $60,000 to $69,999, 7) $70,000 to $79,999, 8) $80,000 to $89,999, 9)
$90,000 to $99,999, 10) $100,000 to $149,999, 11) $150,000 to $199,999, and 12)
$200,000 or more.
Education—What is the highest level of education you completed? The values for
Education are 1) grade 1-8, 2) some high school, 3) high school graduate or GED, 4)
some college, 2-year degree, 5) 4-year college graduate, and 6) Post-graduate education.
Gender— Gender? The values for gender are 0) male and 1) female.
Work status— Are you currently…? The values for employed are 0) unemployed and 1)
employed.
South— This variable was created from using the variable for state. Please select your
current state of residence. The values for south are 0) other and 1) south.
Political Orientations
Political Interest— Some people are very interested in politics while other people can’t
stand politics, how about you? Are you…..? The values for political interest are 1) Not at
all interested in politics, 2) Not that interested in politics, 3) Somewhat, and 4) Very
interested in politics.
Party Strength—Do you consider yourself to be a strong {Dem/Rep}, or not? The values
for party strength are 1) yes and 0) no.
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YPP Survey 2013-2015
Survey Items used to Create Factor’s 1 and 2 (Same questions for Waves 2 and 3)
Liking a post/article—Q80. We find that many people participate in politics in other ways
besides voting. Please tell us if you have supported a candidate, political party, or
political issue during the past 12 months by: Expressing support through a social network
site such as Facebook, IM or Twitter (for example by “liking” or becoming a fan)? The
values for Liking a post/article are 1) yes and 0) no.
Joined a political group online—Q83. We find that many people participate in politics in
other ways besides voting. Please tell us if you have supported a candidate, political
party, or political issue during the past 12 months by: Starting or joining a political group
on a social network site (like MySpace or Facebook). The values for Joined a political
group online are 1) yes and 0) no.
Sharing a post—Q84. People use a variety of methods to gather and share information
about political candidates, campaigns or political issues. Please tell us how often you
have done the following during the past 12 months: Forwarded, re-tweeted or posted
someone else’s article, blog, picture or video about a political campaign, candidate or
issue? The values for sharing a post are 1) never, 2) less than once a month, 3) once or
twice a month, 4) once a week, and 5) several times a week.
Circulating a post/blog/article—Q85. People use a variety of methods to gather and share
information about political candidates, campaigns or political issues. Please tell us how
often you have done the following during the past 12 months: Created and circulated your
own article, blog, picture or video about a political campaign, candidate or issue to an
online site? The values for circulating a post/blog/article are 1) never, 2) less than once a
month, 3) once or twice a month, 4) once a week, and 5) several times a week.
Commenting on a post/blog/article –Q86. People use a variety of methods to gather and
share information about political candidates, campaigns or political issues. Please tell us
how often you have done the following during the past 12 months: Commented online or
tweeted about an article, blog, picture or video you saw about a political campaign,
candidate or issue? The values for commenting on a post/blog/article are 1) never, 2) less
than once a month, 3) once or twice a month, 4) once a week, and 5) several times a
week.
Posting on social media—Q87. People use a variety of methods to gather and share
information about political candidates, campaigns or political issues. Please tell us how
often you have done the following during the past 12 months: Posted a status update or
sent an email, Tweet or instant message about a political campaign, candidate or issue?
The values for posting on social media are 1) never, 2) less than once a month, 3) once or
twice a month, 4) once a week, and 5) several times a week.
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Signed an online petition—Q94. Many people try to have influence in ways that aren’t
directly related to campaigns or elections. Please indicate whether you have done the
following in the past 12 months: Signed an e-mail, Facebook, or other online petition?
The values for signed an online petition are 1) yes and 0) no.
Contacted the government—Q97. In the past 12 months, have you contacted your local,
state or federal government by sending an email, tweet, or instant message, or by posting
a comment on its website or Facebook page? The values for contacted the government
are 1) yes and 0) no.
Contacted a company—Q98. In the past 12 months, have you contacted a corporation,
company, or business to protest its practices or policies by sending an email, tweet, or
instant message, or by posting a comment on its website or Facebook page? The values
for contacted a company are 1) yes and 0) no.
Contacted a community organization—Q99. In the past 12 months, have you contacted
an organization doing work in your community by sending an email, tweet, or instant
message, or by posting a comment on its website or Facebook page? The values for
contacted a community organization are 1) yes and 0) no.
Discusses politics online—Q102. How often do you discuss politics online? The values
for discusses politics online are 1) never, 2) rarely, 3) sometimes, and 4) often.
Discusses politics online with people with opposing views—Q103. How often do you
discuss politics online with people who do not share your views? The values for
Discusses politics online with people with opposing views are 1) never, 2) rarely, 3)
sometimes, and 4) often.
Independent Variables
Linked Fate—The two questions on linked fate used to construct the measure are “Do
you think what happens generally to people in this country will have something to do
with what happens in your life?” and “Will it affect you.” The values for linked fate are
1) no linked fate, 2) not very much, 3) some and 4) a lot.
Socioeconomic Status/Demographics/Region
Age—The values for age range from 17 to 29.
Income— What was your total combined household income? The values for income are
1) under $25,000, 2) $25,000 to $49,000, 3) $50,000 to $74,999, 4) $75,000 to $99,999,
5) $100,000 and above.
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Education—What is the highest level of education you completed? The values for
Education are 1) less than high school, 2) high school, 3) some college, 4) bachelor’s
degree or higher.
Gender— Gender? The values for gender are 0) male and 1) female.
Work status— Current employment status? The values for employed are 0) unemployed
and 1) employed.
South— This variable was created from using the variable for state. Please select your
current state of residence. The values for south are 0) other and 1) south.
Household Internet Access—The values for household internet access are 0) no and 1)
yes.
Political Orientations
Political Interest— I am interested in political issues. Do you… ? The values for political
interest are 1) Strongly disagree, 2) Disagree, 3) Agree, and 4) Strongly agree.
Party Intensity— We would like to get your feelings toward the president and political
parties. We’d like you to rate them on a scale from 0 to 100 using something we call the
feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel
favorably, and ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel
favorably. Using this scale, please type in the number or click on the thermometer to
indicate how you rate: (The Republican Party/ The Democratic Party). The values for
party intensity range from 0 to 100.

188

Appendix D: Supplemental Tables for Chapter 2
Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Discrimination Measures and Anti-Latino Rhetoric
Perceived
Immigrant
Discriminatio
n
1.000

Experienced
Racial
Discriminatio
n

Experienced
Racial
Discriminatio
n

0.2226

1.000

Perceived
Latino
Discriminatio
n
Perceived
Black
Discriminatio
n
Perceived
Asian
Discriminatio
n
Perceived
White
Discriminatio
n
Anti-Latino
Rhetoric

0.6272

0.2482

1.000

0.5931

0.2651

0.5807

1.000

0.3869

0.1761

0.4414

0.3646

1.000

-0.0396

-0.0631

0.0245

-0.0395

0.1978

1.000

0.1219

0.0642

0.1494

0.0833

0.0288

-0.0123

Perceived
Immigrant
Discriminatio
n

Perceived
Latino
Discriminatio
n
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Perceived
Black
Discriminatio
n

Perceived
Asian
Discriminatio
n

Perceived
White
Discriminatio
n

AntiLatino
Rhetori
c

1.0000

Table 2: Ordered Logistic Regressions for non-Latino non-millennials Predicting Linked
Fate
VARIABLES
Perceived Immigrant Discrimination X
Media Post
Perceived Immigrant Discrimination
Media Post
Experienced Racial Discrimination
Perceived Asian Discrimination
Political Interest
Female
Education (low to high)
Income (low to high)
Employed
Age
Asian Language
Generational Status
Chinese
Indian
Japanese
Filipino
CA
NY
TX
Perceived Black Discrimination
Blacks Doing Economically Better

Asian non-Millennials

Black non-Millennials

White non-Millennials

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

Coef. Linked Fate

0.287

0.109

0.264***

(0.412)

(0.220)

(0.073)

-0.031

0.157

0.040

(0.206)

(0.125)

(0.044)

-0.534

-0.269

-0.653***

(1.272)

(0.790)

(0.233)

0.612**

0.474***

0.594***

(0.270)

(0.171)

(0.083)

0.204

--

--

(0.207)

--

--

0.307*

0.174*

0.531***

(0.159)

(0.094)

(0.042)

-0.182

-0.178

0.091

(0.265)

(0.154)

(0.066)

0.027

0.110

0.139***

(0.117)

(0.082)

(0.032)

0.002

-0.021

-0.033***

(0.041)

(0.028)

(0.011)

-0.274

-0.175

-0.158

(0.441)

(0.233)

(0.137)

-0.021**

-0.016**

0.002

(0.011)

(0.007)

(0.003)

0.614

--

--

(0.567)

--

--

-0.111

0.138

0.309***

(0.248)

(0.131)

(0.064)

0.164

--

--

(0.344)

--

--

0.140

--

--

(0.395)

--

--

0.117

--

--

(0.545)

--

--

0.222

--

--

(0.396)

--

--

-0.249

-0.091

0.103

(0.293)

(0.314)

(0.117)

-0.337

0.014

-1.010***

(0.490)

(0.274)

(0.149)

-0.420

0.105

0.091

(0.513)

(0.275)

(0.130)

--

0.316**

--

--

(0.140)

--

--

-0.090

--

--

(0.068)

--
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Perceived White Discrimination
/cut1

--

--

0.145***

--

--

(0.032)

-0.325

1.097

2.710***

(1.151)

(0.808)

(0.320)

/cut2

-0.024

1.331*

2.906***

(1.151)

(0.808)

(0.321)

/cut3

2.538**

3.368***

5.193***

(1.168)

(0.817)

(0.328)

Observations

1,314

1,611

624

Pseudo R-squared

0.0479

0.0347

0.0528

-264.00497

-743.28439

-4200.4151

Log Likelihood
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix E: Supplemental Tables for Chapter 3
A. Non-Millennial Models
Table 1: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among Latino Non-Millennials
Coef. Political participation

SE

Marginal Effectsa

0.034

(0.049)

.05

Linked Fate

0.105**

(0.042)

.16

Voter Mobilization

0.411***

(0.091)

.61

Party Strength

0.208**

(0.100)

.31

Political Interest

0.388***

(0.071)

.58

Internal Efficacy

-0.041

(0.039)

-.06

External Efficacy

-0.028

(0.044)

-.04

Female

-0.038

(0.090)

-.06

0.181***

(0.044)

.27

Income (low to high)

0.020

(0.015)

.03

Employed

0.199

(0.175)

.30

0.012***

(0.004)

.02

-0.331**

(0.153)

-.49

Generational Status

0.002

(0.062)

.00

Perceived as Immigrant

0.009

(0.029)

.01

Mexican

0.017

(0.111)

.03

VARIABLES
Immigrant Linked Fate

Education (low to high)

Age
Spanish

Cuban

-0.067

(0.201)

-.10

Puerto Rican

0.027

(0.151)

.04

-2.596***

(0.465)

Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

837
0.121
-733.41199

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of
the explanatory variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means.
Marginal effects for binary variables are the discrete change from 0 to 1.
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Table 2: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among Asian Non-Millennials
Coef. Political participation

SE

Marginal Effectsa

-0.037

(0.123)

-.05

0.119

(0.097)

.15

0.657***

(0.207)

.84

0.327*

(0.191)

.42

0.398***

(0.144)

.51

Internal Efficacy

-0.065

(0.093)

-.08

External Efficacy

0.062

(0.101)

.08

Female

-0.171

(0.191)

-.22

Education (low to high)

0.127

(0.095)

.16

0.016

(0.030)

.02

0.244

(0.369)

.31

Age

0.005

(0.008)

.01

Asian Language

-0.659

(0.520)

-.84

0.213

(0.158)

.27

Chinese

-0.117

(0.268)

-.15

Indian

-0.092

(0.277)

-.12

Japanese

-0.130

(0.364)

-.17

-0.183

(0.278)

-.23

-2.616***

(1.007)

VARIABLES
Immigrant Linked Fate
Linked Fate
Voter Mobilization
Party Strength
Political Interest

Income (low to high)
Employed

Generational Status

Filipino
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

763
0.106
-205.01718

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of
the explanatory variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means.
Marginal effects for binary variables are the discrete change from 0 to 1
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Table 3: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation among
Black Non-Millennials
Coef. Political participation

SE

Marginal Effectsa

0.130***

(0.045)

.23

0.064

(0.041)

.11

0.491***

(0.085)

.86

0.210*

(0.109)

.37

Political Interest

0.384***

(0.063)

.67

Internal Efficacy

0.013

(0.036)

.02

External Efficacy

0.028

(0.040)

.05

Female

0.013

(0.086)

.02

0.133***

(0.046)

.23

0.016

(0.015)

.03

Employed

0.311**

(0.153)

.55

Age

0.008**

(0.004)

.01

Generational Status

0.214**

(0.086)

.38

-3.467***

(0.465)

VARIABLES
Immigrant Linked Fate
Linked Fate
Voter mobilization
Party Strength

Education (low to high)
Income (low to high)

Constant
Observations

1,180

Pseudo R-squared

0.0871

Log Likelihood

-828.87199

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of
the explanatory variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means.
Marginal effects for binary variables are the discrete change from 0 to 1
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Table 4: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation among
White Non-Millennials
VARIABLES

Coef. Political participation

SE

Linked Fate

0.098***

(0.015)

Voter Mobilization

0.468***

(0.033)

Party Strength

0.269***

(0.037)

Political Interest

0.499***

(0.027)

Internal Efficacy

-0.005

(0.014)

External Efficacy

0.042***

(0.015)

Female

-0.086***

(0.032)

Education (low to high)

0.120***

(0.016)

Income (low to high)

0.038***

(0.005)

Employed

-0.435***

(0.074)

0.002

(0.001)

Age
Generational Status
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

-0.035

(0.037)

-1.729***

(0.179)

Marginal Effectsa
.22
1.1
.61
1.1
-.01
.10
-.20
.27
.09
-.99
.00
-.08

389
0.115
-4627.5979

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of
the explanatory variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means.
Marginal effects for binary variables are the discrete change from 0 to 1
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B. Millennial and Non-millennial Models with Combined Linked Fate Measure
Table 5: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among Latino Millennials and Non-millennials
VARIABLES
Combined Linked Fate

Latino Millennials
Coef. Political participation
0.194**

Marginal
Effectsa
.22

Latino Non-Millennials
Coef. Political participation
0.133***

.64

0.419***

.54

0.214**

(0.086)
Voter Mobilization

0.551***

Party Strength

0.464***

(0.039)

(0.154)

0.410***
-0.043

.47

0.047
-0.276*

.05

0.129*
0.055*

.15

0.297
-0.050***
-0.088
0.104
0.097*

0.013***

0.144
0.380

-.10

Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

0.414

.02
.30
.02

-0.343**

-.49

(0.150)
.12

-0.002

-.00

(0.061)
.11

0.013

.02

(0.028)
.17

0.022

.03

(0.108)
.44

(0.422)
Puerto Rican

.27

(0.004)

(0.177)
Cuban

-.05

(0.172)

(0.058)
Mexican

0.016

-.06

(0.114)
Perceived as Immigrant

0.190***

0.213

(0.229)
Generational Status

-0.035

.34

(0.015)
Spanish

-.03

(0.015)

(0.219)
Age

-0.021

(0.042)
.06

(0.028)
Employed

-.05

(0.088)

(0.076)
Income (low to high)

-0.033

(0.043)
-.32

(0.145)
Education (low to high)

.58

(0.038)

(0.075)
Female

0.404***
(0.070)

-.05

(0.069)
External Efficacy

.30

(0.098)

(0.099)
Internal Efficacy

.60

(0.090)

(0.151)
Political Interest

Marginal
Effectsa
.19

-0.081

-.11

(0.198)
.48

0.032

(0.313)

(0.146)

-1.959***

-2.820***

(0.657)

(0.450)

761

874

0.105

0.126

-442.42246

-758.7765

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
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.05

a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of
the explanatory variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means.
Marginal effects for binary variables are the discrete change from 0 to 1
Table 6: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among Asian Millennials and Non-millennials
VARIABLES
Combined Linked Fate

Asian Millennials
Coef. Political participation

Marginal
Effectsa

0.300*

.24

(0.171)
Voter Mobilization

0.763**

.61

0.565**

.45

0.662***

.53

-0.060

-.05

-0.045

-.04

-0.014

-.01

0.015

.01

0.019

.02

0.388

.31

-0.024

-.02

0.254

.20

0.327

.26

0.111

.09

0.326

.26

Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

-.18

0.130

.16

0.021

.03

0.283

.35

0.005

.01

-0.634

-.78

0.200

.24

-0.154

-.19

-0.132

-.16

(0.271)

-0.061

-.05

(1.353)
Filipino

-0.143

(0.263)

(0.353)
Japanese

.06

(0.155)

(0.410)
Indian

0.051

(0.519)

(0.258)
Chinese

-.07

(0.008)

(0.692)
Generational Status

-0.058

(0.350)

(0.027)
Asian Language

.52

(0.029)

(0.485)
Age

0.416***

(0.091)

(0.045)
Employed

.38

(0.187)

(0.117)
Income (low to high)

0.303

(0.099)

(0.272)
Education (low to high)

.82

(0.092)

(0.152)
Female

0.660***

(0.139)

(0.134)
External Efficacy

.12

(0.188)

(0.209)
Internal Efficacy

0.097

(0.201)

(0.285)
Political Interest

Marginal
Effectsa

(0.115)

(0.308)
Party Strength

Asian Non-millennials
Coef. Political participation

-0.118

-.15

(0.358)

0.133

.11

-0.177

(0.390)

(0.271)

-3.307***

-2.802***

(1.249)

(0.966)

690

807

0.124

0.105

-133.76259

-215.82512

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-.22

Source: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2016
a. Marginal effects are the marginal changes associated with an increase in each unit of
the explanatory variable with all other explanatory variables held at their means.
Marginal effects for binary variables are the discrete change from 0 to 1
Table 7: Negative Binominal Regression of Identity Predicting Political Participation
among Black Millennials and Non-millennials

Combined Linked Fate

Black Millennials
Coef. Political
participation

Marginal
Effectsa

Black Non-millennials
Coef. Political
participation

Marginal Effectsa

0.107

.17

0.161***

.27

(0.083)
Voter Mobilization

0.209

(0.044)
.33

(0.169)
Party Strength

0.230
0.441***

.36

0.050

.67

0.163**

.08

-0.031

.26

0.050

-.05

0.046

.08

0.211

.07

-0.027*

.33

Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

0.159

.04

0.008

.01

0.136***

.23

0.019

.03

0.229

.39

(0.142)
-.04

(0.015)
Generational Status

0.024

(0.015)

(0.199)
Age

.04

(0.044)

(0.029)
Employed

0.024

(0.083)

(0.075)
Income (low to high)

.65

(0.039)

(0.160)
Education (low to high)

0.385***

(0.035)

(0.081)
Female

.36

(0.059)

(0.066)
External Efficacy

0.212**
(0.107)

(0.105)
Internal Efficacy

.86

(0.082)

(0.169)
Political Interest

0.504***

0.010***

.02

(0.004)
.25

0.197**

(0.113)

(0.082)

-2.216***

-3.540***

(0.713)

(0.443)

679

1,299

0.0561

0.0864

-394.64933

-913.56513

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix F: Supplemental Tables for Chapter 4
Table 1: Poisson and Ordered Logistic Regressions of Linked Fate Predicting Online Discursive Politics, Passive and Active Online
Political Participation
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
VARIABLES
Coef. Passive Online
Coef. Active Online
Coef. Online Discursive
Political Participation T2
Political Participation T2
Politics Participation T2
Linked Fate
0.167***
0.144***
0.230***
Female
Latino
Black
Asian
Partisan Intensity
Political Interest
Household Internet
Income
Education
Age
South
Employed
Passive Online Participation T1
Active Online Participation T1
Online Discursive Politics T1
/cut1
/cut2
/cut3
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log Likelihood

(0.029)

(0.044)

-0.090

0.198*

(0.066)
0.048

(0.065)

(0.102)

(0.145)

0.142

-0.150

0.450**

(0.090)

(0.140)

(0.192)

0.242***

-0.260*

-0.024

(0.086)

(0.139)

(0.200)

0.069

0.073

0.358

(0.093)

(0.136)

(0.220)

0.001

0.003**

0.008***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.408***

0.418***

0.841***

(0.042)

(0.066)

(0.095)

-0.156

1.224**

0.954**

(0.165)

(0.485)

(0.467)

-0.012

-0.072**

-0.027

(0.023)

(0.034)

(0.052)

-0.004

0.011

-0.061

(0.039)

(0.060)

(0.090)

-0.018*

-0.008

-0.023

(0.010)

(0.014)

(0.022)

-0.093

0.129

-0.201

(0.067)

(0.103)

(0.154)

-0.009

-0.149

-0.046

(0.066)

(0.103)

(0.155)

0.309***

--

--

(0.017)

--

--

--

0.452***

--

--

(0.033)

--

--

--

1.030***

--

--

(0.099)

--

--

5.089***

--

--

(0.774)

--

--

7.108***

--

--

(0.798)

--

--

9.845***

--

--

(0.863)

-1.358***

-3.503***

--

(0.304)

(0.625)

--

927

901

973

0.246

0.245

0.180

-1265.7016

712.05672

-755.31623

Standard errors in parentheses
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: YPP Survey 2013-2015

200

REFERENCES
Almond, Gabriel Abraham, and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Althaus, Scott L. and David Tewksbury. 2000. “Patterns of Internet and Traditional News
Media Use in a Networked Community.” Political Communication 17(1): 21-45.
The Atlantic. n.d. “When It Comes to Politics, Do Millennials Care About Anything?”
theatlantic.com. https://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/allstate/when-it-comesto-politics-do-millennials-care-about-anything/255/ (July 4, 2019).
American Press Institute. 2015. “Differences by Race and Ethnicity in How Millennials
Get News.” https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/surveyresearch/millennials-technology-news-race-ethnicity/ (December 15, 2017).
Anderson, Monica and Paul Hitlin 2016; “Social Media Conversations About Race | Pew
Research Center.” 2016. https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/08/15/social-mediaconversations-about-race/ (March 27, 2019).
Anduiza, Eva, Aina Gallego, and Marta Cantijoch. 2010. “Online Political Participation
in Spain: The Impact of Traditional and Internet Resources.” Journal of
Information Technology & Politics 7 (4): 356–68.

Barreto, Matt A., Lorrie Frasure-Yokley, Edward D. Vargas, and Janelle Wong. 2018.
“Best Practices in Collecting Online Data with Asian, Black, Latino, and White
Respondents: Evidence from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election
Survey.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 6(1): 171–80.

Barreto, Matt, Lorrie Frasure-Yokley, Edward Vargas and Janelle Wong. 2017. The
Collaborative Multiracial Post-election Survey (CMPS), 2016. Los Angeles, CA.
Barreto, Matt, Natalie Masuoka, and Gabriel Sanchez. 2008. “Religiosity, Discrimination
and Group Identity among Muslim Americans.” Presented at the Western Political
Science Association Annual Conference, San Diego, March

201

Bakker, Tom P., and Claes H. de Vreese. 2011. “Good News for the Future? Young
People, Internet Use, and Political Participation.” Communication Research 38
(4): 451–70.

Bauerlein, Mark. 2008. The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young
Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future (or, Don't Trust Anyone Under 30). New
York, NY: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin.

Bejarano, Christina E. 2013. Latina Advantage: Gender, Race, and Political Success.
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Bimber, Bruce, and Lauren Copeland. 2013. “Digital Media and Traditional Political
Participation Over Time in the U.S.” Journal of Information Technology &
Politics 10(2): 125–37.

Bimber, Bruce. 2003. Information and American Democracy: Technology in the
Evolution of Political Power. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Bimber, Bruce. 2001. “Information and Political Engagement in America: The Search for
Political Effects of the Internet.” Political Research Quarterly 54(1): 53–67.

Bennett, W. Lance. 2008. Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage
Youth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bennett, Sue, Karl Maton, and Lisa Kervin. 2008. “The ‘Digital Natives’ Debate: A
Critical Review of the Evidence.” British Journal of Educational Technology
39(5): 775–86.
Best, Samuel J., and Brian S. Krueger. 2005. “Analyzing the Representativeness of
Internet Political Participation.” Political Behavior 27 (2): 183–216.
Bethlehem, Jelke. 2010. “Selection Bias in Web Surveys.” International Statistical
Review 78(2): 161–88.

202

Bonilla, Yarimar, and Jonathan Rosa. 2015. “#Ferguson: Digital Protest, Hashtag
Ethnography, and the Racial Politics of Social Media in the United States.”
American Ethnologist 42(1): 4–17.
Boulianne, Shelley. 2015. “Social Media Use and Participation: A Meta-analysis of
Current Research.” Information, Communication & Society 18 (5): 524–38.
Boulianne, Shelley. 2011. “Stimulating or Reinforcing Political Interest: Using Panel
Data to Examine Reciprocal Effects Between News Media Use and Political
Interest.” Political Communication 28(2): 147–162.
Boulianne, Shelley. 2009. “Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-analysis of
Research.” Political Communication 26 (2): 193–211.
Bureau, US Census. 2019. “Behind the 2018 U.S. Midterm Election Turnout.” The
United States Census Bureau.
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-statesmidterm-election-turnout.html (July 4, 2019).
Bureau, US Census. 2017. “The Digital Divide: By Internet, Computer, Race & Hispanic
Origin.” https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2017/comm/internet.html
(June 20, 2019).
Caliendo, Stephen M., Suzanne Chod, and William Muck. 2016. “Using Twitter to
Increase Political Interest in Undergraduate Students.” Journal of Political
Science Education 12(3): 282–301.
Carroll, Rory. 2015. “Latinos Officially the Biggest Ethnic Group in California.” The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/08/latinos-officiallybiggest-ethnic-group-california (May 2, 2019).

Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller. 1976. The Voter Decides.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Pr.

Chavez, Leo. 2013. The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the
Nation, Second Edition. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

203

Chong, Dennis, and Reuel Rogers. 2005. “Racial Solidarity and Political Participation.”
Political Behavior 27:347–74.
CNN. 2018. “How Millennials Could Kill Politics as We Know It.” CNN.
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/07/politics/how-millennials-could-kill-politics-aswe-know-it/index.html (July 4, 2019).

Cohen, Cathy J, Matthew Fowler, Vladimir E Medenica, and Jon C Rogowski. 2018.
“Millennials and Technology: An Overview of Usage, News Consumption, the
Future of Work, and Public Policy.”
Couper, Mick P., and Peter V. Miller. 2008. “Web Survey Methods Introduction.” Public
Opinion Quarterly 72(5): 831–35.
Couper, Mick P. 2000. “A Review of Issues and Approaches.” Public Opinion Quarterly
64:464–494.
Conover, Pamela J. 1988. “The Role of Social Groups in Political Thinking.” British
Journal of Political Science 18(1):51–76.
Costello, Anna B. and Jason W. Osborne. 2005. “Best Practices in Exploratory Factor
Analysis.” Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation 10(7): 1-9.

Conway, Margaret. 2001. Political Participation in the United States. Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly Press.

Dalton, Russell. 2016. The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation Is Reshaping
American Politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Dawson, Michael C. 1994. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

DeSipio, Louis. 1996. Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos As a New Electorate.
Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.

204

De Zúñiga, Homero Gil. 2009. “Blogs, journalism, and political participation.” In
Journalism and Citizenship: New Agendas, eds. Papacharissi, 108-123. New
York, NY: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Dillman, Don A. 2006. “Why Choice of Survey Mode Makes a Difference.” Public
Health Reports 121(1): 11–13.
Dowe, Pearl K. Ford, Sekou M. Franklin, and Niambi M. Carter. 2018. “Policy
Symmetry and Cross-Racial Linked Fate in the Early Years of the Obama
Presidency.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 0(0): 1–27.

Earl, Jennifer, and Katrina Kimport. 2011. Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in
the Internet Age. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ekström, Mats and Johan Östman. 2013. “Information, Interaction, and Creative
Production: The Effects of Three Forms of Internet Use on Youth Democratic
Engagement.” Communication Research 42(6): 796-818.
Ellison, Nick, and Michael Hardey. 2014. “Social Media and Local Government:
Citizenship, Consumption and Democracy.” Local Government Studies 40(1): 21–
40.
Feezell, Jessica T. 2016. “Predicting Online Political Participation: The Importance of
Selection Bias and Selective Exposure in the Online Setting.” Political Research
Quarterly 69(3): 495–509.
Feezell, Jessica T. and Jessica Jones. 2017. “Disagreement Without Deterrence: The
Importance of the Setting for the Study of Political Disagreement and
Participation of Youth.” American Politics Research (47) 4: 915-946.

Fraga et al. 2010. “The Evolving Latino Community and Pan-ethnicity: Explorations into
the Confluence of Interactions, Networks, and Identity.” In Latino Lives in
America: Making It Home. Fraga, Luis Ricardo et al., 145-176. Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press.

205

Frey, William H. 2016. “Diversity Defines the Millennial Generation.” Brookings.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/06/28/diversity-defines-themillennial-generation/ (June 29, 2017)

Fry, Richard. 2016. “Millennials Match Baby Boomers as Largest Generation in U.S.
Electorate, but Will They Vote?” Pew Research Center.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/16/millennials-match-babyboomers-as-largest-generation-in-u-s-electorate-but-will-they-vote/ (November
14, 2017)

Flores-González, Nilda. 2017. Citizens but Not Americans: Race and Belonging among
Latino Millennials. New York, NY: NYU Press.

Foot, Kirsten A. and Steven M. Schneider. 2006. Web Campaigning. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.

Garcia, John. 2003. Latino politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests.
Lahman, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Garcia, John. 2000. “The Latino and African American Communities: Bases for Coalition
Formation and Political Action.” In Immigration and Race: New Challenges for
American Democracy, edited by Gerald Jaynes, 255–76. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.

García Bedolla, Lisa and Melissa R. Michelson. 2012. Mobilizing Inclusion:
Transforming the Electorate through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Garcia-Castañon, Marcela, Alison D. Rank, and Matt A. Barreto. 2011. “Plugged In or
Tuned Out? Youth, Race, and Internet Usage in the 2008 Election.” Journal of
Political Marketing 10(1–2): 115–38.
Garrett, Kelly R., Dustin Carnahan, and Emily K. Lynch. 2013.“A Turn toward
Avoidance? Selective Exposure to Online Political Information, 2004–2008.”
Political Behavior 35(1): 113–34.

206

Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone
Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." American
Political Science Review 94(3): 653-663.
Gibson, Rachel, and Marta Cantijoch. 2013. “Conceptualizing and Measuring
Participation in the Age of the Internet: Is Online Political Engagement Really
Different to Offline.” The Journal of Politics 75 (3): 701–16.
Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Logan Molyneux, and Pei Zheng. 2014. “Social Media, Political
Expression, and Political Participation: Panel Analysis of Lagged and Concurrent
Relationships.” Journal of Communication 64 (4): 612–34.
Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Nakwon Jung, and Sebastián Valenzuela. 2012. “Social Media
Use for News and Individuals’ Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Political
Participation.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 17(3): 319–36.
Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Aaron Veenstra, Emily Vraga, and Dhavan Shah. 2010. “Digital
Democracy: Reimagining Pathways to Political Participation.” Journal of
Information Technology & Politics 7 (1): 36–51.
Gonzales, Juan L. 1993. “Race Relations in the United States.” Humboldt Journal of
Social Relations 19(2): 39–78.

Greenberg, Eric, and Karl Weber. 2008. Generation We: How Millennial Youth Are
Taking Over America and Changing Our World Forever. Emeryville: Pachatusan.

Gurin, Patricia, Arthur H. Miller, and Gerald Gurin. 1980. Stratum Identification and
Consciousness. Social Psychology Quarterly 43(1): 30–47.
Hardy, Bruce W., and Dietram A. Scheufele. 2005. “Examining Differential Gains From
Internet Use: Comparing the Moderating Role of Talk and Online Interactions.”
Journal of Communication 55(1): 71–84.
Hargittai, Eszter, and Amanda Hinnant. 2008. “Digital Inequality: Differences in Young
Adults' Use of the Internet.” Communication Research, 35(5), 602-62

207

Hayes-Bautista, David E. 2017. La Nueva California: Latinos from Pioneers to PostMillennials. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
Hayes, Christopher and Carrie Skulley. 2015. “Linked Fate and the Inter-Ethnic
Differences Among Asian-Americans” Working Paper.
Hero, Rodney E., and Anne G. Campbell. 1996. “Understanding Latino Political
Participation: Exploring the Evidence from the Latino National Political Survey.”
Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 18(2): 129–41.

Hero, Rodney. 1992. Latinos an Exploration of Political Understanding. Paper Presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago.

Hilbe, Joseph M. 2011. Negative Binomial Regression. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Hochschild, Jennifer. 1992. “The Word American Ends in ‘I Can’: The Ambiguous
Promise of the American Dream.” William & Mary Law Review 34:139–70.

Hochschild, Jennifer. 1995. Facing up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul
of the Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Howard, Phillip. 2006. New media campaigns and the managed citizen. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Hurwitz, Jon, Mark Peffley, and Jeffery Mondak. 2015. “Linked Fate and Outgroup
Perceptions: Blacks, Latinos, and the U.S. Criminal Justice System.” Political
Research Quarterly 68(3): 505–20.
Jackman Mary R., and Robert W. Jackman. 1973. “An Interpretation of the Relation
Between Objective and Subjective Social Status.” American Sociological Review
38(5): 569–82.

Jardina, Ashley. 2019. White Identity Politics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press.

208

Jaynes, Gerald D. and Robin Williams, Jr. 1989. A Common Destiny: Blacks and
American Society. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Jennings, M. Kent and Vicki Zeitner. 2003. “Internet use and civic engagement: a
longitudinal analysis.” Public Opinion Quarterly 67(3): 311–334.
Jiang, Jingjing 2018. “Millennials Stand out for Their Technology Use.” Pew Research
Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/millennials-stand-outfor-their-technology-use-but-older-generations-also-embrace-digital-life/ (January
7, 2019).
Junn, Jane, and Natalie Masuoka. 2008. “Identities in Context: Racial Group
Consciousness and Political Participation among Asian American and Latino
Young Adults.” Applied Developmental Science 12 (2): 93–101.
Kaufmann, Karen. 2003. “Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for
Latino and African-American Political Coalitions.” Political Research Quarterly
56 (2):199–210.
Kenny, Christopher. 1992. “Political participation and effects from the social
environment.” American Journal of Political Science 36(1): 259-267.
Kim, Claire Jean. 1999. “The racial triangulation of Asian Americans.” Politics & Society
27(1): 105-138.
Krogstad, Jens Manuel et al. 2016. “Millennials Make Up Almost Half of Latino Eligible
Voters in 2016.” Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project.
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/01/19/millennials-make-up-almost-half-oflatino-eligible-voters-in-2016/ (March 17, 2017).

Kruikemeier, Sanne, Guda van Noort, Rens Vliegenthart, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2014.
“Unraveling the Effects of Active and Passive Forms of Political Internet Use:
Does It Affect Citizens’ Political Involvement?” New Media & Society 16: 903–
20.

209

Kushin, Matthew James, and Masahiro Yamamoto. 2010. “Did Social Media Really
Matter? College Students’ Use of Online Media and Political Decision Making in
the 2008 Election.” Mass Communication and Society 13(5): 608–30.
Latino Decisions. 2016. “Latino Decisions 2016 National Election Eve Poll” Available
at:http://www.latinodecisions.com/files/8614/7866/3919/National_2016__Xtabs.p
dfs
Latino Decisions. 2016. “Results From the Colorado Statewide Millennial Poll”
Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/328363404/LD-andLDPSymposium?irgwc=1&content=10079&campaign=Skimbit%2C%20Ltd.&ad
_group=88890X1542021Xdaf317b90e0b336147dade3ffb201a18&keyword=ft75
0noi&source=impactradius&medium=affiliate

Leighley, Jan. 2001. Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and
Ethnic Minorities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Leighley, Jan., and A. Vedilitz. 1999. “Race, ethnicity, and political participation:
Competing models and contrasting explanations.” Journal of Politics, 61, 10921114.
Leighley, Jan. 1990. “Social Interaction and Contextual Influences on Political
Participation.” American Politics Quarterly, 18, 459-475.

Lien, Pei-te, Margaret M. Conway, and Janelle Wong. 2008. The Politics of Asian
Americans. New York, NY: Routledge.
Lien, Pei-te, M. Margaret Conway, and Janelle Wong. 2003. “The Contours and Sources
of Ethnic Identity Choices Among Asian Americans.” Social Science Quarterly
84(2): 461–81.

Long, J. Scott., and Jeremy Freese. 2003. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent
Variables Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
López, Gustavos, Neil G. Ruiz, and Eileen Patten. 2017. “Key Facts about Asian
Americans.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/ (July 6, 2019).

210

Lin, Jih-Hsuan. 2016. “Differential Gains in SNSs: Effects of Active vs. Passive
Facebook Political Participation on Offline Political Participation and Voting
Behavior among First-Time and Experienced Voters.” Asian Journal of
Communication 26(3): 278–97.
Linton, Allen. 2015. “Politically engaged and Alienated Youth: Reevaluating 2010 UK
Student Protests.” In #Youth Action: Becoming Political in the Digital Age. Ed.
Ellen Middaugh and Ben Kirshner, 191-207. Charlotte, NC: Information Age
Publishing.
Liu, Baodong. 2001. “Racial Contexts and White Interests: Beyond Black Threat and
Racial Tolerance.” Political Behavior 23(2): 157–80.
Martinez, Lisa M. 2014. “Dreams Deferred: The Impact of Legal Reforms on
Undocumented Latino Youth.” American Behavioral Scientist 58(14): 1873–90.
Martinez, Lisa M. 2008. “‘Flowers From the Same Soil’: Latino Solidarity in the Wake
of the 2006 Immigrant Mobilizations.” American Behavioral Scientist 52(4): 557–
79.
Masuoka, Natalie. 2006. “Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of
Panethnic Group Consciousness Among Asian Americans and Latinos.” Social
Science Quarterly 87(5): 993–1011.
Masuoka, Natalie. 2008. “Defining the Group: Latino Identity and Political
Participation.” American Politics Research 36(1): 33–61.
McClain, Paula and Stewart Joseph. 2006. “Can We All Get Along?” Racial and Ethnic
Minorities in American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

McClain, Paula D., Jessica Johnson Carew, Jr. Eugene Walton, and Candis S. Watts.
2009. “Group Membership, Group Identity, and Group Consciousness: Measures
of Racial Identity in American Politics?” Annual Review of Political Science
12(1): 471–85.

211

Mena Robles, Jorge, and Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz. 2016. “Activism After DACA: Lessons
from Chicago’s Immigrant Youth Justice League.” North American Dialogue
19(1): 46–54.
Michelson, Melissa R. 2005. “Meeting the Challenge of Latino Voter Mobilization.” The
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 601(1): 85–
101.
Michelson, Melissa R., and Lisa García Bedolla. 2014. “Mobilization by Different
Means: Nativity and GOTV in the United States.” International Migration Review
48(3): 710–27.
Milkman, Ruth. 2017. “A New Political Generation: Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave
of Protest.” American Sociological Review 82(1): 1–31.
Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk. 1981. “Group
Consciousness and Political Participation.” American Journal of Political Science
25: 494–511

Milner, Henry. 2010. The Internet Generation: Engaged Citizens or Political Dropouts.
Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England.

Mossberger, Karen., Carole Tolbert, and Ramona S. McNeal. 2008. Digital citizenship:
The Internet, Society, and Participation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Myers, Kendra. 2016. “How the Internet Is Used by the Millennial Generation and Its
Impact on Family Interaction.” Masters Theses.

Norris, Pippa. 2001. Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the
Internet Worldwide. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press.
Olsen, Marvin 1970. “Social and Political Participation of Blacks.” American
Sociological Review 35:682–97.

212

Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pantoja, Adrian D., and Gary M. Segura. 2003. “Fear and Loathing in California:
Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication Among Latino Voters.” Political
Behavior 25(3): 265–86.
Pantoja, Adrian D., Ricardo Ramirez, and Gary M. Segura. 2001. “Citizens by Choice,
Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos.”
Political Research Quarterly 54(4): 729–50.
Patten, Eileen. 2016. “The Nation’s Latino Population Is Defined by Its Youth.” Pew
Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project.
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/20/the-nations-latino-population-is-definedby-its-youth/ (October 24, 2017).
PBS. 2019. “The Game for 2020 Democrats: Wooing Millennials.” 2019. PBS
NewsHour.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/the-game-for-2020-democrats-wooingmillennials (July 5, 2019).
Pérez, Efrén O. 2015. “Xenophobic Rhetoric and Its Political Effects on Immigrants and
Their Co-Ethnics.” American Journal of Political Science 59(3): 549–64.
Pew Research Center. 2019. “Digital Divide Persists Even as Lower-Income Americans
Make Gains in Tech Adoption.” Pew Research Center.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/07/digital-divide-persists-evenas-lower-income-americans-make-gains-in-tech-adoption/ (July 6, 2019).
Plutzer, Eric. 2002. “Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in
Young Adulthood.” American Political Science Review 96(1): 41-56.
Rainie, Lee, and Rew Perrin. 2016. “Technology Adoption by Baby Boomers (and
Everybody Else).” Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech.
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/03/22/technology-adoption-by-baby-boomersand-everybody-else/ (December 15, 2017).

213

Ramakrishnan, Karthick S. 2005. Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing
Demographics and Political Participation. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Ramírez, Ricardo. 2013. Mobilizing Opportunities: The Evolving Latino Electorate and
the Future of American Politics. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia
Press.
Ramírez, Ricardo. 2005. “Giving Voice to Latino Voters: A Field Experiment on the
Effectiveness of a National Nonpartisan Mobilization Effort.” The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 601(1): 66–84.

Rankin, David M. 2013. US Politics and Generation Y: Engaging the Millennials.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and
Democracy in America. Macmillan Publishing Company.

Rouse, Stella M., and Ashley D. Ross. 2018. The Politics of Millennials: Political Beliefs
and Policy Preferences of America's Most Diverse Generation. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press.
Sanchez, Gabriel R., and Barbara Gomez-Aguinaga. 2017. “Latino Rejection of the
Trump Campaign: How Trump’s Racialized Rhetoric Mobilized the Latino
Electorate as Never Before.” Aztlan 42(2): 165-181.
Sanchez, Gabriel R., and Edward D. Vargas. 2016. “Taking a Closer Look at Group
Identity: The Link between Theory and Measurement of Group Consciousness
and Linked Fate.” Political Research Quarterly 69(1): 160–74.
Sanchez, Gabriel R., and Jillian Medeiros. 2016. “Linked Fate and Latino Attitudes
Regarding Health-Care Reform Policy.” Social Science Quarterly 97(3): 525–39.
Sanchez, Gabriel R., and Patricia Rodriguez Espinosa. 2016. “Does the Race of the
Discrimination Agent in Latinos’ Discrimination Experiences Influence Latino
Group Identity?” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 2(4): 531–47.

214

Sanchez, Gabriel R., and Natalie Masuoka. 2010. “Brown-Utility Heuristic? The
Presence and Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate.” Hispanic Journal of
Behavioral Sciences 32(4):519–31.
Sanchez, Gabriel. 2008. “Latino Group Consciousness and Perceptions of Commonality
with African Americans.” Social Science Quarterly 89 (2): 428–44.
Sanchez, Gabriel R. 2006a. “The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation
Among Latinos in the United States.” American Politics Research 34(4): 427–50.
Sanchez, Gabriel R. 2006b. “The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public
Opinion.” Political Research Quarterly 59(3): 435–446.
Santoro, Wayne A., and Gary M. Segura. 2011. “Generational Status and Mexican
American Political Participation: The Benefits and Limitations of Assimilation.”
Political Research Quarterly 64(1): 172–84.

Shah, Dhavan V, Jaeho Cho, Seungahn Nah, Melissa R Gotlieb, Hyunseo Hwang, NamJin Lee, Rosanne M Scholl, and Douglas M McLeod. 2007. “Campaign Ads,
Online Messaging, and Participation: Extending the Communication Mediation
Model.” Journal of Communication 57 (4): 676–703.
Shah, Dhavan V., Jaeho Cho, William P. Eveland, and Nojin Kwak. 2005. “Information
and expression in a digital age: Modeling Internet effects on civic participation.”
Communication Research 32(5), 531–565.
Shingles, Richard. 1981. “Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing
Link.” American Political Science Review 75:76–79.

Simien, Evelyn M. 2006. Black Feminist Voices in Politics. Albany, NY: State University
New York Press.
Stokes-Brown, Atiya Kai. 2003. “Latino Group Consciousness and Political
Participation.” American Politics Research 31(4): 361–78.

215

Stout, Christopher T., Kelsy Kretschmer, and Leah Ruppanner. 2017. “Gender Linked
Fate, Race/Ethnicity, and the Marriage Gap in American Politics.” Political
Research Quarterly 70(3): 509–22.

Tate, Katherine. 1993. From Protest to Politics: The New Black Politics in American
Elections. New York, NY: Russell Sage Found.
Theocharis, Yannis, and Ellen Quintelier. 2016. “Stimulating Citizenship or Expanding
Entertainment? The Effect of Facebook on Adolescent Participation.” New Media
& Society 18(5): 817–36.
Tolbert, Carole and R. McNeal. 2003. “Unraveling the effects of the internet on political
participation?” Political Research Quarterly 56(2): 175–185.

Tutz, Gerhard. 2012. Regression for Categorical Data. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Twenge, Jean M. 2006. Generation Me: Why Today’s Young Americans Are More
Confident, Assertive, Entitled--and More Miserable than Ever Before. New York:
Free Press.
Ulbig, Stacy G., and Tamara Waggener. 2011. “Getting Registered and Getting to the
Polls: The Impact of Voter Registration Strategy and Information Provision on
Turnout of College Students.” PS: Political Science & Politics 44(03): 544–51.
Uhlaner, Carole. 1991. “Perceived Discrimination and Prejudice and the Coalition
Prospects of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans.” In Racial and Ethnic
Politics in California, eds. Bryan O. Jackson and Michael B. Preston, 339-371.
Berkeley, CA: IGS Press
Uhlaner, Carole. 1989. “Rational Goods and Participation: Incorporating Sociability into
a Theory of Rational Action.” Public Choice 62: 253-285.
Uhlaner, Carole J., Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. “Political
Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s.” Political Behavior 11(3): 195–
231.

216

Wielhouwer, Peter W., and Brad Lockerbie. 1994. “Party Contacting and Political
Participation, 1952-90.” American Journal of Political Science 38(1): 211–29.
Valdez, Zulema. 2011. “Political Participation Among Latinos in the United States: The
Effect of Group Identity and Consciousness.” Social Science Quarterly 92(2):
466–82.
Valenzuela, Ali A., and Melissa R. Michelson. 2016. “Turnout, Status, and Identity:
Mobilizing Latinos to Vote with Group Appeals.” American Political Science
Review 110(4): 615–30.
Vargas, Edward D., Gabriel R. Sanchez, and Juan A. Valdez. 2017. “Immigration
Policies and Group Identity: How Immigrant Laws Affect Linked Fate among
U.S. Latino Populations.” The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics 2(01): 35–
62.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality:
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.

Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America. New York: Harper
& Row.

Verba, Sidney., Norma H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1978. Participation and political
equality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
White, Ariel. 2016. “When Threat Mobilizes: Immigration Enforcement and Latino Voter
Turnout.” Political Behavior 38(2): 355–82.

Winograd, Morley., and Michael D. Hais. 2011. Millennial Momentum: How a New
Generation Is Remaking America. California. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press.

Winograd, Morley., and Michael D. Hais. 2008. Millennal Makeover: MySpace,
YouTube, & the Future of American Politics. Piscataway: Rutgers University
Press.

217

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.

Wong, Janelle., Karthick S. Ramakrishnan, Taeku T. Lee, and Jane Junn. 2011. Asian
American Political Participation. New York, NY: Russel Sage Foundation.
Wong, Janelle. 2006. Democracy’s Promise: Immigrants and American Civic
Institutions. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Xenos, Micahel, and Patricia Moy. 2007. “Direct and Differential Effects of the Internet
on Political and Civic Engagement.” Journal of Communication 57(4): 704–718.

Zepeda-Millán, Chris. 2017. Latino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization, and
Activism. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

218

